Updated July 2011
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TAX DIVISION
SUMMONS
ENFORCEMENT
MANUAL
An Introduction
Co-Authors:
Frank P. Cihlar
Rachel D. Cramer
Frank de Leon
Deborah S. Meland
Ann Carroll Reid
Norma J. Schrock
Updated by Robert W. Metzler (July 2011)
Updated July 2011
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION. ............................................1
II. LAW. ......................................................2
A. IRS SUMMONS AUTHORITY...............................2
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A SUMMONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1. Burdens of production and persuasion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Requirements for a valid summons.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
a. The Supreme Court’s Powell requirements.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
(1) The summons was issued for a legitimate purpose.. . . 5
(2) The summoned information may be relevant. . . . . . . . 6
(3) The summoned information is not already in the
possession of the IRS............................8
(4) The summons meets all administrative requirements
. ...........................................10
b. No “Justice Department referral” is in effect - § 7602(d)
................................................12
c. Requirements to summon certain subject matters. . . . . . . 14
(1) Cable Communications Policy Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
(2) Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA).....................................15
(3) Tax accrual workpapers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. Enforcement actions...................................17
a. No conditional enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
b. Withdrawal and reissuance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
c. Effect of taxpayer appeal. ..........................19
(1) Order is enforceable unless stayed.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
(2) Compliance does not moot an appeal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
c. Remedies for failure to obey enforcement order. . . . . . . . . 23
(1) Coercive Fines................................25
(2) Coercive Imprisonment.........................25
(3) Compensatory Fines...........................27
4. Petitions to quash third-party summons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
a. Requirements. ...................................28
b. Seeking Enforcement..............................30
c. Defective Petitions. ...............................30
C. RESPONSES TO FREQUENT OBJECTIONS AND ARGUMENTS
........................................................31
1. IRS failed to follow administrative requirements. . . . . . . . . . . 31
a. Challenges to the issuance of the summons. . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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b. Challenges to service of the summons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
c. Challenges to the adequacy of the notice of the summons
................................................33
d. Other Arguments. ................................35
2. The summons seeks information that the summoned party has a
legal duty not to reveal.................................35
a. Attorney-client privilege............................36
(1) Elements of the attorney-client privilege.. . . . . . . . . . 36
(2) Express Waiver...............................40
(3) Implied Waiver. ..............................40
(4) Selective Waiver. .............................41
(5) Inadvertent Waiver............................42
(6) Crime-Fraud Exception.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
b. Tax Practitioner privilege.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
c. Work product.....................................48
3. Overly broad, vague, or burdensome.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4. First Amendment privilege.............................53
5. Fourth Amendment privilege. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6. Fifth Amendment privilege.............................57
a. Act of Production..................................58
b. Collective entity doctrine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
c. Required records exception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7. Non-possession.......................................61
8. Improper purpose or institutional bad faith. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9. Criminal referral. ....................................65
10. Intervening events....................................65
D. SPECIALTY SUMMONSES................................66
1. John Doe summonses..................................66
2. Summons for records from a church (I.R.C. § 7611).. . . . . . . . . 67
3. Summons for computer software (I.R.C. § 7612). . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4. Summons pursuant to Tax Treaty and Tax Information
Exchange............................................70
5. Designated summonses (I.R.C. § 6503(j)). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6. Summonses to entities located in the United States for records
located abroad (Bank of Nova Scotia summonses). . . . . . . . . . . 74
7. Formal document requests. ............................75
III. PROCEDURES.............................................77
A. PETITION TO ENFORCE. ................................77
1. Which office should file. ...............................77
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2. Approvals. ..........................................78
3. Documents to File.....................................79
4 . Service of order to show cause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5. Monitoring compliance.................................80
6. Contempt procedures..................................81
B. RESPONDING TO PETITIONS TO QUASH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
C. DISCOVERY AND EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
1. Limitations on discovery. ..............................82
2. Evidentiary Hearings..................................84
D. THE ROLE OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
E. “JOHN DOE” SUMMONS PROCEDURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
F. APPEAL PROCEDURES. .................................86
IV. FORMS
A. CHECKLIST. ..................................... Exhibit 1
B. ENFORCEMENT
1. Petition to Enforce.............................. Exhibit 2
2. Declaration in Support of Petition to Enforce.. . . . . . . . Exhibit 3
3. Show Cause Order.............................. Exhibit 4
4. Certificate of Service. ........................... Exhibit 5
C. PETITIONS TO QUASH
1. Motions to Dismiss.............................. Exhibit 6
2. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. . . . . . . Exhibit 7
3. Order of Dismissal.............................. Exhibit 8
D. JOHN DOE SUMMONS
1.Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe” Summons. . . . .
.............................................. Exhibit 9
2. Declaration in Support of Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe”
Summons .................................... Exhibit 10
3. Memorandum in Support of Petition for Leave to Serve “John
Doe” Summons................................ Exhibit 11
4. Order........................................ Exhibit 12
5. Notice of Filing Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe”
Summons..................................... Exhibit 13
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: PAGE(S)
2121 Arlington Heights Corp. v. IRS,
109 F.3d 1221 (7th Cir. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 79
Acierno v. New Castle County,
40 F.3d 645 (3d Cir. 1994)............................. 2 1
Alford v. United States, 90 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2002-7034
(N.D. Tex. 2002). .................................... 3 5
Alldread v. City of Grenada,
988 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42-43
Alphin v. United States,
809 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 84
America Wrecking Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor,
364 F.3d 321 (D.C. Cir. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7
Application of the United States of America for an Order
Directed to Cablevision System Corp., In re
158 F. Supp.2d 644 (D. Md. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5
Bank of Moulton,
614 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4
Barquero v. United States,
18 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 70-71
Beck v. United States,
91 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2003-1345
(6th Cir. 2003).............................. 30, Ex. 7 at 5
Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85 (1974). .................................. 5 9
Berman v. United States,
264 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2001)........................... 3, 28
Bilodeau v. United States,
577 F. Supp. 234 (N.H. 1983)............................ 4
Bionic Automobile Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner,
721 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1
Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886 (1984). ................................. 2 7
Bob Jones University v. Simon,
416 U.S. 725 (1974). ................................. 2 2
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969). ................................. 5 4
Braswell v. United States,
487 U.S. 99 (1988). .................................. 5 9
Brohman v. United States,
587 F. Supp. 62 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 4
Canaday v. United States,
354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966). .......................... 3 7
Carter v. Gibbs,
909 F.2d 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0
Catena v. Seidl,
343 A.2d 744 (N.J. 1975). ............................. 2 6
Cavallaro v. United States,
284 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2002)............................ 3 7
Chadwick v. Janecka,
312 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2002)............................ 2 6
Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo,
174 F.3d 394 (4th Cir. 1999). .......................... 3 8
Chen Chi Wang v. United States,
757 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2
Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co.,
974 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 40
Chicago Truck Drivers v. Brotherhood Labor Leasing,
207 F.3d 500 (8th Cir. 2000). .......................... 2 3
Chris-Marine USA, Inc. v. United States,
892 F. Supp. 1437 (M.D. Fla. 1995).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6
Church of Scientology v. United States,
506 U.S. 9 (1992)................................ 21-22, 66
City of Jackson,
359 F.3d 727 (5th Cir. 2004). .......................... 2 7
Clady v. County of Los Angeles,
770 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0
Clark v. United States,
289 U.S. 1 (1933)..................................... 4 4
Clarke v. America Commerce National Bank,
974 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1992). .......................... 3 8
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Codner v. United States,
17 F.3d 1331 (10th Cir. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 12, 34-35
Coleman v. America Broadcast Cos.,
106 F.R.D. 201 (D.D.C. 1985).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6
Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. B.B. Andersen
Constr. Co.,
879 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5
Colton v. United States,
306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36, 37, 38
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., In re
293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002). .......................... 4 2
Commissioner v. Hayes,
631 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Cal. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3
Commodities Future Trading Comm’ n v. Armstrong,
284 F.3d 404 (2d Cir. 2002)............................ 2 6
Commodities Future Trading Comm’ n v. Weintraub,
471 U.S. 343 (1985). ................................. 4 0
Connolly v. J.T. Ventures,
851 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1988). .......................... 2 7
Conrad v. United States,
1989 WL 165576 (W.D. Mich. Nov 09, 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1
Cook v. United States,
104 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 18, 34
Copp v. United States,
968 F.2d 1435 (1st Cir. 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4
Cosme v. Internal Revenue Service,
708 F. Supp. 45 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81-82
Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322 (1973). .................... 37, 46, Ex. 11 at 4
Crededio, In re
759 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1985). .......................... 2 6
Crystal v. United States,
172 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1999). .......................... 4
Culinary Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp.,
150 F.R.D. 122 (N.D. Ill. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Cypress Funds, Inc. v. United States,
234 F.3d 1267 (6th Cir. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6
Dame v. United States,
643 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9
Darland v. United States,
921 F. Supp. 316 (D. Md. 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5
David H. Tedder & Associates v. United States,
77 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1996). ........................... 8
DeGroote v. United States,
57 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1373 (W.D.N.Y. 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6
Deal v. United States,
759 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, Ex. 7 at 5
Deleeuw v. I.R.S.,
681 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Mich. 1987).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2
Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.,
128 F.3d 1122 (7th Cir. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42-43
Diversified Industrial, Inc. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). .......................... 4 1
Doe v. KPMG, LLP, 325 F. Supp. 2d 746 (N.D. Tex. 2004),
rev’d on other grounds,
398 F.3d 686 (5th Cir. 2005). .......................... 4 8
Doe v. Wachovia Corp.,
268 F. Supp. 2d 627 (W.D.N.C. 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8
Does, In re
671 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1982). .......................... 6 6
Donaldson v. United States,
400 U.S. 517 (1971). .............................. 57, 65
Dorsey v. United States,
618 F. Supp. 471 (D. Md. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 6
Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761 (1993). ................................. 5 4
Eulich v. United States,
74 Fed. Appx. 373, 374 (5th Cir. 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6
F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 3
Faber v. United States,
69 F. Supp. 2d 965 (W.D. Mich. 1999).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Faber v. United States,
921 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, Ex. 7 at 3
Feltner v. Title Search Co.,
283 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2002). .......................... 2 5
Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976). ......................36, 37, 39, 56-59
Flournoy v. Marshall,
842 F.2d 875 (6th Cir. 1988). .......................... 8 5
Fogelson v. United States,
579 F. Supp. 573 (D. Kan. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 6
Fortney v. United States,
59 F.3d 117 (9th Cir. 1995). . . . . . . . 4, 12, 29, 34, 84, Ex. 7 at 5
Fowler v. Jones,
899 F.2d 1088 (11th Cir. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5
Fraizer v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
161 F.R.D. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1
G-I Holdings Inc., In re
218 F.R.D. 428 (D.N.J. 2003)........................... 3 9
Garden State Nat’l Bank,
607 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1979).............................. 4
Garpeg, Ltd. v. United States,
583 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5
General Signal Corp. v. Donallco, Inc.,
787 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6
Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int’l
Trade Comm.,
122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40, 42
Gillings v. United States,
95 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2005-1014 (9th Cir. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9
Godwin v. United States,
564 F. Supp. 1209 (D. Del. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 2
Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co.,
132 F.R.D. 204 (N.D. Ind. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis,
412 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Grand Jury Investigation, In re,
842 F.2d 1223 (11th Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4
Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), In re,
600 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1979)............................ 2 5
Grand Jury Proceedings, In re,
87 F.3d 377 (9th Cir. 1996). ......................... 44-45
Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), In re,
183 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 1991)............................. 4 4
Grand Jury Proceedings, In re,
517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975). .......................... 3 8
Grand Jury Proceedings, In re,
601 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1979). .......................... 6 0
Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia), In re,
691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4
Grand Jury Proceedings, In re,
727 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 42
Grand Jury Proceedings, In re,
771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1985). .......................... 5 9
Grand Jury Subpoena, In re,
21 F.3d 226 (8th Cir. 1994). ........................... 5 9
Grand Jury Subpoena, In re,
357 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2004). .......................... 4 9
Grand Jury Subpoena, In re,
831 F.2d 225 (11th Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7
Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, In re,
957 F.2d 807 (11th Cir. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
Dated June 13,
1983 & June 22,
1983, In re, 722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 0
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served
upon Underhill, In re,
781 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1986). ........................... 6 0
Grand Jury Witness, In re,
695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982). .......................... 3 8
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Grisham v. United States,
578 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 4
Grosso v. United States,
390 U.S. 62 (1968). .................................. 6 0
Harris, In re,
221 U.S. 274 (1911). ................................. 5 9
Hart v. United States,
817 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 7
Hartman v. United States,
76 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 7856 (M.D. Fla. 1995).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9
Hearn v. Rhay,
68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0
Hebert v. Exxon Corp.,
953 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-20
Herman v. Galvin,
40 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D. Mass. 1999).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 0
Hertz v. Woodman,
218 U.S. 205 (1910). ................................. 1 8
Hintze v. IRS,
879 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1989) ........................ 13, 84
Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479 (1951). ................................. 5 7
Holifield v. United States,
677 F. Supp. 996 (E.D. Wis. 1987).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4
Holifield v. United States,
909 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 35
Feldberg, In re
862 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1988). .......................... 4 5
Int’l Bus. Enters. v. United States,
75 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 95-2237 (S.D. Cal. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4
Int’l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp.,
120 F.R.D. 445 (D. Mass. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1
Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell,
512 U.S. 821 (1994). .............................. 23, 25
Irwin v. Dep’t. of Veterans Affairs,
498 U.S. 89 (1990). .................................. 2 8
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Jungles v. United States,
634 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ill. 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2
Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441 (1972). ................................. 5 7
Kearns v. United States,
580 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Ohio 1983).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9
Khan v. United States,
548 F.3d 549 (7th Cir. 2008). .......................... 1 2
Kish v. United States,
77 A.F.T.R.2d 96-1305,
1996 WL 196730 (W.D.Mich. 1996).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 7
Knauss v. United States,
28 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (S.D. Fla. 1998).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2
Kondik v. United States,
81 F.3d 655 (6th Cir. 1996). ........................... 3 4
Lambert v. Montana,
545 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1976). ......................... 25-26
Lawrence, In re,
279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6
Lefcourt v. United States,
125 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1997)............................. 3 8
Lehman v. Nakshian,
453 U.S. 156 (1981). ........................... Ex. 7 at 3
Liberty Fin. Services v. United States,
778 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1985). .......................... 4
Lindsey, In re,
158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7
Linn v. Chivatero,
714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6
Lois Sportswear, USA, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
104 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3
Lonsdale v. United States,
919 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3
Lujan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2000-365,
2000 WL 1772503 (2000)....................... Ex. 11 at 2
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Mackenzie v. United States,
84 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6725 (E.D. Cal. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8
Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.,
538 U.S. 600 (2003). ................................. 5 5
Madison v. United States,
758 F.2d 573 (11th Cir. 1985). .......................... 2
Maggio v. Zeitz,
333 U.S. 56 (1948). .................................. 2 4
Malone v. Humphrey,
237 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1956). ........................... 1 9
Malone v. United States,
77 A.F.T.R. 2d (RIA) 1157 (M.D. Ga 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9
Martin Marietta Corp., In re,
856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988). .......................... 4 2
Martin-Trigona, In re,
590 F. Supp. 87 (D. Conn. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6
Masat v. United States,
745 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30, Ex. 7 at 5
Mason v. Pulliam,
557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977). .......................... 5 6
Mazurek v. United States,
271 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 2001). .......................... 7 0
McClary v. Walsh,
202 F.R.D. 286 (N.D. Ala. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7
McGarry’s, Inc. v. Rose,
344 F.2d 416 (1st Cir. 1965)............................ 5 7
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,
514 U.S. 334 (1995). ................................. 5 3
McPhaul v. United States,
364 U.S. 372 (1960). ................................. 2 4
McTaggart v. United States,
570 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Mich. 1983).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 6-7
Mills v. Green,
159 U.S. 651 (1895). ................................. 2 2
Mimick v. United States,
952 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 31, 35
Updated July 2011
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Mollison v. United States,
568 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9
Morgan v. United States,
380 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1967). .......................... 3 7
Morrison v. California,
291 U.S. 82 (1934). .................................. 2 4
Morton v. Beyer,
822 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1987)............................ 2 1
Multistate Tax Commission v. United States Steel Corp.,
659 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1981). .......................... 2 0
Nat’l Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. United States,
843 F. Supp. 655 (D. Colo. 1993),
aff’d by unpublished opinion,
42 F.3d 1406 (10th Cir. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54-55
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union,
447 U.S. 607 (1980). ................................. 5 5
Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents,
855 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1988)........................... 2 7
Nat’l Soc’y. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978). ................................. 5 5
Nero Trading, LLC v. U.S. Department of Treasury,
I.R.S., 570 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2009).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3
Nevitt, In re
117 F. 448 (8th Cir. 1902). ............................ 2 5
Newton, In re
718 F.2d 1015 (11th Cir. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Nken v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___,
129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009). ............................ 20, 21
O’Connor v. Midwest Pipe Fabrications, Inc.,
972 F.2d 1204 (10th Cir. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,
436 U.S. 447 (1978). .............................. 54, 55
Okla. Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186 (1946). .............................. 52, 56
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xiv
Cases (continued): Page(s)
Oldham v. United States,
89 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2002-2095
(D. Or. 2002)............................... 30, Ex. 7 at 5
PAA Mgmt., Ltd. v. United States,
962 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 64-65, 84
Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 94 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA)
5953 (W.D. Wash. 2004)............................... 1 9
Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co.,
918 F. Supp. 491 (D.N.H. 1996).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1
Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Group,
Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46 (M.D.N.C. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1
Parmalat Securities Litigation, In re
594 F. Supp.2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4
Peretz v. United States,
501 U.S. 923 (1991). ................................. 8 5
Permian Corp. v. United States ,
665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2
Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D.
455 (N.D. Cal. 1978).................................. 4 1
Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc.,
140 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3
Pintel v. United States, 74 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5105
(C.D. Cal. 1994)...................................... 1 9
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n. on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376 (1973). ................................. 5 5
Pollock v. United States,
202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1953). .......................... 3 7
Ponsford v. United States,
771 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, Ex. 7 at 3
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Turner & Newall, PLC,
137 F.R.D. 178 (D. Mass. 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1
Regions Finance Corp. v. United States,
2008 WL 2139008 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1
Reiserer v. United States,
479 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2007). .......................... 8
Updated July 2011
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Reisman v. Caplin,
375 U.S. 440 (1964). ............................ 3, 18, 85
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast. Constr. Co.,
159 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co.,
32 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1994)............................. 4 0
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc.,
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). .......................... 5 6
Richard A. Vaughn, DDS, P.C. v. Baldwin,
950 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1991). .......................... 5 6
Rigby, In re,
199 B.R. 358 (E.D. Tex. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5
Riggs v. United States,
575 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Ill. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 4
Rivera v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
53 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4
Robert v. United States,
364 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 64, 82
Rock Island A. & L.R. Co. v. United States,
254 U.S. 141 (1920). ........................... Ex. 7 at 3
SEC v. McGoff,
647 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3
Scharringhausen v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA)
2003-651 (S.D. Cal. 2003).............................. 3 0
Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Services,
73 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1995). ........................... 2 7
Scotty’s Contracting & Stone, Inc. v. United States,
326 F.3d 785 (6th Cir. 2003).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5, 13, 47
Sealed Case, In re,
877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 42
Sedco Int’l, S.A. v. Cory,
683 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36-37
Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1 (1948)..................................... 6 0
Shillitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364 (1966). ................................. 2 3
Updated July 2011
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Shipley v. United States,
74 A.F.T.R.2d 94-7713 (E.D. Cal. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 4
Simkin v. United States,
715 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983).......................... 25, 26
Soriano v. United States,
352 U.S. 270 (1957). ........................... Ex. 7 at 3
Sound Video Unlimited, Inc. v. Video Shack, Inc., 661 F. Supp.
1482 (N.D. Ill. 1987).................................. 4 4
Spearbeck v. United States,
846 F. Supp. 47 (W.D. Wash. 1993).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6
Spell v. United States,
907 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1990). ........................ 10, 53
Standard Chartered Bank, PLC v. Ayala Int’l Holding, Inc., 111
F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). .......................... 40-41
Steinhardt Partners, In re,
LP, 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993)........................... 4 2
Stringer v. United States,
776 F.2d 274 (11th Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, Ex. 7 at 2-3
Sugarloaf Funding, LLC v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury,
584 F.3d 340 (1st Cir. 2009).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 10, 64, 81
Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
524 U.S. 399 (1998). ............................... 39-40
Sylvestre v. United States,
978 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 18, 34
Tarplay v. United States, 86 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA)
2000-5833 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)........................... 34-35
Tarpley v. United States,
1997 WL 767577 (S.D.N.Y. Dec 11, 1997).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1
Tax Liabilities of John Does v. United States, In re
866 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52-53
Teltron, Inc. v. Alexander,
132 F.R.D. 394 (E.D. Pa. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6
Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989). ................................. 5 3
Thompson v. United States,
99 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2007-1461 (D. Minn. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . 1 9
Updated July 2011
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum
Dated Jan. 29, In re,
1999, 191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9
Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States,
469 U.S. 310 (1985). .......................... 3, 6, 82, 84
Trader’s State Bank,
695 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3
Tuke v. United States,
76 F.3d 155 (7th Cir. 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 8
Turner, In re
309 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1962)............................. 2 0
Uhrig v. United States,
592 F. Supp. 349 (D. Md. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 6
United States v. Abrahams,
905 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Jose,
131 F.3d 1325,
1329 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). . . . . . . . . . . . 7,18, 38, 52, 56, 83
United States v. Ackert,
169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999)......................... 37, 39
United States v. Adlman,
134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998)........................... 4 8
United States v. Admin. Co.,
74 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 94-5256 (N.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d,
46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1995). ........................... 6 5
United States v. Admin. Enterprises, Inc.,
46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1995). ........................ 35, 65
United States v. Allee,
888 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1989)............................ 5 8
United States v. Argomaniz,
925 F.2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8
United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
465 U.S. 805 (1984). . . . . . . 2, 6, 17-18, 21, 32, 47, 50, Ex. 7 at 2
United States v. Asay,
614 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1980). .......................... 6 1
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
United States v. BDO Seidman,
337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38, 47, 84
United States v. Baggot,
463 U.S. 476 (1983). ................................. 4 9
United States v. Balanced Fin. Mgmt., Inc.,
769 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4, 84
United States v. Ballard,
779 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1986). .......................... 4 5
United States v. Bank of Moulton,
614 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 32, 34
United States v. Barrett,
837 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 17, 64, 84
United States v. Barrier Indus., Inc.,
1997 WL 16668 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
United States v. Barter Syst., Inc.,
694 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1982). ........................... 3
United States v. Beacon Federal Savings & Loan,
718 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1983)............................. 5 7
United States v. Becker,
259 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1958)............................. 3
United States v. Berg,
20 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 1994). ........................ 13, 27
United States v. Bergonzi,
403 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2
United States v. Berney,
713 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3
United States v. Bichara,
826 F.2d 1037 (11th Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 33
United States v. Big D Enterprises, Inc.,
184 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1999). .......................... 2 7
United States v. Bilzerian
926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991)......................... 40-41
United States v. Bisceglia,
420 U.S. 141 (1975). .................. 2, 18, 66, Ex. 11 at 4
United States v. Blackman,
72 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995). .......................... 3 8
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
United States v. Bohonnon,
628 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Conn.), aff’d without
opinion, 795 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1
United States v. Brigham Young University,
679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982), rev’d on other ground,
459 U.S. 1095 (1983). ...................... 67, Ex. 11 at 6
United States v. Brockamp,
519 U.S. 347 (1997). ................................. 2 8
United States v. Brown,
918 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1990). ........................... 2 3
United States v. C.E. Hobbs Found. for Religious Training
& Educ., Inc.,
7 F.3d 169 (9th Cir. 1993). ............................ 6 8
United States v. Caltex Petroleum Corp.,
12 F. Supp. 2d 545 (N.D. Tex. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8
United States v. Cecil E. Lucas General Contractor, Inc.,
406 F. Supp. 1267 (D.S.C. 1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4
United States v. Church of Scientology,
520 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1975). .......................... 8 3
United States v. Church of Scientology of Boston, Inc.,
933 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1991).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8
United States v. Church of Scientology Western U.S.,
973 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1992). .......................... 6 8
United States v. Citizens State Bank,
612 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3
United States v. City of Jackson,
359 F.3d 727 (5th Cir. 2004). .......................... 2 7
United States v. Claes,
747 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1984). .......................... 2 1
United States v. Clement,
668 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 83
United States v. Comm. Fed’l. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
661 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52, 64
United States v. Cox Cable Communications,
81 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2011 (N.D. Fla. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5
Updated July 2011
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
United States v. Crum,
288 F.3d 332 (7th Cir. 2002). .......................... 3 3
United States v. Daffin,
653 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1981). .......................... 1 0
United States v. Darwin Constr. Co.,
873 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 61
United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co.,
385 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1967).......................... 7, 52
United States v. Davey,
543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976)............................. 9
United States v. Davis,
636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1981). .......................... 9
United States v. Deak-Perera & Co.,
566 F. Supp. 1398 (D.D.C. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4
United States v. Deloitte LLP,
610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1
United States v. Derr,
968 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32-33, 72-73
United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605 (1984). ................................. 5 8
United States v. Drollinger,
80 F.3d 389 (9th Cir. 1996). ......................... 62-63
United States v. Drollinger,
80 F.3d 389 (9th Cir. 1996). ........................... 5 8
United States v. El Paso,
682 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1982). .......................... 5 1
United States v. El Paso Co.,
682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982). .......................... 1 7
United States v. El Paso Co.,
682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 17, 36, 51
United States v. Estate Preservation Services,
202 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4
United States v. Euge,
444 U.S. 707 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, Ex. 7at 2, Ex. 11 at 4
United States v. Evans,
113 F.3d 1457 (7th Cir. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6
Updated July 2011
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
United States v. First Family Mortgage Corp.,
739 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8
United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta,
628 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1980). .......................... 8 5
United States v. First Nat’l State Bank of N.J.,
540 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1976)............................ 1 8
United States v. First Nat’l State Bank,
616 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1980)............................. 9
United States v. Fox,
721 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1983)............................. 5 8
United States v. Frederick,
182 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36, 46, 51
United States v. Freedom Church,
613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 61
United States v. Garden State Nat’l Bank,
607 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1979)........................... 4, 63
United States v. Garrett,
571 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0
United States v. Gilleran,
992 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 79
United States v. Giordano,
419 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 52
United States v. Goldman,
637 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1980). ........................... 6
United States v. Graber,
81 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 98-429 (8th Cir. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1
United States v. Hamilton Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
566 F. Supp. 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33-34
United States v. Harris,
628 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83-84
United States v. Hatchett,
862 F.2d 1249 (6th Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8
United States v. Hayes,
722 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-24
United States v. Hefti,
879 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1989). .......................... 2 5
Updated July 2011
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
United States v. Heubusch,
295 F. Supp. 2d 240 (W.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated
and remanded on other grounds,
123 Fed. Appx. 21 (2d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7
United States v. Howard,
360 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1966)............................ 3 3
United States v. Hubbell,
530 U.S. 27 (2000). .................................. 5 8
United States v. Huckaby,
776 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1985). .......................... 6 1
United States v. Ins. Consultants of Knox, Inc.,
187 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 1999). .......................... 3 3
United States v. Jacobs,
117 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997)........................... 44-45
United States v. Jillson,
84 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 99-7115 (S.D. Fla. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2
United States v. John G. Mutschler & Assocs., Inc.,
734 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1984). ........................... 9
United States v. Jones,
581 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5
United States v. Jones,
696 F.2d 1069 (4th Cir. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1
United States v. Jose,
131 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 14, 17-18, 64
United States v. Judicial Watch, Inc.,
371 F.3d 824 (D.C. Cir. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52-53, 56, 83
United States v. KPMG, LLP,
237 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8
United States v. Kaun,
827 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6
United States v. Kersting,
891 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 66, Ex. 11 at 6
United States v. Kis,
658 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 64, 82-84
United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961)............................ 3 7
Updated July 2011
xxiii
Cases (continued): Page(s)
United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank,
437 U.S. 298 (1978). ....................... 2, 5, 12, 14, 63
United States v. Ladd,
471 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Tex. 1979).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3
United States v. Lang,
792 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0
United States v. Lask,
703 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1983). .......................... 8 3
United States v. Lawless,
709 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38-39
United States v. Lawn Builders of New England, Inc.,
856 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1988) ......................... 61-62
United States v. Lenon,
579 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1978). .......................... 1 0
United States v. Leventhal,
961 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8
United States v. Liddell,
327 Fed. Appx. 721 (9th Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4
United States v. Linsteadt,
724 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 52
United States v. Lippitt,
180 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1999). .......................... 2 6
United States v. Lipshy,
492 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Tex. 1979).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8
United States v. Living Word Christian Ctr.,
2009 WL 250049103
A.F.T.R.2d 2009-714.................................. 6 8
United States v. Luther,
481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 52
United States v. MIT,
129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40, 42
United States v. Malnik,
489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974). .......................... 5 8
United States v. Marquardo,
149 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1998)............................. 2 5
Updated July 2011
xxiv
Cases (continued): Page(s)
United States v. Matras,
487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973). .......................... 7
United States v. McAnlis,
721 F.2d 334 (11th Cir. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56, Ex. 7 at 6
United States v. McCarthy,
514 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1975)......................... 80, 83
United States v. McCoy,
954 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 84
United States v. Medlin,
986 F.2d 463 (11th Cir. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2
United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976). .............................. 56, 79
United States v. Millman,
822 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1987)............................ 6 3
United States v. Millstone Enters., Inc.,
864 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1988)............................. 6 5
United States v. Mimick,
952 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12, 31, 35
United States v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.,
440 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2006). .......................... 8-9
United States v. Morgan,
761 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 13
United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632 (1950). ............................... 5, 56
United States v. Mueller,
930 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1991). ........................... 8 4
United States v. Nat’l Bank of S.D.,
622 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52, 84
United States v. Nobles,
422 U.S. 225 (1975). ................................. 5 0
United States v. Nordbrock,
65 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 660 (D. Ariz. 1990), rev’d
on other grounds 941 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1
United States v. Norwest Corp.,
116 F.3d 1227 (8th Cir. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 68, 82
Updated July 2011
xxv
Cases (continued): Page(s)
United States v. Norwood,
420 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2005). .......................... 5 9
United States v. Payne,
648 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1981). .......................... 3 2
United States v. Pittman,
82 F.3d 152 (7th Cir. 1996). ........................... 1 3
United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc.,
644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66, Ex. 11 at 5
United States v. Popkin,
623 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1980). .......................... 1 0
United States v. Porter,
711 F.2d 1397 (7th Cir. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1
United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48 (1964). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5, 31, 36, 56, Ex. 2 at 3
United States v. Privitera,
75 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1266 (9th Cir. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0
United States v. Rakes,
136 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998).............................. 4 4
United States v. Raymond,
228 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54, 56
United States v. Reeder,
170 F.3d 93 (1st Cir. 1999)............................. 4 4
United States v. Reis,
765 F.2d 1094 (11th Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2
United States v. Riewe,
676 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3
United States v. Ritchie,
15 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38, Ex. 11 at 5
United States v. Rizzo,
539 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1976). .......................... 6 3
United States v. Roberts,
858 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 62-63
United States v. Rockwell Int’l,
897 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3, 7, 17, 48
United States v. Roebuck,
81 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 598 (S.D. Iowa 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9
Updated July 2011
xxvi
Cases (continued): Page(s)
United States v. Roundtree,
420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969). .......................... 5 6
United States v. Rue,
819 F.2d 1488 (8th Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 59
United States v. Rylander,
460 U.S. 752 (1983). ............................ 24, 61-62
United States v. Salter,
432 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1970)............................ 8 3
United States v. Saunders,
951 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3
United States v. Schiff,
379 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2004). .......................... 5 4
United States v. Seetapun,
750 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1984). .......................... 2 4
United States v. Sorrells,
877 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62-63
United States v. Southwestern Bank & Trust Co.,
693 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3
United States v. Stone,
976 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1992). .......................... 5 9
United States v. Stuart,
489 U.S. 353 (1989). .......................2, 14, 70-71, 82
United States v. Stuckey,
646 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1
United States v. Teeple,
286 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9
United States v. Texas Heart Inst.,
755 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Barrett,
837 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 18
United States v. Textron, Inc.,
507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.R.I. 2007),
vacated on other grounds,
577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, __U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48, 50
Updated July 2011
xxvii
Cases (continued): Page(s)
United States v. Theodore,
479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973). ........................... 9
United States v. Three Crows Corp.,
324 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Me. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2
United States v. Toyota Motor Co.,
569 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3
United States v. Trader’s State Bank,
695 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3
United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 258 (1947). ................................. 2 5
United States v. Vetco Inc.,
691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981). ......................... 7 4
United States v. Wells,
929 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Ga. 1996).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7
United States v. White,
853 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1988).......................... 6, 56
United States v. Will,
671 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982). .......................... 8 2
United States v. Wills,
475 F. Supp. 492 (M.D. Fla. 1979).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 7
United States v. Wisnowski,
580 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1978). .......................... 8 5
United States v. Wyatt,
637 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1981). .......................... 5 2
United States v. Zolin,
491 U.S. 554 (1989). .............................. 17, 35
Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383 (1981). .........................35-37, 39, 50
Van Manen v. United States,
838 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. 1993)
aff’d, 23 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 1994).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489 (1982). ................................. 5 5
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). ............................. 5 4
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Cases (continued): Page(s)
Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2003). ................................. 5 4
von Bulow, In re,
828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987).......................... 39, 41
Walsh, In re,
623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980). .......................... 3 8
Weil v. Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt.,
647 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1981). ......................... 39-40
Westinghouse Elect. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines,
951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991)........................... 4 2
Wright v. United States, 964 F. Supp. 336 (M.D. Fla.),
aff’d without opinion, 132 F.3d 1461 (11th Cir. 1997). . . . . . . 3 3
Yocum v. United States,
586 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ind. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ex. 7 at 6
Yujuico v. United States,
818 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Cal. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6
Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm’n of Investigation,
406 U.S. 472 (1972). ................................. 5 7
Statutes:
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357,
§ 813, 118 Stat.1418, 1581............................. 4 7
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1001(a),
112 Stat. 685 (1998)............................ 12, 46, 67
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 333(a),
96 Stat. 324, 621-22.................................. 1 2
5 U.S.C.:
§ 552, et seq................................... Ex. 7 at 6
§ 552a, et seq.................................. Ex. 7 at 6
18 U.S.C.:
§ 401(3). ........................................... 2 3
Updated July 2011
xxix
Statutes (continued): Page(s)
26 U.S.C.:
§ 274(h)(6)(C)(I). .................................... 7 0
§ 982............................................. 75-76
§ 982(a). ......................................... 75-76
§ 982(b)(1).......................................... 7 6
§ 982(b)(2).......................................... 7 6
§ 982(c)(1). ......................................... 7 5
§ 982(c)(2). ......................................... 7 6
§ 982(d)(1).......................................... 7 5
§ 6103.......................................... 64, 69
§ 6103(a). ........................................... 9
§ 6503(j)............................................ 7 2
§ 6503 (j)(1)......................................... 7 2
§ 6503(j)(1)(A)(ii)..................................... 7 3
§ 6503 (j)(1)(B). ..................................... 7 3
§ 6503(j)(2)(A)(i)..................................... 7 2
§ 6503(j)(2)(A)(ii)..................................... 7 2
§ 6503(j)(2)(A)(iii).................................... 7 3
§ 6503(j)(3).......................................... 7 3
§ 7210............................................ 3, 25
§ 7402........................................ Ex. 2 at 3
§ 7402(b). ........................................... 3
§ 7503.............................................. 2 8
§ 7525...................................37, 46-48, 51, 77
§ 7525(a)(1)......................................... 4 6
§ 7525(a)(2)......................................... 4 7
§ 7525(a)(3)(A)....................................... 4 6
§ 7525(a)(3)(B)....................................... 4 6
§ 7601............................................... 2
§ 7602...................... 1, 2, 6, 9, 21, 32-33, 52, 63, 66,
Ex. 2 at 3-4, Ex. 7 at 2, Ex. 9 at 1, Ex. 10 at 1,
Ex. 11 at 3-4
§ 7602(a). .................................. 5, 16, 21, 32
§ 7602(b). ........................................ 5, 65
§ 7602(d)(2).......................................... 3
§ 7602(d)(2)(A). ..................................... 1 3
Updated July 2011
xxx
Statutes (continued): Page(s)
§ 7602(d)(3)......................................... 1 3
§ 7603............................... 11, 33, 34, Ex. 3 at 2
§ 7603(b)(1)......................................... 1 1
§ 7604(b). ......................................... 3, 9
§ 7605(b). ........................................... 9
§ 7609........................... 28, 29, 33, 34 Ex. 7 at 2-5
§ 7609(a)(1)...................................... 11, 18
§ 7609(b)(2)(C)....................................... 3 0
§ 7609(e). .......................................... 2 1
§ 7609(e)(2)...................................... 67, 74
§ 7609(f)..................................... 66, 85, 86,
Ex. 9 at 1, Ex. 1 at 1-4, Ex. 13 at 1
§ 7609(h)........................ 29, Ex. 9 at 1, Ex. 13 at 1
§ 7611.............................................. 6 7
§ 7611(h)(1)......................................... 6 7
§ 7612........................................... 68, 69
§ 7612(b)(2)......................................... 6 9
§ 7612(d)(2)(a)....................................... 6 9
§§ 7612(d)(2)(B) & (C)................................. 6 9
§ 7612(d)(3)(A). ..................................... 6 9
§ 7613............................................... 2
§ 7701(a)(11)(B). .................................... 3 2
§ 7701(a)(12)(A)(i).................................... 3 2
28 U.S.C.:
§ 636(b)(1)(a)........................................ 8 5
§§ 1340....................................... Ex. 2 at 3
§ 2412(d)(2)(A). ..................................... 2 7
47 U.S.C.:
§ 551............................................. 14-15
§ 551(a)(2)(A)........................................ 1 4
§ 551(c)(2)(B)........................................ 1 5
§ 551(h). ........................................... 1 5
Miscellaneous:
Announcement 2002-63, 2002-2 C.B. 72. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7
Updated July 2011
xxxi
Miscellaneous (continued): Page(s)
Chief Counsel Advisory, IRS CCA 200230034,
2002 WL 1730123.................................... 1 4
Deleg. Order Number 4 (Rev. 22),
1997 WL 33479254................................... 3 2
Fed. R. App. P.:
Rule 8............................................. 2 0
Rule 8(a)(1)......................................... 2 0
Rule 8(a)(2)(A)....................................... 2 0
Fed. R. Civ. P.:
Rule 4............................................... 7
Rule 4.1............................................ 8 0
Rule 4(b). .................................... Ex. 7 at 8
Rule 4(i)................................... 29, Ex. 7 at 7
Rule 4(i)(3).................................... Ex. 7 at 8
Rule 4(i)(3)(A)................................. Ex. 7 at 8
Rule 8........................................... 79, 86
Rule 12(b)(4).................................. Ex. 7 at 8
Rule 26(b)(3)..................................... 49, 50
Rule 26(b)(3)(A)...................................... 4 8
Rule 26(b)(3)(B)...................................... 4 8
Rule 62............................................. 2 0
Rule 62(d). ......................................... 1 9
Fed. R. Crim. P.:
Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(I)..................................... 4 9
Fed. R. Evid.:
Rule 502(b). ........................................ 4 3
Rule 502(c).......................................... 4 3
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-599, at 267 (1998),
reprinted in 1998-3 C.B. 755, 1023...................... 4 6
H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 79 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N 4655, 4716. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.8199-91, 68 Fed. Reg. 44905-01 (2003),
reprinted in 2003-2 C.B. 756. .......................... 7 3
S. Rep. No. 97-494, vol. 1,
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781 . . . . . . . . . . . . 82, Ex. 7 at 2
S. Rep. No. 98-67, at 28 (1984)............................. 1 4
Updated July 2011
xxxii
Miscellaneous (continued): Page(s)
S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 71 (1998),
reprinted in 1998-3 C.B. 537, 607....................... 4 7
Treas. Regulations (26 C.F.R.,):
§ 301.7602-1. ................................. Ex. 2 at 3
§ 301.7602-1(b)...................................... 3 2
§ 301.7609-4. ....................................... 2 8
§ 301.7609-4(b)(3).................................. 28- 30
§ 301.7611-1. ....................................... 6 7
§ 301.7611-IT. ...................................... 6 7
§ 301.7701-9(b)...................................... 3 2
§ 301.7701-9(c). ..................................... 3 2
45 C.F.R.:
§ 160.103........................................... 1 5
§ 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C).................................. 1 6
§ 164.514(b)......................................... 1 6
§ 164.514(b)(2)....................................... 1 6
8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law
§ 2292.............................................. 3 6
Updated July 2011
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) (26 U.S.C.) authorizes
the IRS to “examine any books, paper, records or other data” that may be
relevant to determine or collect the amount of tax, penalties, and interest
owed to the Government by any taxpayer. In the vast majority of
investigations, the taxpayer or third party voluntarily produces information
to the IRS. This may come in response to an IRS form known as an
Information Document Request (IDR), a letter from the Service, or just in the
course of a conversation between an IRS agent or officer and a taxpayer or
third party.
In the event the person who has the information refuses to provide it
voluntarily or if the Service for whatever reason decides not to make an
informal request and chooses to proceed more formally, Congress has given
the IRS the power to issue an administrative summons in order to compel a
taxpayer or a third party to produce the information – in the form of
documents or testimony or both – for use in its investigation. The summons
will describe the information requested and the investigation to which the
IRS thinks that information may be relevant. The summons will also specify
where and when the information must be produced. If the summoned party
does not comply, the IRS must decide whether it wishes to pursue the matter.
If it does, the Service must ask the Department of Justice to obtain a court
order enforcing the summons. If the court orders enforcement and the
summoned party still refuses to produce the summoned information, the
refusal may result in sanctions for civil or criminal contempt.
As an attorney for the Department of Justice, one of the most important
things for you to remember when you receive a summons enforcement case is
that the summoned information is important to an ongoing investigation.
Because the summons enforcement process, even when expedited, tends to be
time-consuming, it is unlikely that an agent or revenue officer would ask for
enforcement unless they really need the information to complete their work.
In most cases, the statute of limitations on making assessments, collecting
the taxes, or making a decision to bring a criminal case will still be running
while your summons enforcement case is pending. All of this means that for
summons enforcement to be a valuable tool, cases must be brought and
pursued on an expedited basis. It is our hope that the information in this
Manual will help you litigate the cases knowledgeably and expeditiously.
Updated July 2011
2
II. LAW
A. IRS SUMMONS AUTHORITY
The United States’ system of taxation relies on self-assessment and the
good faith and integrity of each taxpayer to disclose completely and honestly
all information relevant to his tax liability. Nonetheless, “it would be naive to
ignore the reality that some persons attempt to outwit the system.” United
States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975). Thus, Congress has charged the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with
the responsibility of administering and enforcing the Internal Revenue Code.
See I.R.C. §§ 7601 and 7602; Madison v. United States, 758 F.2d 573, 574
(11th Cir. 1985).
To this end, Section 7601 of the Code directs the Secretary to make
inquiries into the tax liability of every person who may be liable to pay any
internal revenue tax. Codner v. United States, 17 F.3d 1331, 1332 (10th Cir.
1994). In turn, Section 7602 authorizes the Secretary to examine books,
papers, records, or other data, to issue summonses, and to take testimony for
the purpose of: (1) “ascertaining the correctness of any return,” (2) “making a
return where none has been made,” (3) “determining the liability of any
person for any internal revenue tax . . . ,” (4) “collecting any such liability,” or
(5) “inquiring into any offense connected with the administration or
enforcement of the internal revenue laws.” See, e.g., United States v. Euge,
444 U.S. 707, 710-11 (1980); United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S.
298, 308 (1978); United States v. Rockwell Int’l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1261 (3d Cir.
1990).
The summons statutes, I.R.C. §§ 7602-7613, provide the IRS with an
investigative device that is to be interpreted broadly in favor of the IRS. See
Euge, 444 U.S. at 714-15 (holding that the language of § 7602 includes
authority to summons some physical evidence, and upholding a summons for
handwriting exemplars). Congress’s intent was to foster effective tax
investigations by giving the IRS expansive information-gathering authority.
See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984) (citing
Bisceglia, 420 U.S. at 146); United States v. Norwest Corp., 116 F.3d 1227,
1231-32 (8th Cir. 1997). Restrictions on the summons power are to be
avoided, absent unambiguous Congressional direction. See Arthur Young,
465 U.S. at 816; Euge, 444 U.S. at 715. See also United States v. Stuart, 489
U.S. 353, 364 (1989); Robert v. United States, 364 F.3d 988, 996 (8th Cir.
2004). The Supreme Court has cautioned against restricting the summons
A summoned party who willfully refuses to comply may also be prosecuted
1
under I.R.C. § 7210. See United States v. Becker, 259 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1958)
(affirming a conviction for violating Section 7210, where the defendant had willfully
and knowingly neglected to produce certain of the books and papers called for under
a summons issued by an IRS special agent); see also, Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S.
440, 446 (1964) (“any person summoned who ‘neglects to appear or to produce’ may
be prosecuted under § 7210”). Similarly, a summoned party who is wholly in
default or contumaciously refuses to comply may be subject to sanctions under
I.R.C. § 7604(b), including arrest and punishment for contempt. See Reisman, 375
U.S. at 448. Indeed, when a Section 7604(b) complaint is filed, “[i]f the taxpayer
has contumaciously refused to comply with the administrative summons and the
Service fears he may flee the jurisdiction, application for the sanctions available
under § 7604(b) might be made simultaneously with the filing of the complaint.”
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 n.18 (1964). But see Schulz v. IRS, 395
F.3d 463, clarified upon rehearing, 413 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2005) (without citing
or discussing Becker, holding that a summoned party cannot be held in contempt or
subjected to indictment under Section 7210 absent an enforcement order).
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3
authority absent express legislative direction. See Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v.
United States, 469 U.S. 310, 318 (1985); United States v. Barter Sys., Inc., 694
F.2d 163, 167 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Clement, 668 F.2d 1010, 1013
(8th Cir. 1982).
Once a summons is issued, however, it is not self-enforcing. If the person
to whom a summons is issued fails to comply, the Government must seek
judicial enforcement under I.R.C. §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a). These sections
1
confer authority upon the United States district courts to issue orders
compelling compliance with an Internal Revenue Service summons. Because
the enforcement of a summons invokes the process of the court, a court will
not enforce a summons if enforcement would constitute an abuse of that
process. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); Rockwell Int’l, 897
F.2d at 1261.
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A SUMMONS
The validity of an IRS summons may come before a district court in one
of two ways. First, because a summons is not self-enforcing, the Government
may bring an enforcement proceeding seeking a court order directing
compliance with the summons. (See Section II(B)(3).) Second, in the case of a
third-party summons, certain persons may be entitled to bring a proceeding
to quash the summons. (See Section II(B)(4).) Under no circumstance,
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4
however, is a summoned party entitled to bring a proceeding to quash the
summons. (Id.)
1. Burdens of production and persuasion
However a summons proceeding is initiated, the standard and burden of
proof is the same. In either case, the Government bears the ultimate burden
of persuasion. S. Rep. No. 97-494, vol. 1, at 283 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1029 (“[a]lthough an action to quash the summons must be
instituted by the taxpayer, the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to
its right to enforcement of the summons will remain on the Secretary, as
under current law”); see Crystal v. United States, 172 F.3d 1141, 1143-44 (9th
Cir. 1999) (stating that the Government must make the same showing
whether to “defeat a petition to quash, or to enforce a summons”).
The Government has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing
that the summons is valid. (See Section II(B)(2).) But the Government's
burden is “a slight one” that can be satisfied by a declaration from the
investigating agent. Crystal, 172 F.3d at 1144; United States v. Garden State
Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1979); Alphin v. United States, 809 F.2d
236, 238 (4th Cir. 1987); 2121 Arlington Heights Corp. v. IRS, 109 F.3d 1221,
1224 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Balanced Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 769 F.2d
1440, 1443 (10th Cir. 1985); In re Newton, 718 F.2d 1015, 1019 (11th Cir.
1983).
Once the Government makes its prima facie case, the opposing party has
a heavy burden to show that enforcement would be an “abuse of process.”
Fortney v. United States, 59 F.3d 117, 120 (9th Cir. 1995). To carry this
burden the challenger must show more than mere legal conclusions, and must
allege specific facts and evidence to support his allegations. Garden State
Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d at 68; Liberty Fin. Servs. v. United States, 778 F.2d
1390, 1393 (9th Cir. 1985); Sugarloaf Funding, LLC v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury,
584 F.3d 340, 346 (1st Cir. 2009).
2. Requirements for a valid summons
The validity of a summons is measured by standards established both by
the Supreme Court and by Congress.
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5
a. The Supreme Court’s Powell requirements
The Supreme Court established the framework for judicial review of a
summons in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). In that case the
Court held that the IRS did not have to satisfy any standard of probable
cause in order to issue a valid summons. All that the Government must show
is that the summons (1) is issued for a legitimate purpose; (2) seeks
information that may be relevant to that purpose; (3) seeks information that
is not already within the IRS’s possession; and (4) satisfies all administrative
steps required by the Internal Revenue Code. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58.
(1) The summons was issued for a legitimate purpose
Congress has given the IRS broad directions under Section 7601 to
investigate “all persons . . . who may be liable” for taxes. Sections 7602(a)
and (b) delineate the purposes for which an IRS summons may be issued:
• Ascertaining the correctness of any return,
• Making a return where none has been made,
• Determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax
or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of
any person in respect of any internal revenue tax,
• Collecting any such liability, or
• Inquiring into any offense connected with the administration or
enforcement of the internal revenue laws.
In Powell, the Supreme Court thus noted that the IRS can issue a summons
to investigate “‘merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not.’” 379 U.S. at 57 (quoting United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950)).
When the Supreme Court later held that a summons could not be issued
in aid of a criminal investigation, United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437
U.S. 298 (1978), Congress enacted Section 7602(b) permitting the use of
summons to gather information in aid of a criminal investigation. See
Scotty’s Contracting & Stone, Inc. v. United States, 326 F.3d 785 (6th Cir.
2003). Section 7602(d), however, prohibits the issuance or the enforcement of
a summons with respect to a person if there is in effect a “Justice Department
referral” as defined in the statute. (See Section II(B)(2)(b).)
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(2) The summoned information may be relevant
Section 7602 authorizes the IRS to examine “any books, papers, records,
or other data which may be relevant or material.” (Emphasis added.) In
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 814 (1984), the Court
stated that the language “may be” reflects Congress’s express intention to
allow the IRS to obtain “items of even potential relevance to an ongoing
investigation, without reference to its admissibility.” (Emphasis in original.)
The IRS need not show that the “documents it seeks are actually relevant in
any technical, evidentiary sense.” Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 814. In Powell,
the Supreme Court noted that the IRS can issue a summons to investigate
“‘merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it
wants assurance that it is not.’” 379 U.S. at 57 (quoting Morton Salt, 338 U.S.
642-43). Thus, in applying the Powell test, the question is not whether the
records sought, when disclosed, will contradict a taxpayer’s return, but
whether the records “might” throw light upon the correctness of a return.
Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 814-15 & n.11. The IRS need not accept the word
of the summoned party that records are not relevant. It is entitled to
determine that fact for itself. See Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469
U.S. 310, 323 (1985).
Relevancy determinations necessarily are factual and normally are
reviewed on appeal only for clear error. United States v. Goldman, 637 F.2d
664, 667 (9th Cir. 1980). Relying on the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in
Arthur Young, the various courts of appeals have had little trouble in
construing the Powell relevance standard broadly.
CSylvestre v. United States, 978 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1992) (records of
taxpayer’s savings accounts, checking accounts, and the like are
relevant to purpose of determining possible income tax liability).
CPAA Mgmt., Ltd. v. United States, 962 F.2d 212, 217-18 (2d Cir.
1992) (IRS may seek enforcement of summons even after issuance of
statutory notice of deficiency because Tax Court could redetermine
the correct amount of the deficiency).
CUnited States v. White, 853 F.2d 107, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1988)
(summons for records of attorney/executor of estate enforced as
having “potential” relevance to determination whether fees were
deductible under state law).
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CUnited States v. Rockwell Int’l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1263 (3d Cir. 1990)
(liberal standard of relevance to be applied to determine whether
material in “free reserve file” is relevant to investigation of
correctness of corporation’s 1983 tax return).
CBarquero v. United States, 18 F.3d 1311, 1318 (5th Cir. 1994) (IRS
may summon records for time-barred years so long as those records
are relevant to later years under investigation).
CUnited States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 537 (5th Cir. 1982)
(taxpayer’s “tax-pool analysis” documents that focus on questionable
positions in the tax return are highly relevant even though they
were not used in preparing the tax return).
CUnited States v. Abrahams, 905 F.2d 1276, 1279 n.1, 1281 (9th Cir.
1990) (summons to attorney for “all documents relating to
preparation of income tax returns for others” enforced since such
documents were likely to “throw light” on clients’ tax returns),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325,
1329 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
CUnited States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir. 1969) (holding
that the Commissioner is “licensed to fish”). But see United States v.
Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1967) (IRS “is
not entitled to go on a fishing expedition . . . . [but] must identify
with some precision the documents it wishes to inspect”).
The relevancy test for a summons is a relatively low one, but it is not
non-existent. The Government must establish that there is some realistic
expectation (more than an idle hope) that the summoned information may be
relevant to its investigation. Although the summoned documents or
information need not meet the evidentiary relevancy requirement for
admissibility, the Government should show some logical connection between
the information sought and the purpose of the exam. In most cases, the
potential relevance of the summoned information is self-evident. In other
instances, an explanation may be helpful.
CUnited States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973) (A
corporation not required to produce copies of its budgets when the
IRS justified its request on the need for a “roadmap” to better
understand the corporation’s operations. “The term ‘relevant’
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8
connotes and encompasses more than ‘convenience.’ . . . If we were
to accede to the government’s view, it is difficult to imagine
corporate materials that might not contribute to a more
comprehensive understanding of the workings of the corporation,
and thus, according to the government, be deemed relevant to the
tax investigation.”).
CDavid H. Tedder & Assocs. v. United States, 77 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th
Cir. 1996) (names of a law firm’s clients need not be revealed when
the IRS did not demonstrate that the specific client identities “might
throw light upon the correctness” of the taxpayer’s return).
CUnited States v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 440 F.3d 729, 736-37 (6th
Cir. 2006) (“The present case exemplifies an exceptional
circumstance where automatic reliance upon an agent’s affidavit is
not adequate because (1) the subpoena is directed to a third party,
not to the taxpayer being investigated, (2) the IRS seeks a
voluminous amount of highly sensitive propriety information about
Monumental’s general administration of its products, (3) the IRS has
opposed the imposition of a protective order, and (4) the magistrate
judge, who spent years considering the scope of the summons, found
that the IRS was seeking ‘some irrelevant information.’”).
The results in these cases thus might have been different if the potential
relevance of the summoned information had been better described. See
Reiserer v. United States, 479 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding Tedder
did not apply where “the IRS maintain[ed] that interviewing Reiserer’s
clients may help the IRS determine the number of illegal schemes marketed
by Reiserer, a purpose relevant to a § 6700 investigation”).
(3) The summoned information is not already in the
possession of the IRS
To satisfy the third Powell requirement, the IRS must show that the
summoned information is not already in the IRS’s possession. As noted
above, the simple statement in the IRS agent’s declaration that the
summoned information is not in the possession of the IRS is sufficient to shift
the burden of proof to the party opposing enforcement to come forward with
evidence to the contrary. This Powell requirement may not be satisfied,
however, when someone in the IRS other than the declaring agent has the
summoned information and it is available for use in the exam.
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9
The courts have “declined to apply a literal interpretation of this Powell
criterion in favor of a practical approach to IRS accessibility.” United States v.
John G. Mutschler & Assocs., Inc., 734 F.2d 363, 367-68 (8th Cir. 1984). The
Fifth Circuit explained this “practical approach” as follows:
The “already possessed by government” defense originated in the passage
of United States v. Powell [ ], for which the Supreme Court cited no
authority. Powell construed not only the implicit prerequisites to
enforceability of a summons issued under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7602, 7604(b), but
also the explicit limitation contained in 26 U.S.C. § 7605(b), which
forbids “unnecessary” summonses. Read in context, we construe the
“already possessed” principle enunciated by Powell as a gloss on
§ 7605(b)’s prohibition of “unnecessary” summonses, rather than an
absolute prohibition against the enforcement of any summons to the
extent that it requests the production of information already in the
possession of the IRS.
United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1037 (5th Cir. 1981). But see United
States v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 440 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
claim that documents obtained by IRS in the course of investigating another
taxpayer were not accessible because of the confidentiality provisions of I.R.C.
§ 6103(a)).
The following are instances where the courts have applied the practical
approach to IRS accessibility.
CDifficult to retrieve - United States v. First Nat’l State Bank, 616
F.2d 668, 673-74 (3d Cir. 1980) (the IRS can summon documents
that may be in its possession but which are difficult to retrieve). See
also United States v. Linsteadt, 724 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1984); cf.
United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 755 (4th Cir. 1973) (court
refused to enforce a summons directed to a tax preparer for copies of
all the returns of his clients for three years because there was no
record evidence that the IRS could not readily retrieve the
information).
CDifferent versions - United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996, 1001 (2d
Cir. 1976) (may demand production of original documents rather
than copies); United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir.
1973) (access to records from other sources “does not destroy the
government’s right to inspect the original and primary records of the
Updated July 2011
10
Corporation”); United States v. Daffin, 653 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir.
1981) (retained copies of tax returns to compare with the originals
filed with the IRS); Sugarloaf Funding, LLC v. U.S. Dept. of
Treasury, 584 F.3d at 350 (“the IRS is entitled to obtain relevant
records from third parties to compare for accuracy any records
obtained from the taxpayer”).
CSecond look - Spell v. United States, 907 F.2d 36, 38 (4th Cir. 1990)
(taxpayer may not refuse to comply with summons issued by special
agent merely because his returns were examined previously by
revenue agent); United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1242 (4th Cir.
1986) (allowing a “second look” for a different and additional
purpose); United States v. Morgan, 761 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir.
1985) (special agent’s fraud inquiry is considered a continuation of
the original, uncompleted audit); United States v. Popkin, 623 F.2d
108, 109 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (examination by revenue agent
does not “fulfill the needs of a special agent investigating fraud”);
United States v. Lenon, 579 F.2d 420, 422 (7th Cir. 1978) (fraud
investigation “different in both approach and extent” from a routine
audit); United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 (5th Cir.
1978) (IRS’s entitlement to a single meaningful examination may
necessitate additional scrutiny of documents by the special agent).
(4) The summons meets all administrative requirements
The fourth element of the Powell test is that the IRS comply with the
administrative steps required by the Code. These steps include service on the
summoned party and, in the case of a third-party summons, notice to any
person identified in the summons.
Courts occasionally have excused minor failures to comply with the
required administrative steps provided that the taxpayer has not been
prejudiced thereby. United States v. Tex. Heart Inst., 755 F.2d 469, 478 (5th
Cir. 1985) (provided that the taxpayer has had “every benefit of the
administrative steps required by the Code, a failure by the IRS to meet the
technical niceties of the statute will not bar enforcement”) (emphasis in
original), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341
(5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Privitera, 75 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1266, 1266
(9th Cir. 1995) (“Minor violations will be excused where the IRS acts in good
faith and there is no prejudice to the taxpayer.”). But even though the Sixth
Circuit allowed enforcement of a summons despite a nonprejudicial
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11
administrative deficiency, it cautioned that it expected the IRS to strictly
adhere to all administrative niceties in future cases. See Cook v. United
States, 104 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 1997). In other words, “technical” violations
should be not treated lightly.
• Service on the summoned party - Section 7603 specifies how a
summons should be served on the summoned party. Part (a)
provides the general method of service – “by an attested copy
delivered in hand to the person to whom it is directed, or left at his
last and usual place of abode.” An attested copy is merely a copy of
the original summons with an signed statement on its face that it is
a true and accurate copy. Mimick v. United States, 952 F.2d 230
(8th Cir. 1991). Part (b) provides that summonses issued to “third-
party recordkeepers,” as that term is defined in Section 7603(b)(2),
may be served “by certified or registered mail to the last known
address” of the summoned party. I.R.C. § 7603(b)(1). “Third-party
recordkeepers” include banks, financial institutions, credit card
companies, attorneys, and accountants. The mandates of Rule 4 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to the service of
IRS summonses. United States v. Gilleran, 992 F.2d 232, 233 (9th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Bichara, 826 F.2d 1037, 1039 (11th Cir.
1987). Section 7603(a) also provides that “a certificate of service
signed by the person serving the summons shall be evidence of the
facts it states on the hearing of an application for the enforcement of
the summons.”
• Notice to others of a third-party summons - Section 7609(a)(1)
requires that a person identified in a summons receive notice if the
summons seeks information “with respect to” that person. The most
obvious case is when a third party (i.e., bank) is summoned to
produce records relating to a taxpayer’s examination. In that case
the taxpayer must receive notice of the summons. The less obvious
case is when a third party is summoned to produce another person’s
records (i.e., parent’s, girlfriend’s) in connection with a taxpayer’s
examination. Any other person whose records are identified in the
summons should receive notice.
Section 7609(a) also establishes the method of such notice,
which can be provided in person or by certified or registered mail. It
must be served within three days after the summons is served and
at least 23 days before the summons compliance date. The notice
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12
must include a copy of the summons and an explanation of that
person’s right to bring a proceeding to quash the summons. Several
courts have held that the notice copy need not include the
attestation required of the copy served on the summoned party.
Codner v. United States, 17 F.3d 1331, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 1994);
Fortney v. United States, 59 F.3d 117, 120-21 (9th Cir. 1995). In
United States v. Mimick, 952 F.2d at 231-32, however, the Eighth
Circuit held that attested copies must be served on both the
summoned party and any noticee.
• Notice to taxpayer of third-party contact - Section 7602(c),
added to the Code as part of the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, §
3417(a), 112 Stat. 685, 757-58, provides that “[a]n officer or employee
of the Internal Revenue Service may not contact any person other
than the taxpayer with respect to the determination or collection of
the tax liability of such taxpayer without providing reasonable notice
in advance to the taxpayer that contacts with persons other than the
taxpayer may be made.” Failure to notify taxpayer of a third-party
contact is a serious defect. In United States v. Jillson, 84 A.F.T.R.2d
(RIA) 99-7115 (S.D. Fla. 1999), the court denied enforcement of
summonses to third parties because the IRS had not issued a notice
of contact to the taxpayer prior to issuing the summonses.
b. No “Justice Department referral” is in effect - § 7602(d)
In addition to satisfying the Powell requirements, a summons must also
satisfy a specific statutory requirement. In LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298,
the Supreme Court held that a summons could not be issued in aid of a
criminal investigation. Congress responded four years later by enacting
Section 7602(b), which permits the use of a summons to gather information in
aid of a criminal investigation. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 333(a), 96 Stat. 324, 621-22. Section
7602(d), however, enacted at the same time, precludes either the issuance of a
summons or the commencement of a proceeding to enforce it once a “Justice
Department referral” is in effect with respect to the person whose liabilities
are under investigation. See Khan v. United States, 548 F.3d 549 (7th Cir.
2008) (holding that § 7602(d) applies to taxpayers under Justice Department
referral, but not to third-parties under referral). The phrase “Justice
Department referral” is a term of art and embraces the following:
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13
A Justice Department referral is in effect with respect to any person if --
(i) the Secretary has recommended to the Attorney General a grand jury
investigation of, or the criminal prosecution of, such person for any
offense connected with the administration or enforcement of the internal
revenue laws, or
(ii) any request is made under section 6103(h)(3)(B) for the disclosure of
any return or return information (within the meaning of section 6103(b))
relating to such person.
I.R.C. § 7602(d)(2)(A).
Each taxable period and each tax imposed by a separate IRC chapter are
treated separately. I.R.C. § 7602(d)(3). Thus, a summons issued with respect
to the examination of the 1979 and 1980 years was proper, despite an
indictment alleging tax crimes for 1976 and 1977. Commissioner v. Hayes,
631 F. Supp. 785, 787 (N.D. Cal. 1985). See also United States v. Pittman, 82
F.3d 152, 157 (7th Cir. 1996) (offenses related to taxes from different chapters
of the IRC or offenses under different titles, such as Title 26 (taxes) and Title
31 (money laundering) are treated separately).
In general, courts have recognized that Section 7602(d) created a bright
line, with a “Justice Department referral” being the line of demarcation. See
Scotty’s Contracting & Stone, 326 F.3d 785 (collecting cases). But the law in
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits is not entirely clear. United States v. Berg,
20 F.3d 304, 309 n.6 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the IRS “cannot use its
summons authority if its only purpose is to gather evidence for a criminal
investigation, (i.e. if it has “‘no civil purpose whatsoever’ and [it] ‘has
abandoned any institutional pursuit of civil tax determination.’”) (citations
omitted). Compare Hintze v. IRS, 879 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating
that the summons may have been quashed if the taxpayers had shown “that
the IRS was pursuing its investigation for the sole purpose of building a case
on anticipated criminal charges”), overruled on other grounds, Church of
Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 15 n.8 (1992), with Morgan, 761 F.2d
at 1012 (stating that Section 7602(d) “drew a ‘bright line’ indicating that the
summons power ended at the point where an investigation was referred to the
Justice Department for prosecution” (citations omitted)). In the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits, it is important that the agent’s declaration clearly state
that the IRS has not abandoned its civil purpose. Thus, for example, when a
summons is issued by a Special Agent in aid of a criminal investigation, the
Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779.
2
The Senate report states that “[t]he phrase ‘to collect personally identifiable
3
information’ covers the various ways that individuals can be identified, including
name, address, and social security number.” S. Rep. No. 98-67, at 28 (1984). The
cognate House report, paraphrasing the statute, states that “‘personally
identifiable information’ . . . would include specific information about the
subscriber, or a list of names and addresses on which the subscriber is included, but
does not include aggregate information about subscribers which does not identify
particular persons.” H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 79 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N 4655, 4716.
Updated July 2011
14
declaration should indicate that any related civil liabilities, which may
include penalties, have not been finally determined and the information
sought is relevant to that determination as well.
The IRS may not issue a summons or seek to enforce it if the IRS already
has made an institutional decision to make a “Department of Justice
referral.” Such conduct would constitute bad faith. United States v. Jose, 131
F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“It is well established that the IRS
is acting in bad faith if it pursues a summons enforcement after having
already decided to make a recommendation for prosecution . . . .”) (citing
LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. at 317, and United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S.
353, 362 (1989)).
c. Requirements to summon certain subject matters
Special procedures apply to summonses seeking information concerning
certain subjects.
(1) Cable Communications Policy Act
The Service takes the position that it must comply with Section 631 the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551, when issuing a
2
summons to a cable company. Chief Counsel Advisory, IRS CCA 200230034,
2002 WL 1730123. Section 551(c)(1) generally prohibits a cable company
from disclosing a subscriber’s “personally identifiable information,” without
the prior written or electronic consent of the subscriber concerned.
“Personally identifiable information” “does not include any record of
aggregate data which does not identify particular persons.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 551(a)(2)(A).
3
Exceptions are also made if the disclosure is necessary to render (or conduct a
4
legitimate business activity related to) a service to the subscriber (Section
551(c)(2)(A)); the disclosure is of the subscriber’s name and address to any cable or
other service, provided certain conditions are satisfied (Section 551(c)(2)(C)); or the
disclosure is to a government entity as authorized under chapters 119, 121, or 206
of Title 18, provided the disclosure does not reveal the subscriber’s selection of video
programming (Section 551(c)(2)(D)).
Updated July 2011
15
If the cable company provides either internet or telephone service in
addition to cable television service, however, disclosure of the information
relevant to the internet or telephone service is not restricted by Section 551 of
the Cable Act. Disclosure of information relevant to internet or telephone
service is permitted under Section 2703(c)(2) of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C., and Section 551(c)(2)(D) of the Cable
Act. See In re Application of United States of Am. for an Order Directed to
Cablevision Sys. Corp., N.Y., 158 F. Supp. 2d 644 (D. Md. 2001).
Where Section 551 of the Cable Act applies, it is subject to several
exceptions, including one that permits disclosure in response to a court order
obtained by a governmental entity. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B). Such an order,
4
however, (1) must be based on clear and convincing evidence that the
subscriber is reasonably suspected of having engaged in criminal activity and
that the information sought would be material evidence in the case, and (2)
must be obtained in a proceeding in which the subscriber is afforded the
opportunity to appear and contest the claim. 47 U.S.C. § 551(h). See United
States v. Cox Cable Communications, 81 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2011 (N.D. Fla.
1998) (holding the IRS satisfied the requirements of Section 551(h) with the
agent’s declaration).
(2) Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA)
The IRS may have additional burdens to meet when requesting health
information protected by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) of 1996 Privacy Regulations, 45 C.F.R. parts 160 and 164, from a
“covered entity” (e.g., a physician, healthcare organization, health insurer,
etc.). “Protected health information” is defined, inter alia, as information, in
any form, maintained by a covered entity that can identify the individual and
relates to that individual’s health, receipt of healthcare services, or the past,
present, or future payment for the healthcare services provided. See 45
C.F.R. § 160.103. Additionally, documents containing information that would
Updated July 2011
16
identify the healthcare recipient’s relatives, employers, or household
members can also qualify as protected information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b).
Three exceptions allow the Service to obtain protected health information
while enforcing the Internal Revenue Code: the taxpayer’s consent, the law
enforcement exception, and the administrative and judicial proceedings
exception. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2004-034, addresses the standards for
applying those exceptions. IRS CCN CC-2004-034, 2004 WL 3210766.
An administrative summons issued under Section 7602(a)(2) qualifies
under the law enforcement exception. In addition to the usual requirements
for enforcement, however, a summons seeking protected health information
must satisfy a three-pronged test: (1) the information sought must be
“relevant and material” to a “legitimate law enforcement inquiry”; (2) the
request must be “specific and limited in scope to the extent reasonably
practicable in light of the purpose for which the information is sought”; and
(3) “[d]e-identified information could not reasonably be used.” 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C). The privacy rules list eighteen specific identifiers,
ranging from such traditional categories as name and address to less
traditional categories, including web addresses, biometric identifiers (e.g.,
finger and voice prints), account numbers, and vehicle identification numbers
(e.g., license plates).
To satisfy the requirements of the three-pronged test, the Service is to
supplement any summons for protected health information with a statement
that the three additional requirements have been met. CC-2004-034, *4. A
covered entity may reasonably rely on such a statement and produce the
summoned information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(h)(2). A declaration
accompanying a request to bring a summons enforcement action should
incorporate the requirements of the three-pronged test and represent that
they have been satisfied.
(3) Tax accrual workpapers
Special rules apply when issuing and seeking enforcement of a summons
issued for tax accrual workpapers. Enforcement of such summonses should
be handled by the Tax Division. As a matter of practice, the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General (Civil Trial Matters) and the appropriate Section Chief
should be notified whenever the Tax Division receives a suit to enforce a
summons for tax accrual workpapers.
In United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 , 561 (1989), the Supreme Court found
5
itself “evenly divided with respect to the issue of the power of a district court to
Updated July 2011
17
Tax accrual workpapers are documents and memoranda relating to an
auditor’s evaluation of a taxpayer’s reserves for contingent tax liabilities.
Such workpapers may contain information pertaining to the taxpayer’s
financial transactions, identify questionable positions taken on tax returns,
and reflect the auditor’s opinions regarding the validity of such positions.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984); United States v. El
Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 533-35 (5th Cir. 1982). Tax accrual workpapers are
generally prepared as a part of the process of auditing a corporation’s
financial statements, not as part of the tax return preparation process. The
tax accrual workpapers can be prepared by in-house or outside accountants.
The IRS has adopted a policy of restraint in seeking tax accrual workpapers.
Announcement 2002-63, 2002-2 C.B. 72; I.R.M. 4.10.20.
In Arthur Young, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
workpapers were privileged. A summons for tax accrual workpapers is
accordingly enforceable so long as the documents meet the low threshold of
relevance and the other Powell requirements for enforcement.
Even after Arthur Young, though, courts may entertain assertions of
work-product and other privileges. See United States v. Rockwell Int’l, 897
F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing the enforcement of a summons seeking
tax accrual workpapers when the district court failed to also consider whether
the documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-
product doctrine); see also Section II.C.2.c (discussing cases addressing the
work-product privilege).
3. Enforcement actions
If the summoned party fails to comply with the summons, Section 7604
provides the United States with a means to enforce the summons by filing an
enforcement proceeding in federal district court. (See, Section III.A.)
a. No conditional enforcement
There is no authority for a court to conditionally enforce a summons.
United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); United States
v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341, 1350-51 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per curiam).
5
place restrictions upon the dissemination by the IRS of information obtained
through a § 7604 subpoena action” and therefore affirmed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, insofar as it upheld the district court’s
conditional-enforcement order. Such an affirmance is not binding in other cases, see
Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1910), and the Ninth Circuit later
reversed its Zolin decision in Jose, 131 F.3d at 1329.
Updated July 2011
18
The power of the court in a summons enforcement case is “‘strictly limited to
granting or denying enforcement of the terms of the specific summons.’”
United States v. Abrahams, 905 F.2d at 1287 (quoting United States v. First
Nat’l State Bank of N.J., 540 F.2d 619, 624-25 (3d Cir. 1976)). Nothing in the
Internal Revenue Code authorizes a court to engraft “equitable” requirements
on its enforcement order so as to limit the IRS's internal use of the summoned
information. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) (injunction issued
against IRS summons dismissed for want of equity); United States v. First
Family Mortgage Corp., 739 F.2d 1275, 1278 (7th Cir. 1984) (Tax
Anti-Injunction Act barred taxpayer’s request for an injunction against IRS’s
use of summoned information). Although the summons power is not absolute,
restrictions on that authority should not be imposed “‘absent unambiguous
directions from Congress.’” United States v. Arthur Young & Co. , 465 U.S.
805, 816 (1984) (quoting United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975)).
b. Withdrawal and reissuance
It is always the IRS’s prerogative to withdraw a summons it has issued;
and in most cases, if not all, it is free to reissue the summons. In the case
where a procedural defect is detected, consider whether withdrawal and
reissuance would be appropriate. Some courts have overlooked technical
defects in the issuance of a summons where the taxpayer or summoned party
has not suffered prejudice. United States v. Tex. Heart Inst., 755 F.2d 469
(5th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Barrett, 837
F.2d 1341 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc) (per curiam); Sylvestre v. United States,
978 F.2d 25, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d
1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980). But not all courts do it lightly. In Cook v. United
States, 104 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 1997), the IRS had provided the taxpayers with
just 22 days’ notice of the compliance date for a third-party summons, instead
of the 23 days mandated by Section 7609(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed
the denial of the taxpayers’ petition to quash, as taxpayers conceded that they
had suffered no actual prejudice from the violation, but cautioned that its
decision should not be taken as “a license to ignore statutory deadlines or to
In Becker v. United States, 451 U.S. 1306 (1981), the taxpayers offered to post
6
a supersedeas bond and argued they were entitled under Rule 62(d) to a stay of an
IRS summons enforcement order pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, acting as Circuit Justice, issued an order in which he granted a
temporary stay in order to allow the full Court to consider the issue of Rule 62(d)’s
availability. But the full Court did not take up the issue and the stay was lifted.
See 452 U.S. 935.
Updated July 2011
19
negligently violate other legal requirements” and that the “court shall review
future violations of technical legal requirements by the I.R.S. and its agents
and attorneys with an increasingly critical eye.” 104 F.3d at 890-91.
When an IRS summons is withdrawn, a petition to quash that summons
becomes moot. Malone v. Humphrey, 237 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1956); Gillings v.
United States, 95 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2005-1014 (9th Cir. 2005); Pintel v. United
States, 74 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 94-5105 (C.D. Cal. 1994). Dame v. United States,
643 F. Supp. 533, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Kearns v. United States, 580 F. Supp.
8, 10 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Thompson v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2007-
1461 (D. Minn. 2007); Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 94 A.F.T.R.2d
(RIA) 5953 (W.D. Wash. 2004). Similarly, a taxpayer’s appeal of a summons
enforcement order becomes moot upon the withdrawal of a summons.
c. Effect of taxpayer appeal
(1) Order is enforceable unless stayed
Absent a stay pending appeal, once a district court orders a summons
enforced, the summoned party must comply with the court’s order,
notwithstanding the taking of an appeal. On occasion, taxpayers have
contended that they were entitled to a stay of a summons enforcement order
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d), which provides that a stay may be obtained “by
giving a supersedeas bond.” But a stay under Rule 62(d) is “subject to the
6
exceptions contained in subdivision (a) of [the] rule.” Rule 62(a) provides an
automatic 10-day stay of execution upon a judgment or of proceedings for its
enforcement, but excepts from its scope “an interlocutory or final judgment in
an action for an injunction” and directs that the discretionary provisions of
subdivision (c) “govern the suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting of an
injunction during the pendency of an appeal.” The automatic stay provisions
of Rule 62(a) and (d) are thus most often, if not always, confined to cases
involving money judgments. See, e.g., Hebert v. Exxon Corp., 953 F.2d 936,
Updated July 2011
20
938 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Courts have restricted the application of Rule 62(d)’s
automatic stay to judgments for money because a bond may not adequately
compensate a non-appealing party for loss as a result of the stay of a non-
money judgment.”). We know of no case holding that a summons enforcement
order was subject to an automatic stay.
A party, however, may seek a discretionary stay of an enforcement order
pending appeal, as it might any other order or judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
62 and Fed. R. App. P. 8. Ordinarily, the party seeking a stay must first
move for a stay in the district court. Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1). A motion for a
stay may be made to the court of appeals, if the movant can show that moving
first in the district court would be impracticable or can state that the district
court has denied the movant’s request for a stay. Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2)(A).
The standards for determining whether a stay pending appeal should be
granted require that the moving party establish: (i) a “strong” showing that it
will prevail on the merits on appeal; (ii) that irreparable injury will result
unless the stay is granted; (iii) that issuance of a stay will result in no
substantial harm to other interested persons; and (iv) that issuance of a stay
will result in no substantial harm to the public interest. Nken v. Holder, ___
U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009). The first two factors are “the most
critical.” Id.
Courts are not likely to grant a stay pending appeal of a summons
enforcement order.
A stay pending an appeal from [an order enforcing] a summons under
§ 7602(2) should not be granted as a matter of course, but only when
there is a substantial possibility of success, and then on terms
designed to expedite the appeal and, if necessary and appropriate, to
protect against the running of any applicable statute of limitations.
In re Turner, 309 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1962) (cited in Multistate Tax Comm’n v.
U. S. Steel Corp., 659 F.2d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1981)). If a stay of an order
enforcing a first-party summons is granted and the taxpayer is unwilling to
extend the statute of limitations on assessment, it may be necessary to seek
an expedited appeal. Otherwise, the time for the IRS to make the assessment
may expire before the summoned information is available to the IRS. If a
taxpayer petitions to quash a third-party summons, however, the statute of
limitations on assessment is suspended (see I.R.C. § 7609(e)) and there is
generally no need to seek an expedited appeal.
Updated July 2011
21
(i) Likelihood of success on the merits – Given the IRS’s
broad investigative power and the highly deferential clear-error standard of
review, see, e.g., United States v. Claes, 747 F.2d 491, 495-96 (8th Cir. 1984),
once the district court has determined that the Powell requirements have been
satisfied, the movant usually has little, if any, likelihood of overturning a
summons enforcement order on appeal. After all, Section 7602 gives the IRS
broad, although not unlimited, power to investigate. It extends the summons
power to the examination of “any books, papers, records, or other data which
may be relevant or material” to an inquiry. I.R.C. § 7602(a) (emphasis added).
“The language ‘may be’ reflects Congress’ express intention to allow the IRS to
obtain items of even potential relevance to an ongoing investigation, without
reference to its admissibility.” Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 814 (emphasis in
original). On that ground alone, a stay should usually be denied. But the
other requirements are equally formidable.
(ii) Irreparable injury in the absence of a stay – Historically,
a movant might have argued irreparable injury if a stay were not granted,
because compliance with the summons would moot any appeal from the
enforcement order. However, this argument has been taken away. In Church
of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992), the Supreme Court held that
compliance with IRS summonses did not moot an appeal from an enforcement
order issued by a district court because “if the summons were improperly
issued or enforced a court could order that the IRS’s copies of the [summoned
material] be either returned or destroyed.” 506 U.S. at 15.
So, too, any alleged damage to the movant’s business or reputation caused
by compliance with a summons enforcement order does not constitute
irreparable harm as a matter of law. See Acierno v. New Castle County, 40
F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994) (preliminary injunction case: “[e]conomic loss does
not constitute irreparable harm”); Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 371 (3d Cir.
1987) (preliminary injunction case: “we do not believe that loss of income alone
constitutes irreparable harm”).
(iii - iv) The balance of hardships and the public interest –
Because the Government is always a party to a summons enforcement
proceeding, the third and fourth criteria for granting a stay, namely, that
issuance of a stay will result in no substantial harm to other interested
persons and will result in no substantial harm to the public interest, merge
into one. Nken v. Holder, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1762. The public’s
interest in the efficient and even-handed administration of the revenue laws is
never served by a stay. It has long been recognized that the Government
Updated July 2011
22
needs “to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum
of pre-enforcement judicial interference.” Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S.
725, 736 (1974). The information provided by a summons plays an important
role in the process of enforcing the tax laws. When a summons is not complied
with promptly, the Government must take a detour from the orderly road of
its investigation. These delays hamper the progress of enforcement and
contravene the public interest. Cf. United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 540 (7th
Cir. 1981) (noting “Congress’s concern that summons enforcement proceedings
be concluded rapidly”). The public’s interest in vigorous and thorough
enforcement of the revenue laws should thus always weigh heavily against
granting a stay.
(2) Compliance does not moot an appeal
“It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority ‘to give
opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles
or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it’. . . .
For that reason, if an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that
makes it impossible for the court to grant ‘any effectual relief whatever’ to a
prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed.” Church of Scientology, 506
U.S. at 12 (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). Relying on these
principles, the Government used to contend that compliance with a summons
mooted an appeal of the district court’s enforcement order. But that is no
longer true.
In Church of Scientology, the Government acquired possession of two
summoned tape recordings, after the District Court ordered enforcement of
the summons, but while the enforcement order was on appeal. Relying on the
authority of the majority (eight of nine) of the Circuit Courts of Appeal that
had considered the issue, the Government moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground of mootness. The Ninth Circuit agreed and dismissed the appeal. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue. Instead of relying on
the line of cases cited by the Government involving IRS summonses, the Court
chose instead to rely on numerous decisions holding that compliance with a
district court order enforcing a Federal Trade Commission subpoena did not
moot an appeal of the enforcement order. Consequently, the Supreme Court
held that compliance with an order enforcing an IRS summons did not moot an
appeal of the enforcement order, because “if the summons were improperly
issued or enforced a court could order that the IRS’s copies of the [summoned
material] be either returned or destroyed.” 506 U.S. at 15.
Updated July 2011
23
Although Church of Scientology was a loss for the Government, it is not
without benefit. If nothing else, it precludes a losing party from contending
that it should be entitled to a stay pending appeal on the ground that
compliance with the summons enforcement order would result in the
irreparable harm of mooting the appeal.
c. Remedies for failure to obey enforcement order
If a party does not obey an order to comply with an IRS summons, the
Government may initiate contempt proceedings to compel compliance. See,
e.g., United States v. Brown, 918 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Riewe, 676 F.2d 418, 421 (10th Cir. 1982). District courts have inherent power
to enforce compliance with orders through contempt proceedings. Shillitani v.
United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).
Contempt of court is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary as conduct that
defies the authority or dignity of a court. A motion for contempt in federal
court, whether civil or criminal, is premised on 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), which
provides that “[a] court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine
or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and
none other, as . . . [d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command.”
In contrast to criminal contempt, civil contempt is designed to force the
contemnor to comply with an order of the court. Int’l Union, United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994). A district court may impose a
sanction for contempt only if it finds that the party requesting the sanction
has proven contempt by clear and convincing evidence. Peterson v. Highland
Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998); Chicago Truck Drivers v.
Bhd. Labor Leasing, 207 F.3d 500, 505 (8th Cir. 2000).
For a party to be held in contempt, it must be shown that: (1) a valid
order existed, (2) the party had knowledge of the order, and (3) the party
disobeyed the order. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Constr. Co., 159 F.3d 1311,
1315 (10th Cir. 1998). The moving party is required only to establish a prima
facie case of contempt by demonstrating that certain conduct was required by
a previous court order and that the alleged contemnor failed to comply with
that order. United States v. Hayes, 722 F.2d 723, 725 (11th Cir. 1984). A
prima facie case for contempt may be made either by affidavits attached to the
petition, or by sworn testimony presented in open court. The show cause order
places on the alleged contemnor the burden of showing why he should not be
Updated July 2011
24
held in contempt. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983). The
defendant must present some evidence to explain or justify his failure to
produce the requested information. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372,
379 (1960); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934).
The only question at the contempt stage is whether the contemnor has the
present ability to obey the court’s enforcement order. In raising this defense,
the defendant bears the burden of production. Rylander, 460 U.S. at 757.
The defendant does not meet this burden simply by alleging non-possession of
the summoned documents and asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege.
Rylander, 460 U.S. at 758-62, United States v. Rue, 819 F.2d 1488 (8th Cir.
1987).
Any questions regarding the propriety of the summons and whether it
should have been enforced must have been raised in the enforcement hearing.
Rylander, 460 U.S. at 757. “[The] contempt proceeding does not open to
reconsideration the legal or factual basis of the order alleged to have been
disobeyed and thus become a retrial of the original controversy.” Maggio v.
Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 69 (1948).
In the contempt proceeding the summoned party must be able to show
that he or she had made all reasonable efforts to comply with the summons to
avoid contempt. See United States v. Seetapun, 750 F.2d 601, 605-06 (7th Cir.
1984); Hayes, 722 F.2d at 725-26; United States v. Liddell, 327 Fed. Appx. 721
(9th Cir. 2009). A defendant “demonstrates [an] inability to comply [with a
court order] only by showing that he has made ‘in good faith all reasonable
efforts to comply.’” United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted) (affirming contempt where contemnor’s record searches did
not amount to “all reasonable efforts”).
In United States v. Hayes, 722 F.2d 723, Hayes, a summoned tax
promoter, partially complied with an order enforcing the summons, but
claimed that some of the documents were being held in Switzerland by Hayes’s
business partner, who refused to release them. Despite Hayes’s alleged
“diligent requests” involving trips to Switzerland to obtain the documents, the
appellate court found that Hayes failed to make “all reasonable efforts” to
comply with the order: “[O]ther avenues for obtaining the material were never
explored.” Hayes failed to take any actions against his business partner,
including researching his legal rights, threatening his business partner with
legal action, or consulting an attorney. “He cannot carry his burden… merely
by adducing evidence that he has requested the documents, when it appears
Updated July 2011
25
that he has greater leverage at his disposal.” 722 F.2d at 725-26 (emphasis in
original).
Because such contumacious conduct interferes with the administration of
justice, it is punishable by coercive sanctions to induce compliance, or by
remedial sanctions to compensate an aggrieved party for losses sustained for
past disobedience of the court’s order. Feltner v. Title Search Co., 283 F.3d
838, 841 (7th Cir. 2002). In fashioning sanctions for civil contempt, district
courts should consider “the character and magnitude of the harm threatened
by continued contumacy, and the probable effectiveness of any suggested
sanction in bringing about the result desired.” United States v. United Mine
Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947). Appropriate sanctions may include a
coercive daily fine, a compensatory fine, or coercive incarceration. Int’l Union,
512 U.S. 821; United States v. Marquardo, 149 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1998);
O’Connor v. Midwest Pipe Fabrications, Inc., 972 F.2d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.
1992).
(1) Coercive Fines
When fixing the amount of coercive daily fines, district courts must also
consider “the amount of defendant’s financial resources and the consequent
seriousness of the burden to that particular defendant.” United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. at 304. One appellate court upheld fines of $5,000 a day for failure to
turn over documents pursuant to a summons enforcement order. United
States v. Darwin Constr. Co., 873 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1989). Coercive fines may
exceed the $1,000 criminal fine under Section 7210 for failure to comply with a
summons. United States v. Hefti, 879 F.2d 311, 315 (8th Cir. 1989).
(2) Coercive Imprisonment
The basis for permitting a court summarily to order coercive
imprisonment for recalcitrant persons without affording them the safeguards
of a criminal proceeding is that the contemnors hold “the keys of the prison in
their own pockets,” and therefore can purge themselves of the contempt at any
time. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). When a court finds that
confinement has lost its coercive effect, it essentially becomes punitive and the
contemnor must be released. See, e.g., Lambert v. Montana, 545 F.2d 87 (9th
Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 423-24 (3d
Cir. 1979); Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1983). To hold
the contemnor longer would violate due process. Lambert, 545 F.2d at 89.
Updated July 2011
26
Although the due process test is easily formulated (i.e., when
incarceration no longer has a coercive effect, it violates due process), the point
at which coercive imprisonment ceases to be coercive and essentially becomes
punitive is not readily discernible. While the courts have not formulated a
bright-line test to determine whether a contemnor has met his burden of
persuasion, it is well settled that a person’s insistence that he will never
comply is not sufficient. Lambert, 545 F.2d at 90 (citing Catena v. Seidl, 343
A.2d 744, 747 (N.J. 1975)). “Obviously, the civil contempt power would be
completely eviscerated were a defiant witness able to secure his release merely
by boldly asserting that he will never comply with the court’s order.” Braun,
600 F.2d at 425. What has emerged, therefore, is the requirement that the
contemnor bear the burden of establishing that there is no substantial
likelihood that continued confinement would accomplish its coercive purpose.
Id. (citing Lambert, 545 F.2d at 90-91). Self-serving statements about present
intention not to comply is not persuasive evidence that the defendants will not
change their minds. See Simkin, 715 F.2d at 37 (a contemnor’s present
intention not to comply does not preclude the possibility that continued
confinement will cause a change of mind).
A court must make an individualized decision whether there remains a
realistic possibility that continued confinement might cause the contemnor to
comply. In re Crededio, 759 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1985). In making its
decision, a court should be mindful that incarceration of contemnors for civil
contempt is premised on the notion that the desire for freedom, and
concomitantly the willingness to comply, increases with the time spent in
prison. Braun, 600 F.2d at 428; In re Martin-Trigona, 590 F. Supp. 87, 91 (D.
Conn. 1984). Courts have not hesitated to incarcerate civil contemnors for
periods greater than a year. See, e.g., United States v. Lippitt, 180 F.3d 873,
878 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding incarceration remains coercive after two years);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Armstrong, 284 F.3d 404, 408 (2d Cir.
2002) (upholding continued civil contempt incarceration after period of more
than two years); In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (over two
years); Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding no
constitutional ban to incarcerating defendants seven years where defendant
has present ability to comply with order).
(3) Compensatory Fines
Compensatory fines compensate the party for injuries resulting from the
contemptuous behavior. Gen. Signal Corp. v. Donallco, Inc., 787 F.2d 1376,
1380 (9th Cir. 1986). The amount of compensatory sanctions includes the
Updated July 2011
27
actual costs incurred by the moving party. Id. Compensatory damages may
also include the amount of loss caused by the contumacy. United States v.
Berg, 20 F.3d 304, 311 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Connolly v. J.T. Ventures, 851
F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that the loss due to contempt in a
copyright infringement action may include profits from the sale of the items).
Actual costs incurred by the moving party include attorneys fees and costs
of attending the contempt hearing. A reasonable hourly rate to award for fees
is the amount “according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community.” Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 906
(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)); see also
United States v. City of Jackson, 359 F.3d 727, 733 (5th Cir. 2004) (“When a
court awards attorney’s fees to the government as a sanction for an adverse
party’s improper conduct, [ ] we treat the hourly rate in the local legal
community as a benchmark for determining the amount of attorney’s fees to
be imposed.”); United States v. Big D Enters., Inc., 184 F.3d 924, 936 (8th Cir.
1999) (same); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d
1080, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988) (same). The Government may argue that, at a
minimum, the Government should be awarded a rate equal to the rate
referenced in the Equal Access to Justice Act (28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A),
effective 1996). See City of Jackson, 359 F.3d at 734. The statute allows for
adjustments for inflation. The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price
Index inflation calculator is available at www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm. See Am.
Wrecking Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor, 364 F.3d 321, 330 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
4. Petitions to quash third-party summons
Certain persons are entitled to bring a judicial proceeding to quash a
summons. A summoned party, whether or not the taxpayer under
investigation, is never entitled to commence an action to contest the validity of
an IRS summons. Only a summons issued to a third party is potentially
subject to a pre-enforcement challenge, but even then, not by the summoned
third party. If the summoned party has a good-faith reason to refuse
compliance, his only recourse is to wait and defend an enforcement action
brought against him by the Government. If, under Section 7609(a), notice of a
third-party summons is required to be given to any person (including the
taxpayer) identified in the summons, the person receiving such notice (the
“noticee”) is entitled, under Section 7609(b)(2) to bring a proceeding to quash
the summons. But certain requirements must be met.
Subsections (b)(3) and (c) of 26 C.F.R. § 301.7609-4 emphasize the
7
jurisdictional nature of the notice requirements. Subsection (b)(3) states that “[i]f a
person entitled to notice of the summons fails to give proper and timely notice to
either the summoned person or the IRS in the manner described in this paragraph,
that person has failed to institute a proceeding to quash and the district court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the proceeding.” Subsection (c) states that “[u]nless the person
entitled to notice has notified both the IRS and the summoned person in the
appropriate manner, the person entitled to notice has failed to institute a
proceeding to quash.”
One California court (in an unpublished ruling) held that the 20-day period
8
can be subject to equitable tolling. Mackenzie v. United States, 84 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA)
6725, 6726-27 (E.D. Cal. 1999). In so doing, it relied on Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990). Subsequently, the Supreme Court considered whether
the statute of limitation for refund suits could be equitably tolled in light of Irwin,
and held that equitable tolling did not apply. United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S.
347 (1997). An analogous argument can be made with respect to the 20-day filing
requirement to quash a summons.
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a. Requirements
Section 7609 sets forth several requirements relating to time of filing,
requirement of notice, and location of the suit. The requirements are
jurisdictional: they comprise part of the conditions of the United States’
waiver of sovereign immunity and must be strictly adhered to by the
petitioner. Berman v. United States, 264 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (motion to
quash must be filed within 20 days of mailing notice); accord Faber v. United
States, 921 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1990); Stringer v. United States, 776 F.2d 274
(11th Cir. 1985); Ponsford v. United States, 771 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir.
1985). See also 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7609-4(b)(3), (c). As sovereign immunity
7
cannot be waived unless the statutory conditions have been met, counsel for
the United States have no authority to disregard or overlook failures to comply
with the requirements of Section 7609. Moreover, although these
requirements are jurisdictional and their absence may be raised at any time
(even on appeal), they should be raised as soon as possible.
The first requirement is found in Section 7609(b)(2)(A), which provides
that the petition to quash must be filed not later than the 20th day after the
noticee has been given notice. Ponsford, 771 F.2d 1305; Berman, 264 F.3d 16.
8
See also 26 C.F.R. § 301.7609-4(b)(2). If that 20th day falls on a weekend or
legal holiday, the last day to file the petition is the next business day. I.R.C. §
7503.
Updated July 2011
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Second, Section 7609(b)(2)(B) requires the noticee who petitions to quash
the summons to send by registered or certified mail copies of the petition to
the summoned person and to the office designated by the Secretary of the
Treasury (which is generally, but not always, the issuing IRS agent). See also
26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7609-4(b)(2)(ii), (iii). Section 7609(b)(2)(B)’s 20-day window
for a noticee to bring a petition to quash reflects Congress’s intent to expedite
summons actions and eliminate frivolous delay so that the actual investigation
can proceed.
The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i) for service upon the United States
and its agencies, corporations, officers, and employees also apply, which
means that copies should be sent by registered or certified mail or delivered to
the United States Attorney for the district, as well as sent by registered or
certified mail to the Attorney General in Washington, D.C. United States v.
Roebuck, 81 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 598, 601 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (“Rule 4’s service
requirements apply to petitioners proceeding under Section 7609.”). Accord
Faber v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 2d 965, 967 (W.D. Mich. 1999); Malone v.
United States, 77 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1157 (M.D. Ga. 1996); Hartman v. United
States, 76 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 7856 (M.D. Fla. 1995). A petition to quash an IRS
summons that is not served on the Attorney General and the United States
Attorney pursuant to Rule 4(i) is subject to dismissal. Van Manen v. United
States, 838 F. Supp. 335, 337 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (citing former Rule 4(d)(4)),
aff’d on other grounds by unpublished opinion, 23 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 1994).
The time limit for serving the United States is different from the 20-day
time limit for filing the petition to quash and for mailing the petition to both
the designated IRS office and the summoned person. Rule 4(m) provides the
applicable time limit for serving the United States. Mollison v. United States,
568 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9 Cir. 2009) (Petitioner “must serve the United States
th
within 120 days [of the filing of the petition], as required by Rule 4(m).”).
Third, pursuant to Section 7609(h), a petition to quash must be filed in
the district where the summoned party “resides or is found.” See also
26 C.F.R. § 301.7609-4(b)(1). This provision is a jurisdictional requirement
rather than a matter of venue. Deal v. United States, 759 F.2d 442, 444 (5th
Cir. 1985). The statute does not define “resides or is found,” and the courts
have interpreted the meaning of the term only infrequently. The Ninth
Circuit held that the Nevada district court did not have jurisdiction to hear a
petition to quash a summons issued to a California bank. Fortney v. United
States, 59 F.3d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit stated that
Updated July 2011
30
jurisdiction is “vested in the district where the summons is to be answered”
rather than “by the location of the taxpayer.” Masat v. United States, 745 F.2d
2003-985, 988 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Beck v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d
(RIA) 1345 (6th Cir. 2003). The district court in Oregon found that the statute
requires “something more than the Due Process analysis of minimum
contacts” and requires “a physical presence within the forum.” Oldham v.
United States, 89 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2002-2095, 2097 (D. Or. 2002). Similarly, a
district court in California dismissed a petition to quash a summons issued to
MasterCard International because it did not have an office in California.
Scharringhausen v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2003-651 (S.D. Cal.
2003).
b. Seeking enforcement
Section 7609(b)(2)(A) permits the Government to “seek to compel
compliance with the summons” (which may be by counterclaim or motion,
depending on the circumstances) whenever a petition to quash a summons has
been filed. Whether to seek enforcement is a strategic decision to be made in
consultation with the IRS. The summoned party may comply with the
summons after the petition to quash the summons is dismissed or denied,
without a corresponding order enforcing the summons. In such cases, seeking
enforcement is unnecessary. If, on the other hand, there is a possibility that
compliance would not follow, an enforcement order would be binding on the
summoned party, whether or not a named party in the case. I.R.C.
§ 7609(b)(2)(C) (“the person summoned shall have the right to intervene. . .
[and] shall be bound by the decision in such proceeding (whether or not the
person intervenes in such proceeding)”).
c. Defective petitions
If the petitioner has not demonstrated that the jurisdictional
requirements for a petition to quash have been satisfied, counsel should
request evidence from the petitioner demonstrating that the requirements
have been satisfied. If the petitioner fails to promptly demonstrate that the
requirements have been satisfied, a motion to dismiss the petition should be
filed. If the summoned party is unwilling to comply, a petition to enforce
should be filed.
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C. RESPONSES TO FREQUENT OBJECTIONS AND ARGUMENTS
In addition to claiming that the Government failed to establish the four
Powell requirements, a summoned party or noticee may attempt a broader
attack on a summons’s validity. In United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58
(1964), the Court explained that in a summons enforcement proceeding:
It is the court’s process which is invoked to enforce the administrative
summons and a court may not permit its process to be abused. Such an
abuse would take place if the summons had been issued for an improper
purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle
a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith
of the particular investigation.
The taxpayer may “challenge the summons on any appropriate ground.”
United States v. Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316, 319 (1st Cir. 1979) (citations
omitted; emphasis added). The court is faced with the task of balancing the
interests of the taxpayer and the Government. “On one hand is the
Government’s interest in summary proceedings designed to expedite tax
collection. On the other hand is the taxpayer’s right to protection from the
improper use of the Internal Revenue Service’s summons powers.” United
States v. Stuckey, 646 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
In addition to broadside attacks challenging the propriety of the
summons, what follows are responses to typical arguments challenging the
validity of a summons.
1. IRS failed to follow administrative requirements
Taxpayers often argue that a court should not enforce a summons, or
should quash a summons to a third party, because the IRS failed to follow
appropriate procedures, including failure to properly issue, serve, or give
notice of the summons. In effect, such taxpayers are arguing that the fourth
requirement of the Powell requirements has not been met. (See Section
II(B)(2)(a)(4).)
Even if all the administrative steps required by the Code were not
followed, a court may order enforcement of the summonses. Several courts
have held that not every failure to follow an administrative requirement
imposed by the Code necessitates denial of enforcement. See Mimick v. United
States, 952 F.2d 230, 231-32 (8th Cir. 1991). In the words of the Fifth Circuit:
Updated July 2011
32
Nothing in the language of the code itself mandates this sanction [denial
of enforcement] for infringement [of the Code's administrative
requirements]. The correct approach for determining whether to enforce
a summons requires the court to evaluate the seriousness of the violation
under all the circumstances including the Government’s good faith and
the degree of harm imposed by the unlawful conduct.
United States v. Payne, 648 F.2d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 1981), (quoting United
States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980)).
a. Challenges to the issuance of the summons
One of the most common challenges to summons enforcement is to the
official’s authority to issue the summons. Section 7602(a) provides summons
authority to the “Secretary,” meaning “the Secretary of the Treasury or his
delegate.” I.R.C. § 7701(a)(11)(B). “Delegate,” in turn, is defined as “any
officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department duly authorized by
the Secretary of the Treasury directly, or indirectly by one or more
redelegations of authority, to perform the function mentioned or described in
the context.” I.R.C. § 7701(a)(12)(A)(i).
The Secretary of the Treasury has delegated authority to issue
summonses to the Commissioner of the IRS. Treas. Reg. § 301.7602-1(b)
(authorizing the Commissioner of the IRS to issue summonses under I.R.C.
§ 7602); Treas. Reg. §301.7701-9(b) (Treasury regulations authorizing the
Commissioner to perform some function “shall constitute a delegation by the
Secretary of the authority to perform such function”). The Secretary has
authorized the Commissioner to redelegate this authority to IRS employees.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-9(c). The Commissioner has redelegated this
authority. Deleg. Order No. 4 (Rev. 22), 1997 WL 33479254 (delegating from
Commissioner to various IRS employees, including revenue agents, authority
to issue summonses).
The Supreme Court and the courts of appeal have recognized that the
Secretary’s authority to issue summonses has been delegated to the IRS and
its employees. See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805,
814 (1984) (“[a]s a tool of discovery, the § 7602 summons is critical to the
investigative and enforcement functions of the IRS”); United States v. Ins.
Consultants of Knox, Inc., 187 F.3d 755, 759 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[t]he IRS is
authorized to issue summonses” pursuant to I.R.C. § 7602); Holifield v. United
States, 909 F.2d 201, 205 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The information-gathering
Updated July 2011
33
authority granted to the IRS under § 7602 is quite broad.”). Challenges to this
delegation have been dismissed as lacking merit. United States v. Derr, 968
F.2d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting argument that IRS agents did not have
delegated authority to issue summonses); United States v. Saunders, 951 F.2d
1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 1991) (same for summons issued by IRS Revenue Officer);
Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1445, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990) (failure
to publish Treasury Department orders delegating authority did not deprive
the IRS of authority to issue summons).
b. Challenges to service of the summons
Section 7603 provides that an IRS summons “shall be served . . . by an
attested copy delivered in hand to the person to whom it is directed or left at
his last and usual place of abode.” United States v. Bichara, 826 F.2d 1037
(11th Cir. 1987) (proper service of a summons to a taxpayer does not require
that the IRS leave the summons with some person of suitable age and
discretion). Service “in hand” of an officer of a corporate taxpayer, including a
managing agent, is sufficient to effect service on a foreign corporation. United
States v. Toyota Motor Co., 569 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
The same IRS agent or officer may both issue and serve a summons
pursuant to Sections 7602 and 7603. United States v. Crum, 288 F.3d 332, 334
(7th Cir. 2002); Derr, 968 F.2d at 946-47; United States v. McCoy, 954 F.2d
1000, 1001 (5th Cir. 1992); Bichara, 826 F.2d at 1038; United States v.
Howard, 360 F.2d 373, 375 (3d Cir. 1966).
Only the summoned party may raise objections to defects in service of a
summons to a third-party recordkeeper; the taxpayer has no standing to
assert objections to a summons that are personal to the third-party
recordkeeper. Wright v. United States, 964 F. Supp. 336 (M.D. Fla.), aff’d
without opinion, 132 F.3d 1461 (11th Cir. 1997).
c. Challenges to the adequacy of the notice of the summons
While the procedural requirements of Section 7603 for serving the person
named in the summons must be strictly observed, a failure to strictly comply
with the taxpayer notice requirements of I.R.C. § 7609 does not necessarily
warrant the quashing of third-party summonses. United States v. Hamilton
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 566 F. Supp. 755, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The
sufficiency of the notice to the taxpayer must be judged by different standards
since its only purpose is to apprise the notice of an event that has already
Updated July 2011
34
occurred. Id. (citing R. Fink, Tax Fraud—Audit Investigations, Prosecutions,
Vol. 1 § 7.05[2] at 7-53 (MB 1981)).
To evaluate the seriousness of the facial defects, the court looks to all of
the circumstances, including the Government’s good faith and the prejudicial
effect to the taxpayer. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980)
(failure to list addresses of third parties is not prejudicial); Tarplay v. United
States, 86 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2000-5833 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v.
Hamilton Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 566 F. Supp. at 758 (failure of the
summons to properly list address of taxpayer on summons not prejudicial);
Int’l Bus. Enters. v. United States, 75 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 95-2237 (S.D. Cal.
1995) (third-party summons will be enforced if agent makes good-faith effort
to deliver a copy to taxpayer’s last-known address, even though agent used the
wrong address, if taxpayer actually receives notice).
Courts have enforced summonses despite defects in the timing of the
notice to taxpayers. See Cook v. United States, 104 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that district courts possess discretionary authority to excuse the
Service’s technical notice errors where the party in interest suffered no actual
prejudice); Sylvestre v. United States, 978 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1992) (affirming
district court’s refusal to quash summonses in which taxpayer was served 21
days before the date fixed for examination of records, where taxpayer had
opportunity to intervene and seek to quash the summons); Rivera v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 53 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 84-1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (absent harm
to petitioner, refusing to quash summonses, notices of which were given to
petitioner 18 and 22 days before the date set for examination); Holifield v.
United States, 677 F. Supp. 996, 998 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (although summons
required third party to produce records 11 days after service of summons, in
view of the fact that (a) the IRS later extended the date for production, (b) the
plaintiff was able to move to quash, and (c) the records had not yet been
produced, the plaintiff had not been harmed and the summons would be
enforced).
Section 7603 requires that the IRS provide an attested copy of the
summons to the summoned party. The majority of courts have held that the
IRS need not provide an attested copy to noticees. Kondik v. United States, 81
F.3d 655, 657 (6th Cir. 1996) (“we hold that § 7609 requires only that
taxpayers be served with copies, not attested copies”); Fortney v. United
States, 59 F.3d 117, 120 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the absence of an express
attestation requirement in Section 7609 is dispositive of Congress’s intent);
Codner v. United States, 17 F.3d 1331, 1334 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Congress did
Updated July 2011
35
not intend to require that notice copies of summonses served on taxpayers be
attested.”); Darland v. United States, 921 F. Supp. 316 (D. Md. 1996). In the
Eighth Circuit, however, the court held in Mimick, 952 F.2d at 231-32 that
attested copies must be served on both the summoned party and any noticees.
d. Other Arguments
Taxpayers have from time to time unsuccessfully alleged other procedural
defects:
CIn issuing summonses, the IRS is not required to comply with
procedural safeguards established by the Justice Department for
issuing grand jury subpoenas to attorneys. Holifield, 909 F.2d at
205.
CThere is no statute of limitations on enforcement of a summons.
“[B]eing lulled [into thinking the summons had been abandoned] and
then rudely awakened is not the kind of harm . . . that allows laches
to be used to deprive a plaintiff of his rights.” United States v.
Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (addressing
argument that Government could not file summons enforcement
action three-and-a-half years after issuance of summons).
CThe IRS is not required to complete a substitute for return prior to
issuing a summons. Tarplay v. United States, 86 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA)
5833 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
CNo OMB control number is required for a summons. Alford v. United
States, 90 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2002-7034 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
2. The summons seeks information that the summoned party
has a legal duty not to reveal
A frequently encountered defense is that the summons calls for privileged
documents or testimony. Only those privileges recognized under federal law,
however, will be considered. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989).
a. Attorney-client privilege
Summonses are “subject to the traditional privileges and limitations,”
including attorney-client privilege. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
Updated July 2011
36
398 (1981). The attorney-client privilege encourages “full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote[s]
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice.” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. Protecting the privilege, however, comes at
a significant cost to the truth-seeking function of the adversarial system.
Zolin, 491 U.S. at 561-63. “However, since the privilege has the effect of
withholding relevant information from the fact-finder, it applies only where
necessary to achieve its purpose.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403
(1976).
A claim of attorney-client privilege will be upheld only: (1) where legal
advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be
waived. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1461 (7th Cir. 1997)
(quoting 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2292
(McNaughton rev. 1961)). The party asserting the privilege bears the burden
of establishing each of the necessary elements. Id. at 1461; United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
Blanket assertions of privilege are unacceptable: Colton v. United States,
306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530,
541 (5th Cir. 1982). Claims of privilege must be made and sustained on a
question-by-question and document-by-document basis.
(1) Elements of the attorney-client privilege
(i) “Where legal advice of any kind is sought.” It is essential that
the advice in question be “legal.” Business advice is not covered by the
privilege. See, e.g., Sedco Int’l, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1982);
Teltron, Inc. v. Alexander, 132 F.R.D. 394 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Coleman v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 106 F.R.D. 201, 205-06 (D.D.C. 1985). Nor is the preparation of a
tax return legal advice. See, e.g., United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496 (7th
Cir. 1999).
(ii) “From a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such.”
It is not enough that a communication be made by or to a lawyer. For the
privilege to apply, the lawyer must be performing services or giving advice in
his capacity as a lawyer. Evans, 113 F.3d at 1463. The following is a list of
some occasions when the privilege has been held not to apply:
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CIf one consults with an attorney, not as a lawyer, but as a friend or as
a business advisor, the consultation is not privileged. In re Lindsey,
158 F.3d 1263, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Sedco Int’l, 683 F.2d 1201;
Colton, 306 F.2d at 638.
CThere is no privilege if the advisor is not an attorney, unless the
Section 7525 privilege, discussed below, applies. (See Section
II(C)(2)(b).) While there is no federal accountant’s privilege as such,
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973), there may be
circumstances in which the privilege will extend to an accountant
hired by an attorney to assist in his representation of the client.
Compare United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961), with
Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2002), and United
States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999).
CWhen an attorney is acting as a mere scrivener the privilege does not
apply. See Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir.
1966) (attorney prepares tax returns); Pollock v. United States, 202
F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 1953) (“transaction involves a simple transfer
of title to real estate and there is no consultation for legal advice”).
CAn attorney who acts as his client’s agent for receipt or disbursement
of money or property to or from third parties is not acting in a legal
capacity, and records of such transactions are not privileged. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 831 F.2d 225, 228 (11th Cir. 1987); Morgan v.
United States, 380 F.2d 686, 693 (9th Cir. 1967). See United States v.
Wells, 929 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (enforcing summons to
attorney for trust account documents concerning real estate
transactions of client).
CBank records of receipts and disbursements in lawyers’ trust
accounts are not privileged communications. McClary v. Walsh, 202
F.R.D. 286 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
(iii) “The communications relating to that purpose.” “The
privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect
disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the
attorney . . . .” Upjohn, 499 U.S. at 395-96. Thus, documents do not become
cloaked with the attorney-client privilege by being passed from client to
lawyer, Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403-04, and the information that a person
Updated July 2011
38
furnishes an attorney for the purpose of preparing his tax return is not
privileged. United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1983).
Matters such as the client’s identity, engagement letter, retainer
agreement, or fees are generally not privileged. See, e.g., United States v.
BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2003) (client identity); United
States v. Leventhal, 961 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1992) (fees); United States v.
Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995) (client identities and fees); United
States v. Abrahams, 905 F.2d at 1283 (names of tax preparer attorney’s clients
and his fees); Lefcourt v. United States, 125 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1997) (client
identities and fees); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1994)
(same); Clarke v. Am. Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992)
(attorney billing statements); but see United States v. Liebman 742 F.2d 807
(3d Cir. 1984) (holding IRS could not summon names of clients lawyer had
advised could take certain deductions).
Billing records that reveal the substance of confidential discussions
between attorney and client, may be privileged. In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489,
494-95 (7th Cir. 1980). The attorney-client privilege applies to correspondence
between attorney and client which reveals the client’s motivation for creating
the relationship, as well as bills, ledgers, time records and other documents
that reveal the nature of the services provided. In re Grand Jury Witness, 695
F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1982). Accord, Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394
(4th Cir. 1999) (attorney billing records that revealed identity of federal
statutes researched were privileged).
To the general rule that a client’s identity and the nature of his fee
arrangement with his attorney are not privileged, some courts have recognized
a limited exception “where disclosure would . . . constitute the ‘last link’ in an
existing chain of evidence likely to lead to the client’s indictment.” Blackman,
72 F.3d at 1424; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir.
1975). But the last link doctrine has not met with universal acceptance, see,
e.g., Ritchie, 15 F.3d at 602, n.13 (“our circuit has expressly rejected the last
link doctrine”), and, even in circuits that have adopted it, it will not
necessarily prevent enforcement of an IRS summons, see Leventhal, 961 F.2d
at 940-41.
(iv) “Made in confidence.” There must be an expectation of
confidentiality for the communication to be privileged. If the matter is not
intended to remain confidential but is, for example, to be disclosed on a tax
return, it is not privileged. See Colton, 306 F.2d at 637; In re Grand Jury
Updated July 2011
39
Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases). Documents
transmitted to an attorney with the intent that the information will be
transmitted to a third party (e.g., documents needed for real estate closings
and business transactions) are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Weil
v. Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981));
Lawless, 709 F.2d at 487.
(v) “By the client.” In order to be privileged, communications
must be made by the client. Communications made by someone other than
the client, even if made for the benefit of the client and even if very helpful to
the attorney in rendering legal advice, are not privileged. Ackert, 169 F.3d at
138 (“[A] communication between an attorney and a third party does not
become shielded by the attorney-client privilege solely because the
communication proves important to the attorney's ability to represent the
client.”); In re G-I Holdings Inc., 218 F.R.D. 428, 436 (D.N.J. 2003) (same).
When the client is not an individual but a legal entity, such as a corporation, a
court must determine which individual’s communications with corporate
counsel will be protected. This determination is made case by case, with an
eye to identifying those persons who (1) need to obtain legal advice to perform
their job and guide the corporate decision-making, and (2) are likely to have
factual knowledge which the lawyer needs to know to give the best legal
advice. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-96.
(vi) “Are at his instance permanently protected.” See Swidler &
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (holding that the attorney-client
privilege survives the death of a client, unless some other exception to the
privilege applies).
(vii) “From disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser.” An
attorney need not produce documents that his client could not be compelled to
produce. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403-05. (“Since each taxpayer transferred
possession of the documents in question from himself to his attorney in order
to obtain legal assistance in the tax investigations in question, the papers, if
unobtainable by summons from the client, are unobtainable by summons
directed to the attorney by reason of the attorney-client privilege.”).
(viii) “Except the protection be waived.” In general, only the
client can waive the attorney-client privilege, as the privilege “belongs solely
to the client.” In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100-01 (2d Cir. 1987). An
exception exists in some states which allows the personal representative of a
Updated July 2011
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decedent to waive the privilege in certain circumstances. Swidler & Berlin,
524 U.S. at 404 n.2. In the case of a corporate client, officers and directors
control the privilege, which can be raised or waived. That authority, even
with respect to past communications, passes to a trustee in bankruptcy, who
can choose to waive the privilege in light of his fiduciary duties to creditors
and shareholders. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471
U.S. 343, 358 (1985).
(2) Express Waiver
Generally, disclosure of confidential communications or attorney work
product to a third party constitutes a waiver of privilege as to those items. See
Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1414
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en
banc); Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1985);
United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997). Once the attorney-client
privilege has been waived, the privilege is generally lost for all purposes and
in all forums. Genentech, 122 F.3d at 1416. Voluntary disclosure of a
privileged document waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to all
communications on the same subject matter. Weil, 647 F.2d at 24; Golden
Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 207-08
(N.D. Ind. 1990); Standard Chartered Bank, PLC v. Ayala Int’l Holdings, Inc.,
111 F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
(3) Implied Waiver
A party may waive the attorney-client privilege by asserting claims or
defenses that put his or her attorney’s advice at issue in the litigation. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994). See
Chevron, 974 F.2d 1156 (party’s claim that its tax position was reasonable
because it was based on advice of counsel puts advice at issue and waives
privilege). Common factors in finding implied waiver are (1) assertion of the
privilege is a result of an affirmative act; (2) through the affirmative act, the
asserting party has placed the protected information at issue by making it
relevant; and (3) application of privilege would deny the opposing party access
to information vital to its defense. Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash.
1975).
The doctrine of waiver by implication reflects the position that the
attorney-client privilege may not be used as both a sword and a shield.
Chevron, 974 F.2d at 1162; United Statees v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292
Updated July 2011
41
(2d Cir. 1991); In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 103. In other words, “[a]
defendant may not use the privilege to prejudice his opponent’s case or to
disclose some selected communications for self-serving purposes.” Bilzerian,
926 F.2d at 1292; accord United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir.
1982) (“Selective disclosure for tactical purposes waives the privilege.”).
Where a waiver has been found, the courts have taken at least three
different approaches in defining the scope of the waiver:
CThe scope of the waiver only extends to the specific documents
produced: Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 137 F.R.D.
178, 182 (D. Mass. 1991); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v.
Kittinger/Pa. House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 52 (M.D.N.C. 1987);
Int’l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 446
(D. Mass. 1988).
CThe scope of the waiver encompasses all privileged materials on the
same subject matter as the produced documents: Standard
Chartered Bank, 111 F.R.D. at 85; Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig
Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v.
Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286, 289 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
CThe scope of the waiver includes all privileged documents relating to
the same subject matter as the produced documents: In re Sealed
Case, 877 F.2d 976, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
(4) Selective Waiver
In Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en
banc), the Eighth Circuit held that the corporate defendant had not waived the
attorney-client privilege when it disclosed to the SEC certain memoranda and
other documents prepared by special outside counsel who had been retained to
investigate certain practices of the company’s personnel. The court of appeals
concluded that only a “limited” waiver had occurred, thereby giving rise to
what has come to be called the “selective” waiver doctrine. As its only reason
for its conclusion, the court stated that “[t]o hold otherwise may have the
effect of thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to employ
independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect
stockholders, potential stockholders and customers.” Id. at 611.
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The doctrine has not achieved much traction, as most courts have refused
to apply it. See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 293 F.3d 289, 302
(6th Cir. 2002) (“we reject the concept of selective waiver, in any of its various
forms”); MIT, 129 F.3d 681 (disclosure normally negates the privilege);
Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1997)
(“The cases . . . generally reject a right of ‘selective’ waiver, where, having
voluntarily disclosed privileged information to one person, the party who made
the disclosure asserts the privilege against another person who wants the
information.”); Genentech, 122 F.3d 1409 (rejecting selective waiver doctrine to
allegedly inadvertent disclosure); In re Steinhardt Partners, LP, 9 F.3d 230 (2d
Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply selective waiver doctrine to voluntary disclosure
of work product to SEC); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the
Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting application of selective
waiver doctrine); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988)
(same); Permian Corp. v. United States , 665 F.2d 1214, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(finding selective waiver theory “wholly unpersuasive”); but see United States
v. Bergonzi, 403 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“Whether the
sort of selective waiver McKesson seeks is available in this Circuit is an open
question.”) (citing Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 720 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc) (“[T]he law [regarding selective waiver] is not . . . settled.”)).
The Tax Division’s view has been that selective waiver would extend the
privilege beyond its intended purpose of encouraging full disclosure to one's
attorney in order to obtain informed legal assistance. In MIT, 129 F.3d 681,
the Tax Division successfully contended that MIT had forfeited attorney-client
privilege and work-product protection for documents that had been disclosed
to the Defense Contract Audit Agency. MIT thus had to turn over the
documents in response to an IRS summons.
(5) Inadvertent Waiver
A voluntary disclosure of information that is inconsistent with the
confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship waives the privilege.
Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993). There is no
consensus, however, as to the effect of inadvertent disclosure. Some courts
hold that where there has been a disclosure of privileged communications to
third parties, the privilege is lost, even if the disclosure is unintentional or
inadvertent. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980; In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 727 F.2d at 1356.
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The majority of courts, while recognizing that inadvertent disclosure may
result in a waiver of the privilege, have incorporated an approach that takes
into account the facts surrounding a particular disclosure. Alldread, 988 F.2d
at 1434. Courts generally apply the following factors in determining whether
inadvertent disclosure should be treated as a waiver of attorney-client
privilege:
the reasonableness of the precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure,
the time taken to rectify the error, the scope of the discovery and the
extent of the disclosure. There is, of course, an overreaching issue of
fairness and the protection of an appropriate privilege which, of course,
must be judged against the care or negligence with which the privilege is
guarded.
Lois Sportswear, USA, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co. 104 F.R.D. 103, 105
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Dellwood Farms, 128 F.3d at 1127.
On September 19, 2008, Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 502
to provide clear rules for inadvertent disclosures “made in a Federal
proceeding or to a Federal office or agency” (Fed. R. Evid. 502(b)) and for
disclosures “made in a State proceeding” (Fed. R. Evid. 502(c)). The advisory
committee note for Rule 502 states that it “applies to inadvertent disclosures
made to a federal office or agency, including but not limited to an office or
agency that is acting in the course of its regulatory, investigative or
enforcement authority.” Thus, the rule applies to disclosures made in
response to an IRS summons.
Rule 502 (b) protects inadvertent disclosures “made in a Federal
proceeding or to a Federal office or agency” if the privilege holder took
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure and took reasonable steps to rectify the
error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5)(B). Rule 502(c), which governs inadvertent disclosures made in a
State proceeding, is designed to apply the law (i.e., State or federal) that is
most protective. Rule 502 does not apply to inadvertent disclosures to
individuals and non-Federal entities outside of Federal and State proceedings.
Further, it applies only to the attorney-client privilege and work-product
protection.
The ABA has issued an opinion stating that a lawyer who receives
materials that on their face appear to be subject to the attorney-client
Updated July 2011
44
privilege or otherwise confidential, under circumstances where it is clear that
they were not intended for the receiving lawyer, should refrain from
examining the materials, notify the sending lawyer, and abide by the
instructions of the lawyer who sent them. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992). An attorney who receives such
materials should immediately confer with his or her supervisor.
(6) Crime-Fraud Exception
The attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications “in
furtherance of intended or present continuing illegality.” In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Jacobs, 117
F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1997). When a client abuses the system by consulting an
attorney for the purpose of furthering criminal or fraudulent activity, the
application of the attorney-client privilege is overcome by the “crime-fraud
exception” and such information loses its protected status. Zolin, 491 U.S. at
561-63. See also Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933). In those
circumstances, the value to society of encouraging attorney-client
communications is outweighed by “the costs of probative evidence foregone.”
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 1999).
The party seeking application of the crime-fraud exception to overcome
the attorney-client privilege must make the following prima facie showing:
(1) that the client was engaged in (or was planning) criminal or
fraudulent activity when the attorney-client communications took
place; and (2) that the communications were intended by the client
to facilitate or conceal the criminal or fraudulent activity.
Violette, 183 F.3d at 75 (emphasis in original). The exception applies not only
where the client actually knows that the contemplated activity is illegal, but
also where the client “reasonably should have known.” United States v. Rakes,
136 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998). Moreover, whether the attorney knew about or
was complicit in the illegal activity has no bearing on the crime-fraud
determination. See United States v. Reeder, 170 F.3d 93, 106 (1st Cir. 1999);
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1987); Jacobs,
117 F.3d at 87. The moving party must also establish “some relationship
between the communications at issue and the alleged offense.” Sound Video
Unlimited, Inc. v. Video Shack, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1482, 1486 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
Updated July 2011
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Prima facie evidence is a “lax standard.” In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 626
(7th Cir. 1988).
To determine whether the crime-fraud exception applies, the court may
conduct an in camera review of the alleged communications. “[A] lesser
evidentiary showing is needed to trigger in camera review than is required to
ultimately overcome the privilege.” Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572.
Once that showing is made, the decision whether to engage in in
camera review rests in the sound discretion of the district court. The
court should make that decision in light of the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, including, among other things,
the volume of materials the district court has been asked to review,
the relative importance to the case of the alleged privileged
information, and the likelihood that the evidence produced through
in camera review, together with other available evidence then before
the court, will establish that the crime-fraud exception does apply.
Id.
Whether or not there has been an in camera review, the district court
exercises its discretion again to determine whether the facts are such that the
crime-fraud exception applies. Jacobs, 117 F.3d at 87. Mere allegations or
suspicion by the Government are insufficient. But proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is not necessary to justify application of the crime-fraud exception. The
test for invoking the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is
whether there is “reasonable cause to believe that the attorney’s services were
utilized in furtherance of the ongoing unlawful scheme.” Reasonable cause is
more than suspicion but less than a preponderance of evidence. In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d at 381 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
The crime-fraud exception is not limited to traditional criminal activities;
the crime-fraud exception has been applied to civil fraud, as well as criminal
fraud. See United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1986)
(communications relating to a fraudulent conveyance and scheme to conceal
assets from bankruptcy court are not protected by the attorney-client
privilege); United States v. Barrier Indus., Inc., 1997 WL 16668 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); In re Rigby, 199 B.R. 358 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (crime-fraud exception
applies to communications in furtherance of scheme to partition property to
avoid IRS lien; exception applies to work-product privilege as well).
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b. Tax Practitioner privilege - § 7525
Prior to the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, the attorney-client privilege was
limited to a communication between client and lawyer. And the Supreme
Court had ruled in Couch, 409 U.S. at 335, that “no confidential accountant-
client privilege exists under federal law, and no state-created privilege has
been recognized in federal cases.” So things stood until 1998, when Congress
added Section 7525 to the Code.
For communications made on or after July 22, 1998, Section 7525(a)(1)
provides that “[w]ith respect to tax advice, the same common law protections
of confidentiality which apply to a communication between a taxpayer and an
attorney shall also apply to a communication between a taxpayer and any
federally authorized tax practitioner to the extent the communication would
be considered a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and
an attorney.” A “federally authorized tax practitioner” is “any individual who
is authorized under Federal law to practice before the Internal Revenue
Service if such practice is subject to Federal regulation under section 330 of
title 31, United States Code.” I.R.C. § 7525(a)(3)(A). “Tax advice” is defined
as “advice given by an individual with respect to a matter which is within the
scope of the individual’s authority to practice [before the IRS].” I.R.C. §
7525(a)(3)(B).
Section 7525 only “protects communications between a taxpayer and a
federally authorized tax practitioner ‘to the extent the communication would
be considered a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and
an attorney.’” Frederick, 182 F.3d at 502 (quoting I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1)). The
scope of the Section 7525 privilege is thus no broader than that of the
attorney-client privilege and is subject to all the limitations and restrictions
imposed on the attorney-client privilege at common law. For example, the
Conference Committee report notes that the Section 7525 privilege may be
waived by disclosure to third parties in the same way as is true of the
attorney-client privilege. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-599, at 267 (1998), reprinted
in 1998-3 C.B. 755, 1023.
The Section 7525 privilege is subject to special statutory limitations that
otherwise make it significantly narrower than the attorney-client privilege.
The privilege, such as it is, may only be asserted in any noncriminal tax
Updated July 2011
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matter before the IRS and in any noncriminal tax proceeding in Federal court
brought by or against the United States. I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2). As a
consequence, it is not available in response to a summons issued by an IRS
special agent pursuing a criminal investigation. So, too, it is not available in
any non-tax matter or proceeding, whether or not the IRS or the United States
is a party. Thus, it “may not be asserted to prevent the disclosure of
information to any regulatory body other than the IRS.” S. Rep. No. 105-174,
at 71 (1998), reprinted in 1998-3 C.B. 537, 607.
With respect to communications made before October 22, 2004, Section
7525(b) provides that the privilege “shall not apply to any written
communication which is between a federally authorized tax practitioner and
any director, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the person, or any
other person holding a capital or profits interest in the person, and in
connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect participation of the
person in any tax shelter.” (Emphasis added.) For these purposes, Section
7525(b) incorporates Section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)’s broad definition of the term
“tax shelter” as “(I) a partnership or other entity, (II) any investment plan or
arrangement, or (III) any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose
of such partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion
of Federal income tax.”
With respect to communications made on or after October 22, 2004,
Section 7525(b) was amended by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-357, § 813, 118 Stat.1418, 1581, to make the tax practitioner
privilege inapplicable to any written communication in connection with the
promotion of the direct or indirect participation of any person in such a tax
shelter, whether or not the participant is a corporation.
Among the cases to consider contentions that the Section 7525 privilege
applied are:
CBDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (applying attorney-client privilege law
to reject claim that a client’s identity was privileged under Section
7525);
CScotty’s Contracting & Stone, Inc. v. United States, 326 F.3d 785 (6th
Cir. 2003) (rejecting suggestion that Arthur Young is no longer good
law in light of Section 7525);
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CDoe v. KPMG, LLP, 325 F. Supp. 2d 746 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (rejecting
claim that client identities were privileged under Section 7525), rev’d
on other grounds, 398 F.3d 686 (5th Cir. 2005);
CDoe v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 627 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (finding
Section 7525 inapplicable where the United States was not a party,
there was no IRS tax proceeding, and the tax shelter involved a
corporation);
CUnited States v. KPMG, LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2002)
(finding Section 7525 did not apply to communications relating to
preparation of tax returns).
CUnited States v. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 151-52 (D.R.I.
2007), vacated on other grounds, 577 F.3d 21 (1 Cir. 2009), cert.
st
denied, – U.S. – , 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010) (Independent auditor does
not provide “tax advice” within Section 7525 when it seeks to
determine the adequacy of the audited company’s tax reserve.).
c. Work product
In general, the work-product doctrine, now embodied in Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3), provides qualified protection for:
“documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for another party or by or its representative
(including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent).” If “otherwise discoverable,” such materials “may
be discovered” if “the party shows that it has substantial need for the
materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship,
obtain the substantial equivalent by other means.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3)(A). A court “order[ing] discovery of those materials . . . must
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other
representative concerning the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B).
The question whether a document was prepared in anticipation of
litigation is often a difficult factual matter. United States v. Rockwell Int’l,
897 F. 2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1990). In United States v. Adlman, 134 F. 3d 1194 (2d
Cir. 1998), the Court of Appeals vacated a district court’s decision holding that
Updated July 2011
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a memorandum prepared by outside accountants analyzing likely IRS
challenges to a corporate reorganization was not protected work-product and
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the
memorandum had been generated in the ordinary course of business. The
court accepted, without question, the taxpayer’s assertion that litigation “was
virtually certain to result” from the proposed transaction if carried out,
because the IRS usually audited the taxpayer’s returns, the claimed refund
was so large it would require approval from the Joint Congressional
Committee on Taxation under section 6405, and there was no case or IRS
ruling exactly on point which would validate the transaction. Id. at 1196. The
court held that “a document created because of anticipated litigation, which
tends to reveal mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories
concerning the litigation, does not lose work-product protection merely
because it is intended to assist in the making of a business decision influenced
by the likely outcome of the anticipated litigation.” Id. at 1195. In the course
of its opinion, the Second Circuit rejected what it viewed as a narrower
standard, described as “principal purpose” or “primarily to assist in”
litigation, as opposed to primarily to assist in making a business decision
influenced by the likely outcome of the anticipated litigation. Id. at 1195. See
also, In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Torf), 357 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir. 2004). In
any event, anticipation of an IRS audit does not amount to anticipation of
litigation, and a factual record can be made to establish this point.
In United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 482 (1983), the Supreme Court
held that an IRS civil audit was not “preliminary to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding” within the meaning of Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(I). As a
result, grand jury transcripts and documents could not be disclosed for use in
the audit. Although the Court noted, 463 U.S. at 479 n.3, that its decision was
limited to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(I) and that “[o]ther considerations may govern the
construction of similar standards in other contexts (e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3) (‘in anticipation of litigation or for trial’)),” its opinion is nonetheless
instructive.
The Court explained the “preliminarily to” requirement as follows:
[T]he Rule contemplates only uses related fairly directly to some
identifiable litigation, pending or anticipated. Thus, it is not enough
to show that some litigation may emerge from the matter in which
the material is to be used, or even that litigation is factually likely to
emerge. The focus is on the actual use to be made of the material. If
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50
the primary purpose of disclosure is not to assist in preparation or
conduct of a judicial proceeding, disclosure under (C)(i) is not
permitted.
Baggot, 463 U.S. at 480 (emphasis in original). In other words, a civil tax
audit does not in and of itself portend litigation. The Baggot Court recognized
that there are four possible outcomes of a civil audit, three of which may
involve litigation at some point in the future. Id. Nevertheless, the Court
held that an audit was not “preliminarily to” litigation:
The fact that judicial redress may be sought, without more, does not
mean that the Government’s action is “preliminar[y] to a judicial
proceeding.” Of course, it may often be loosely said that the
Government’s action is “preparing for litigation,” in the sense that
frequently it will be wise for an agency to anticipate the chance that
it may be called upon to defend its actions in court. That, however, is
not alone enough to bring an administrative action within (C)(i).
Where an agency’s action does not require resort to litigation to
accomplish the agency’s present goal, the action is not preliminary to
a judicial proceeding for purposes of (C)(i).
Id. at 481-82. See also, Culinary Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 150 F.R.D.
122, 130 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (documents prepared during OSHA investigation not
in anticipation of litigation because, in OSHA cases, litigation generally is
contemplated only after the employer refuses to recognize and correct safety
violations).
While the Supreme Court, with citation to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), has
held that the work-product doctrine protects “material prepared by agents for
the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself” (United States
v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975)), and applies to summons enforcement
proceedings, Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 398-99, the Court also has held that there is
no work-product immunity for the tax accrual work papers prepared by an
accountant on behalf of a corporation. See United States v. Arthur Young &
Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984). (See, Section II.B.2.c.(3).) Work-product
protection turns, in substantial part, on the role of the person preparing the
sought-after document. An accountant who is in the role of auditor of a public
company does not create memoranda “because of” litigation. United States v.
Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1 Cir. 2009) (en banc) (work-product protection
st
does not apply to tax accrual workpapers because they are prepared in the
In Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, 2008 WL 2139008, No. 2:06–CV-00895
9
(N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008), a district court held that the work-product privilege applies
to documents generated by financial-reporting purposes. The Government’s appeal
in the Regions case was dismissed after the parties stipulated that Regions’s
production of the withheld documents mooted the appeal. Regions Fin. Corp. v.
United States, No. 08-13866-C (Dec. 30, 2008). The district court in Regions
indicated that it was persuaded by the lower court’s decision in Textron, which was
reversed on appeal.
Updated July 2011
51
ordinary course of business to support financial filings and gain audit
approval); United States v. El Paso, 682 F.2d 350 (5 Cir. 1982) (same); but see
th
United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that pre-
existing work product created by public company’s outside counsel that was
recorded by an independent auditor during an audit of the company’s financial
statements was protected work product). An outside auditor is performing a
9
very different function than a business or tax advisor. It is important in each
case to set forth a factual record demonstrating the work done and the role of
the document creator.
Privilege for work-product, other than the mental impressions of an
attorney, may be overcome with a showing of substantial need. In the
summons enforcement context, a factual record needs to be made to establish
the substantial need for non-opinion work-product. Attorney opinion work-
product, on the other hand, receives special protection by the courts; it is not
available even upon a showing of substantial need. See Pacamor Bearings,
Inc. v. Minebea Co., 918 F. Supp. 491 (D.N.H. 1996) (attorney opinion work-
product distinguished from “ordinary” work-product); Fraizer v. Se. Pa.
Transp. Auth., 161 F.R.D. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (same).
Finally, it must be recalled that while I.R.C. § 7525 creates a tax
practitioner privilege analogous to the attorney-client communication
privilege, it does not create a work-product privilege apart from that created
by Rule 26(b)(3). Frederick, 182 F.3d at 502.
3. Overly broad, vague, or burdensome
As an adjunct to arguments attacking the relevance of summoned
materials, parties resisting enforcement of IRS summonses frequently assert
that summonses are so broad, indefinite, or burdensome as to constitute an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. To pass
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52
constitutional muster, however, all that is required is that the summons
describe the documents with sufficient particularity and not be excessive for
the purposes of the inquiry. See Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 209 (1946). “As for specificity, the summons [need only describe] the
requested documents in enough detail to inform [the summoned party] of
exactly what he was to produce.” United States v. Abrahams, 905 F.2d at
1282. See also United States v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 371 F.3d 824, 832 (D.C.
Cir. 2004); United States v. Medlin, 986 F.2d 463, 467 (11th Cir. 1993) (“An
IRS summons is overbroad if it ‘does not advise the summoned party what is
required of him with sufficient specificity to permit him to respond adequately
to the summons.’” (quoting United States v. Wyatt, 637 F.2d 293, 302 n.16 (5th
Cir. 1981))).
While the Commissioner’s summons authority has been described as a
license to fish, United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1973)
(“Sec. 7602 authorizes the Secretary or his delegate ‘to fish’”); United States v.
Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir. 1969) (“Secretary or his delegate has
been specifically licensed to fish by § 7602”), this license is not without limit.
The IRS may not conduct an unfettered “fishing expedition” through a
person’s records, but “must identify with some precision the documents it
wishes to inspect.” United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129,
131 (3d Cir. 1967). Thus, in testing for overbreadth, the question is not
whether the summons calls for the production of a large volume of records.
Instead, the questions are rather, first did the summons describe the
requested documents in enough detail to inform the summoned party of
exactly what is to be produced, Abrahams, 905 F.2d at 1282, 1285, and,
second, may the summoned records be relevant to the inquiry. In re Tax
Liabs. of John Does v. United States, 866 F.2d 1015, 1021 (8th Cir. 1989).
Summonses that are definite in nature and finite in scope, and that request
only information that may be relevant to the IRS’s inquiry, consistently have
been enforced against challenges for overbreadth. See, e.g., United States v.
Reis, 765 F.2d 1094, 1096 n.2 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Linsteadt, 724
F.2d 480, 483 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Cmty. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 661 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Nat’l Bank of S. D., 622
F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1980).
Likewise, the courts have not been receptive to arguments that a
summons may be overly burdensome to the summoned party. It is now well
established that enforcement of a summons seeking relevant records will not
be denied merely because the summons seeks production of (or a search
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through) a great many records or will result in significant expenditure of the
recordkeeper’s time and money. See, e.g., Judicial Watch, 371 F.3d at 832;
Spell v. United States, 907 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Berney,
713 F.2d 568, 571-72 (10th Cir. 1983); Luther, 481 F.2d at 432-33; In re Tax
Liabs. of John Does, 866 F.2d at 1021 (rejecting employer’s claim that the cost
of compliance with summons seeking payroll records for 50 employees was out
of proportion to any revenue the IRS might obtain); United States v.
Southwestern Bank & Trust Co., 693 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1982) (reversing
district court’s refusal to enforce fully a summons requiring review of 10
million documents).
4. First Amendment privilege
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
Government from “abridging the freedom of speech.” The Government may
investigate speech, either spoken or written, only if it is outside the First
Amendment’s protection.
Courts may quash IRS administrative summonses that would infringe on
First Amendment rights either of the speaker or of the speaker’s audience.
United States v. Trader’s State Bank, 695 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (vacating an order enforcing an IRS summons seeking all church
banking records as overbroad and an infringement on the church’s First
Amendment rights of freedom of association and freedom of religion); United
States v. Citizens State Bank, 612 F.2d 1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding
that the district court erred in failing to consider First Amendment
implications of IRS summons). The right to speak or write anonymously is an
inherent part of First Amendment freedoms, as are the rights to participate in
an organization, listen to a speaker, or read anonymously. See generally
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
If the summoned party can make a “prima facie showing of arguable First
Amendment infringement,” then, before a court will enforce the summons, the
Government must demonstrate “a rational connection between the disclosure
required by the summons and a legitimate governmental end, and must
demonstrate a cogent and compelling governmental interest in the disclosure.”
Trader’s State Bank, 695 F.2d 1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 1983). The effect of this
standard is that the IRS summons should be narrowly drafted to avoid First
Amendment implications.
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It is not illegal merely to advocate a false tax theory. See generally
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“the First Amendment ‘ordinarily’
denies a State ‘the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and
political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to be false and
fraught with evil consequence’”) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
374 (1927)); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.”).
Unless the speech falls into one of three unprotected or less-protected
categories, a court will not permit the Government to restrict or otherwise
interfere with speech. The three categories, which often overlap, are: (a) false
commercial speech, (b) speech that is part of a course of illegal conduct, and
(c) speech that incites others to imminently violate the law. Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 448-49 (1969).
(a) The First Amendment does not protect false commercial speech.
Commercial speech is entitled to less protection under the First Amendment
than political speech, and so can more easily be regulated or enjoined. Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771-72 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is protected by the First
Amendment, but that the Government may regulate false commercial speech).
The Supreme Court has held that the Government “may ban commercial
expression that is fraudulent or deceptive without further justification.”
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993). Commercial speech is subject to
injunction, however, only if it is false or misleading; otherwise, it is protected
by the First Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Estate Pres. Servs., 202
F.3d 1093, 1096 n.3, 1097, 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (enjoining as “fraudulent
conduct” and misleading “commercial speech” the “marketing” and “selling” of
a “training manual” that provided “false tax advice”); United States v.
Raymond, 228 F.3d 804, 807, 815 (7th Cir. 2000) (enjoining as “false or
misleading commercial speech” advertisements and a three-volume book);
United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming ban on sale of
the book FEDERAL MAFIA, containing autobiographical information and Schiff’s
anti-tax theories, but also offering instructions on how to fraudulently
complete an IRS W-4 Form and providing a two-page attachment for
customers to submit to the IRS with their “zero-income” Forms 1040); Nat’l
Commodity & Barter Ass’n/Nat’l Commodity Exch. v. United States, 843 F.
Updated July 2011
55
Supp. 655, 665 (D. Colo. 1993) (“Perhaps the NCBA Freedom Books, standing
alone, would amount to mere advocacy. But the NCBA went so far as to
establish the NCE [a warehouse bank] and tout the privacy it afforded to
members. The NCE was clearly established to thwart enforcement of the tax
laws, and as such was an abusive tax shelter.”), aff’d by unpublished opinion,
42 F.3d 1406 (10th Cir. 1994) .
(b) The First Amendment does not protect speech that is itself part of a
course of illegal conduct. Speech directed toward committing a crime – for
example, conspiracy or tax fraud – can itself be “conduct.” Banning a course of
conduct does not violate the First Amendment “‘merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed.’” Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456 (citation omitted). See
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496
(1982) (holding that “the government may regulate or ban entirely” “speech
proposing an illegal transaction”). The Supreme Court has emphasized that
the First Amendment “does not shield fraud,” Illinois exrel. Madigan v.
Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S 600, 612 (2003), and has pointed to
“[n]umerous examples . . . of communications that are regulated without
offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about
securities, corporate proxy statements, the exchange of price and production
information among competitors, and employers’ threats of retaliation for the
labor activities of employees.” Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456 (citations omitted); see
also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 389 (1973) (order prohibiting newspaper from publishing discriminatory
advertisement); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696-
699 (1978) (injunction against publication of ethical canon); NLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980) (ban on secondary picketing).
(c) The First Amendment does not protect speech that incites others to
imminently violate tax laws. The “incitement” line of cases began with
Brandenburg v. Ohio, in which the Supreme Court, examining whether the
First Amendment applied to statements to an angry mob, held that First
Amendment protection turned on whether the surrounding circumstances –
the context in which the statements were made – made it likely that the
statements would incite others to imminent lawlessness. 395 U.S. at 448-49.
Since Brandenburg, courts have focused on the “imminence” part of this test.
Injunctions prohibiting tax scheme advocacy have been upheld under
Brandenburg where customers were persuaded by, and followed, the
In Richard A. Vaughn, DDS, P.C. v. Baldwin, 950 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1991),
10
the court concluded that the Fourth Amendment applied to the IRS’s retention of
records voluntarily turned over in response to a summons once that consent was
withdrawn. Once consent is withdrawn, the United States must obtain a court
order. See also, Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1284 (5th Cir. 1983); Mason v.
Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977).
Updated July 2011
56
promoter’s advice. See Raymond, 228 F.3d at 815; United States v. Kaun, 827
F.2d 1144, 1150-52 (7th Cir. 1987). Every circuit that has addressed the issue
has “concluded that the First Amendment is generally inapplicable to charges
of aiding and abetting violations of the tax laws.” Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc.,
128 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).
5. Fourth Amendment privilege
Powell does not require a showing of probable cause. United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51 (1964); United States v. White, 853 F.2d 107, 109 (2d
Cir. 1988) (“[W]e find the district court’s summons enforcement requirement
that the IRS must make a prima facie showing of ‘fraud, overreaching, or
excessiveness by the attorney or the Surrogate’ to be inconsistent with
Powell’s holding that only a showing of a legitimate purpose, and not a
showing of probable cause, is required for summons enforcement of its
summonses and we therefore reverse.”). A summons that complies with the
Powell requirements and is narrowly drawn satisfies the Fourth Amendment.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 n.7 (1976). “A summons is not
overbroad for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment ban on ‘unreasonable
searches and seizures’ if the inquiry is ‘within the authority of the agency, the
demand is not too indefinite[,] and the information sought is reasonably
relevant.’” United States v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 371 F.3d 824, 833 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1950) and
Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946)). See also Cypress
Funds, Inc. v. United States, 234 F.3d 1267 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Abrahams, 905 F.2d at 1282; United States v. McAnlis, 721 F.2d 334, 337
(11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 849-50 (5th Cir.
1969).
10
A taxpayer’s Fourth Amendment rights are not implicated by a summons
to a third party. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-44 (1976) (“Since no Fourth Amendment
interests of the depositor are implicated here, this case is governed by the
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57
general rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party to obtain the
records of that party does not violate the rights of a defendant, even if a
criminal prosecution is contemplated at the time of the subpoena is issued.”).
A summons that allegedly resulted from an unconstitutional search or
other Fourth Amendment violation, however, may be challenged on Fourth
Amendment grounds. United States v. Beacon Fed. Sav. & Loan, 718 F.2d 49,
54 (2d Cir. 1983) (taxpayer argued that enforcement of summonses should be
denied because they were part of an investigation that was intensified as the
result of an unconstitutional search and seizure by the revenue agent). A
taxpayer must make a substantial preliminary showing of a Fourth
Amendment violation before a court will entertain such allegations. Id. A
summons may be used, however, to obtain documents previously suppressed
in a criminal case because of an improper search, so long as there is an
independent source for knowledge of documents. McGarry’s, Inc. v. Rose, 344
F.2d 416, 418 (1st Cir. 1965) (permitting use of an administrative summons to
obtain documents previously seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
because IRS agent had knowledge of the documents independent of the
unlawful seizure); United States v. Heubusch, 295 F. Supp. 2d 240 (W.D.N.Y.
2003), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 123 Fed. Appx. 21 (2d Cir.
2005) (citing with approval McGarry’s, Inc. v. Rose; remanding for
consideration of Fifth Amendment claim).
6. Fifth Amendment privilege
A person summoned to answer questions from an IRS agent is entitled to
assert the Fifth Amendment right not to testify against oneself, where
appropriate. The assertion of the privilege, however, is subject to the same
limitations that obtain in other situations. “The witness is not exonerated
from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would
incriminate himself – his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of
incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified.”
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); accord Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). “It is well established that the privilege
protects against real dangers, not remote and speculative possibilities.”
Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm’n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478
(1972); see also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (holding
that the Fifth Amendment “protects against any disclosures which the witness
reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to
other evidence that might be so used”).
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As a corollary to this principle, “a mere blanket assertion of the privilege
will not suffice.” United States v. Hatchett, 862 F.2d 1249, 1251 (6th Cir.
1988). The privilege must be asserted with specificity. If the summoned party
appears at a compliance hearing, but is not given the opportunity to invoke
the privilege on a question-by-question basis because no relevant and specific
questions were asked, he will not have relinquished the privilege. It is thus
“incumbent upon the Government to ask specific questions” when a summoned
party does appear. United States v. Drollinger, 80 F.3d 389, 393 n.5 (9th Cir.
1996) (failure to appear at enforcement hearing and at contempt hearing and
to appeal either the enforcement or the contempt order did not waive the
privilege). If the agent excuses appearance based on a blanket assertion of the
Fifth Amendment, the IRS may be found to have waived compliance, thereby
rendering the summons unenforceable. See United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d
682 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 39 (N.D. Tex.
1979).
Some courts will conduct their own in camera examination to determine
whether the privilege has been properly asserted question by question. United
States v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 1991). Courts may
provide the summoned party an opportunity to assert the privilege even after
it has enforced the summons. United States v. Allee, 888 F.2d 208 (1st Cir.
1989).
a. Act of Production
A person who invokes the Fifth Amendment as a basis to withhold
documents must “make a showing as to how disclosure of the summoned
documents might tend to incriminate him.” United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32,
40 (2d Cir. 1983). The act of producing evidence in certain circumstances may
violate an individual’s Fifth Amendment rights. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-13.
This is so because the act of complying with the Government’s request may
have testimonial aspects and an incriminating effect. See United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984). By producing summoned documents, the
taxpayer may tacitly concede “the existence of the papers demanded and their
possession or control by the taxpayer,” and he may authenticate the
documents by indicating his “belief that the papers are those described in the”
summons. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27,
41-43 (2000) (holding that because the grand jury subpoena was so broad, the
respondent had to “make extensive use of ‘the contents of his own mind’” in
Updated July 2011
59
order to identify the responsive documents, and the act of producing the
documents therefore had a testimonial aspect) (citation omitted).
Where the existence, possession and authenticity of the summoned
documents are established as “foregone conclusion[s],” the summoned party’s
act of producing the documents “adds little or nothing to the sum total of the
Government’s information,” and does not “rise[] to the level of testimony
within the protection of the Fifth Amendment.” Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411; Doe,
465 U.S. at 614 n.13. As explained in Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411 (quoting In re
Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911)), “[u]nder these circumstances . . . ‘[t]he
question is not of testimony but of surrender.’” See United States v. Norwood,
420 F.3d 888, 895-896 (8th Cir. 2005) (existence of documents associated with
credit card accounts a “foregone conclusion”); see also United States v. Teeple,
286 F.3d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Stone, 976 F.2d 909, 911-
12 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rue, 819 F.2d 1488, 1492 (8th Cir. 1987).
b. Collective entity doctrine
There is a critical distinction between collective entities and individuals,
when it comes to the Fifth Amendment. It is well established that an
individual cannot rely on his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination to avoid producing the records of a collective entity which
are in his possession in a representative capacity. Braswell v. United States,
487 U.S. 99, 104 (1988); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 771 F.2d 143, 148 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc). While
this rule was first announced with respect to corporate records, it also applies
to other collective entities including dissolved corporations, partnerships,
labor unions and other unincorporated associations. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88-89.
This rule also applies to former officers of a corporation. In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 1992) (“We hold
that a custodian of corporate records continues to hold them in a
representative capacity even after his employment is terminated. It is the
immutable character of the records as corporate which requires their
production and which dictates that they are held in a representative capacity.
Thus, the production of such documents is required regardless of whether the
custodian is still associated with the corporation or other collective entity.”).
But see In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999,
191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
June 13, 1983 & June 22, 1983, 722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983).
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c. Required records exception
The “required records” exception to the Fifth Amendment applies to the
disclosure of documents that persons in a regulated industry are required by
the Government to maintain. See generally In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601
F.2d 162, 168 (5th Cir. 1979). There are several reasons for this rule, notably
that “the public interest in obtaining such information outweighs the private
interest opposing disclosure and the further rationale that such records
become tantamount to public records.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Additionally, courts have held that production of such records is “in a sense
consented to as a condition of being able to carry on the regulated activity
involved.” Id. at 171.
The Supreme Court first recognized the required records exception in
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), and formulated the standards for
the exception in Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968):
The premises of the doctrine, as it is described in Shapiro, are
evidently three: first, the purposes of the United States’ inquiry
must be essentially regulatory; second, information is to be obtained
by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which the regulated
party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must
have assumed “public aspects” which render them at least analogous
to public documents.
This formulation of the rule has become a three-part test that courts generally
apply to determine whether the required records exception applies. See
generally In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 21 F.3d 226, 228 (8th Cir. 1994).
The required records exception is distinguishable from the “collective
entity doctrine.” Although sole proprietors are not subject to the collective
entity doctrine and may otherwise have Fifth Amendment rights, they are
subject to the required records exception. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 21
F.3d at 230; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served upon
Underhill, 781 F.2d 64, 67-70 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying required records
exception to sole proprietorships); Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner,
721 F.2d 1072, 1082 (7th Cir. 1983); Herman v. Galvin, 40 F. Supp. 2d 27, 29
(D. Mass. 1999).
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Courts have held that the required records exception applies to income
tax return preparers who are compelled by Section 6107(b) to retain and
disclose tax returns. See United States v. Nordbrock,65 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 660,
662 (D. Ariz. 1990), rev’d on other grounds 941 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Bohonnon, 628 F. Supp 1026, 1028-29 (D. Conn.), aff’d
without opinion, 795 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1985). But at least one circuit has
refused to apply the exception to records required by Section 6001. United
States v. Porter, 711 F.2d 1397, 1404-05 (7th Cir. 1983).
7. Non-possession
When an IRS summons is served, the rights and obligations of the party
on whom the summons was served become fixed. United States v. Darwin
Constr. Co., 873 F.2d 750, 755 (4th Cir. 1989). Receipt of a summons imposes
on the recipient a duty to retain possession of the documents pending a
judicial determination of the enforceability of the summons. United States v.
Asay, 614 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1980).
A respondent who did not have possession or control of the documents at
the time the summons was served must raise this as a defense to enforcement
of the summons in the initial enforcement proceeding. United States v.
Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983). Lack of possession or control of the
requested records is a defense to the enforcement of a summons only if the
respondent properly establishes non-possession. Id. The Government is not
required to make any showing that the requested books and documents are
within the possession or control of the respondent. On the contrary, the
respondent bears the burden of producing credible evidence of non-possession.
See United States v. Lawn Builders of New England, Inc., 856 F.2d 388, 392
(1st Cir. 1988) (stating that the court “rejected the contention that the IRS
must prove by positive evidence the existence of the records and their
possession by the summonee”) (emphasis in original) (citing United States v.
Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316, 322 (1st Cir. 1979)); United States v. Huckaby,
776 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 1985) (a defendant must prove a lack of possession
by the introduction of “credible evidence”); United States v. Graber, 81
A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 98-429 (8th Cir. 1998). Thus, a respondent who wishes to
raise a defense of non-possession must present credible evidence that he or she
does not have possession or control of the requested documents.
Not possessing the records is not a defense to enforcement of the
summons if the respondent caused the records not to be in his possession after
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receiving the summons. Asay, 614 F.2d at 660. “Not surprisingly, the law does
not allow a custodian of records to send them away after receiving a summons
and then claim he cannot produce them because they are no longer in his
possession.” United States v. Three Crows Corp., 324 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206 (D.
Me. 2004).
The Fifth Amendment may not be invoked as a substitute for evidence
proving that the records are not in the respondent’s possession. The Fifth
Amendment privilege “has never been thought to be in itself a substitute for
evidence that would assist in meeting a burden of production.” Rylander, 460
U.S. at 758. The Supreme Court analogized to a criminal defendant’s right
against self-incrimination: “That the defendant faces such a dilemma
demanding a choice between complete silence and presenting a defense has
never been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination.” Id. at 759 (emphasis omitted). If the Fifth Amendment were
permitted to replace the burden to produce evidence, it “would convert the
privilege from the shield against compulsory self-incrimination which it was
intended to be into a sword whereby a claimant asserting the privilege would
be freed from adducing proof in support of a burden which would otherwise
have been his.” Id. at 758. Just as a defendant in a criminal trial is required
to produce evidence of any defense he wishes to raise, so too must the
respondent who wishes to raise non-possession as a defense to enforcement.
Often the taxpayer first asserts non-possession in a contempt proceeding
following the taxpayer’s failure to comply with an enforcement order. Once a
court orders the summons enforced, however, a presumption arises that the
documents are in existence and in the continuing possession and control of the
respondent. United States v. Sorrells, 877 F.2d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 1989). See
also United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988) (court’s
enforcement order is res judicata on the issue of possession at the time when
the order was entered). Because parties may not relitigate the merits of the
original court order at a contempt proceeding, taxpayers may not avoid
contempt by arguing that the documents were not in their possession prior to
enforcement. Rylander, 460 U.S. at 757; Lawn Builders of New England, Inc.,
856 F.2d at 395. The respondent may raise a present inability to comply as a
defense to entry of an order of contempt, however. “While the court is bound
by the enforcement order, it will not be blind to evidence that compliance is
now factually impossible.” Rylander, 460 U.S. at 757. A taxpayer claiming
present inability to comply with the summons has the burden of production
with respect to that impossibility. Id. See also United States v. Drollinger, 80
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F.3d 389, 393 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sorrells, 877 F.2d at 349. Self-
serving denials by the respondent are not sufficient to meet this burden.
Roberts, 858 F.2d at 701. The respondent must show that he undertook “in
good faith all reasonable efforts to comply.” United States v. Rizzo, 539 F.2d
458, 465 (5th Cir. 1976).
8. Improper purpose or institutional bad faith
Taxpayers may argue that a summons was issued for an improper
purpose by alleging that the IRS acted in bad faith in issuing the summons,
issued the summons to harass the taxpayer, or that the IRS is pressuring the
taxpayer to settle a collateral dispute.
A court must look at the “institutional posture” of the IRS and determine
whether the summons was issued with the intent to harass the taxpayer.
United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 316 (1978). In United
States v. Millman, 822 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1987), the Second Circuit further
explained the “institutional posture” test:
[T]he “institutional posture” test is the appropriate standard for
determining whether a summons is issued merely to harass the taxpayer,
that the motive of an agent involved in an investigation is a relevant
factor in determining that institutional posture, as are the particular
facts of each investigation and each taxpayer’s situation, and that while
the institutional test is applicable to a claim such a Millman’s, how that
posture, and the good faith of the IRS, are determined is a matter for
case-by-case adjudication.
Id. at 309. While the agent’s personal intent is relevant, it is not dispositive.
LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. at 316. The taxpayer must disprove the actual
existence of a valid purpose by the IRS in issuing the summons. “After all, the
purpose of the good-faith inquiry is to determine whether the agency is
honestly pursuing the goals of § 7602 by issuing the summons.” Id.
The taxpayer cannot meet this burden by making mere conclusory
allegations without specific facts showing an improper purpose. LaSalle, 437
U.S. at 316. In responding to the Government’s showing, the taxpayer must
factually oppose the Government’s allegations by affidavit. Legal conclusions
or mere memoranda of law will not suffice. United States v. Garden State
Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 61, 71 (3d Cir. 1979) (conclusory allegations are
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insufficient). A taxpayer who meets this burden may be provided an
opportunity to substantiate his or her claims in a limited evidentiary hearing.
(See Section III.C.)
Although the following list of cases is not exclusive, it illustrates various
arguments that taxpayers have made regarding the impropriety of the
Government in attempting to enforce the summons:
CSummons allegedly issued to harass taxpayers: United States v.
Cmty. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 661 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Cecil E. Lucas Gen. Contractor, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 1267
(D.S.C. 1975).
CImproper ex parte communications between the IRS Appeals Office
and the Examination Division: Robert v. United States, 364 F.3d 988
(8th Cir. 2004) (even though the court found the ex parte
communications were improper, the summonses were enforced
because the improper communications did not evidence bad faith or
an improper purpose in issuing the summonses).
CSummonses allegedly issued to retaliate against taxpayers for
exercising their rights to free association, free speech, and
substantive and procedural due process. United States v. Kis, 658
F.2d 526, 539 (7th Cir. 1981).
CIRS might improperly disclose the summoned documents: United
States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
district court may not conditionally enforce a summons to prevent
violations of I.R.C. § 6103); United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325, 1328
(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (reversing the district court’s order
requiring the IRS to notify the taxpayer before distributing the
summoned documents to other divisions of the IRS, including
Criminal Investigations).
CIRS allegedly committed fraud in gathering information used to issue
the summons: United States v. Deak-Perera & Co., 566 F. Supp.
1398, 1402 (D.D.C. 1983).
CSummons allegedly used to skirt discovery rules: Sugarloaf Funding,
LLC v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 584 F.3d at 348-49; PAA Mgmt., Ltd.
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v. United States, 962 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Admin.
Co., 74 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 94-5256 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that where
summonses were issued before Tax Court petition is filed, there is no
abuse of Tax Court’s discovery rules), aff’d, 46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir.
1995) .
CInformation used to prepare summons came from illegal wiretap:
United States v. Millstone Enters., Inc., 864 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1988)
(holding that district court erred in considering whether summons
was based on illegal wiretap at contempt hearing).
9. Criminal referral
Taxpayers occasionally complain that a civil summons was issued in bad
faith because the IRS was attempting to collect information by which it can
bring criminal charges. The possibility that criminal charges could be
considered at some time in the future does not make a summons invalid.
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 544 (1971). Indeed, a summons
may be issued in furtherance of a criminal investigation. Prior to 1982, the
IRS summons power could be exercised only if there was a civil purpose to the
examination, but the enactment of I.R.C. § 7602(b) changed that. Now, a
summons may be issued solely to further a criminal investigation, provided
that the matter has not yet been referred to the Department of Justice for
review and prosecution. (See Section II(B)(2)(b).)
10. Intervening events
In general, the validity of a summons is tested as of the date of issuance,
and events occurring after the date of issuance, but before enforcement, should
not affect enforceability. See Garpeg, Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 799
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (subsequent referral to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution); PAA Mgmt., Ltd. v. United States, 962 F.2d 212, 219 (2d Cir.
1992) (filing of Tax Court petition after issuance of summons); United States v.
Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (passage of time since
issuance of summons).
There are two notable exceptions to the general rule: First, compliance
with the summons before enforcement is ordered will, in most cases, obviate
the need for an enforcement order. However, compliance by the summoned
person after an enforcement order is issued will not moot an appeal of an
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enforcement order or of the denial of a petition to quash the summons.
Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 17-18 & n. 11 (1992).
Second, an enforcement action cannot be commenced after a “Department
of Justice referral” (as defined in Internal Revenue Code section 7602(d)) has
been made. This prohibition applies as well to seeking enforcement in
response to a petition to quash, as is permitted by Section 7609(b)(2)(A).
DeGroote v. United States, 57 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1373 (W.D.N.Y. 1986).
D. SPECIALTY SUMMONSES
1. John Doe summonses
John Doe summonses are issued to discover the identities of unknown
taxpayers. All proceedings involving such summonses are handled by the Tax
Division. The Tax Division’s policy is that the Deputy Assistant Attorney
General (Civil Trial Matters) should approve the filing of a petition seeking
authorization to serve a John Doe summons. (See Section III.E.)
In United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975), the Supreme Court
held that Sections 7601 and 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code empowered
the IRS to issue John Doe summonses to discover the identity of unknown
taxpayers. Congress subsequently codified this authority in Section 7609(f),
which requires that, before the IRS may serve a John Doe summons, it must
obtain authorization from a federal district court judge in an ex parte court
proceeding.
At the ex parte court proceeding, the Government must establish that: (1)
the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or
ascertainable group or class of persons; (2) there is a reasonable basis for
believing that such person or group or class may fail or may have failed to
comply with any provision of any internal revenue law; and (3) the
information sought to be obtained from the examination of the records or
testimony (and the identity of the person or persons with respect to whose
liability the summons is issued) is not readily available from other sources.
I.R.C. § 7609(f). See In re Does, 671 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1982); see also United
States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302, 306 (3d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d 1345, 1349-50 (10th Cir. 1982), rev’d
on other ground, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983); United States v. Kersting, 891 F.2d
1407, 1409 (9th Cir. 1989).
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If the summoned party refuses to comply with a John Doe summons, the
Government can pursue enforcement by filing a petition with the federal
district court in which the summoned party resides or is found. The
traditional Powell factors also apply to enforcement of a John Doe summons.
Pursuant to Section 7609(e)(2), the running of the statute of limitations with
respect to the John Doe is suspended, if compliance with the John Doe
summons is not resolved within six months after service of the summons.
2. Summons for records from a church (I.R.C. § 7611)
Special rules apply when issuing and seeking enforcement of a summons
issued as part of an examination of a church. The Tax Division handles all
proceedings involving the enforcement of such summonses. As a matter of
practice, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General (Civil Trial Matters) should
be notified whenever the Tax Division receives a suit to enforce a summons in
connection with an examination of a church.
Section 7611 imposes procedural and substantive requirements on the
IRS’s ability to examine the tax-exempt status of a church and whether any of
its activities may be subject to tax. The term “church” includes any
organization claiming to be a church and any convention or association of
churches. I.R.C. § 7611(h)(1); Treas. Reg. § 301.7611-1, Q&A (3).
The statute requires that, before the IRS may even inquire, a “high-level
Treasury official” must reasonably believe, based on facts and circumstances
recorded in writing, that the church may not be exempt, or is carrying on an
unrelated trade or business that is subject to tax, or may have engaged in
activities that are subject to tax. Once the high-level official forms the
required belief, a church is entitled to written notice of and the basis for the
belief. The identity of the high-level official is the subject of a new proposed
regulation, published in August, 2009. See
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/E9-18659.htm.
The existing regulation states that the appropriate high-level Treasury
official is a “Regional Commissioner (or higher Treasury official).” Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7611-IT, Q&A (1). Because the position of Regional Commissioner no
longer exists (pursuant to the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1001(a), 112 Stat. 685 (1998)), the
IRS has delegated to other IRS officials the authority to institute a church tax
inquiry. See Delegation Order 193 (rev. 6) (rev. Nov. 8, 2000).
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This delegation order was successfully challenged in United States v.
Living Word Christian Ctr., 2009 WL 250049 (D. Minn.), 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-
714, 2009-1 USTC P 50,199, where the court held that the Director of Exempt
Organizations, Examination, was not a sufficiently high-level official.
In order to begin a church tax examination, in addition to the notice of
inquiry, a notice of examination must be sent to the church, with a copy to
Division Counsel/Associate Chief Counsel, Tax Exempt and Government
Entities, describing the records and activities which the IRS seeks to examine.
The notice must describe the IRS’s concerns and include copies of all relevant
documents that would be disclosable if a FOIA request had been made. In
addition, the notice must provide an opportunity for a conference with the
IRS. Any examination must be completed within two years from the date of
the notice of examination. This period will be suspended under certain
circumstances, including any period during which a summons enforcement
proceeding is pending.
Church records may be examined only “to the extent necessary” to
determine liability for, and the amount of, any tax. Religious activities may be
examined only “to the extent necessary” to determine whether an organization
claiming to be a church is a church for any period. Accordingly, in addition to
the Powell requirements, the Government’s papers must demonstrate
“necessity,” which requires a particularized showing of need for each category
of records summoned. United States v. C.E. Hobbs Found. for Religious
Training & Educ., Inc., 7 F.3d 169 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Church of
Scientology Western U.S., 973 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Church of Scientology of Boston, Inc., 933 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1991).
3. Summons for computer software (I.R.C. § 7612)
Computer software, particularly the underlying source code, may be
valuable intellectual property that often contains copyrighted material or
trade secrets. See United States v. Norwest Corp. 116 F.3d 1227 (8th Cir.
1997); United States v. Caltex Petroleum Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 545 (N.D. Tex.
1998). Congress has specified the circumstances under which the IRS may
summon and use software and source code. I.R.C. § 7612. Section 7612 has
two important parts: (1) protection for the confidentiality of all executable
software; and (2) special rules for summoning the source code of tax-related
software.
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“Computer software executable code” is “any object code, machine code, or
other code readable by a computer when loaded into its memory and used
directly by such computer to execute instructions.” I.R.C. § 7612(d)(3)(A).
Section 7612 protects the confidentiality of executable software by (1) giving
courts jurisdiction to enter protective orders for software; and (2) imposing
conditions on the use of software that comes into possession of the IRS,
notwithstanding the terms of any protective order. The conditions include
limiting access to the software to specific IRS personnel identified to the
taxpayer, limiting use of the software to the audit at hand, returning the
software at the end of the audit, and agreeing not to disclose information
learned about the software. Additionally, § 7612(c)(2)(H) makes it clear that
software shall be treated as return information for purposes of I.R.C. § 6103.
Section 7612 also details the circumstances under which the IRS can
summon computer software source code. Source code is defined as a “code
written by a programmer using a programming language which is
comprehensible to appropriately trained persons and is not capable of directly
being used to give instructions to a computer.” I.R.C. § 7612(d)(2)(a). For
purposes of § 7612, source code also includes programmer notes, design
documents, memoranda, and similar documents, as well as related customer
communications. I.R.C. §§ 7612(d)(2)(B) & (C).
Before the IRS may issue a summons for source code, it must show that it
is not able to ascertain the correctness of an item on the return by using the
taxpayer’s books, papers, records, or other data, or by using the executable
version of the program (the version the taxpayer used). In this narrow
circumstance, Congress has decided that the IRS is required to prove need
before it can get the source code. Further, the IRS must identify, with
specificity, the portion of the source code that is necessary to verify the
correctness of an item on the return. Additionally, the Secretary or his
delegate must make a determination that the need for the source code
outweighs the risks of unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets.
There are exceptions to these requirements for criminal investigations,
source code acquired or developed for internal use rather than for commercial
distribution, any communications between the software owner and the
taxpayer, and any tax-related computer source code that is required to be
produced by some other section of the Code. I.R.C. § 7612(b)(2).
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4. Summons pursuant to Tax Treaty and Tax Information
Exchange
The IRS may exercise its summons authority to carry out any obligations
of the United States under a bilateral tax treaty or tax information exchange
agreement (TIEA) with the United States. A TIEA allows both parties to
obtain from each other information that “may be necessary or appropriate to
carry out and enforce the[ir] tax laws.” I.R.C. § 274(h)(6)(C)(i). The United
States is party to more than 50 bilateral tax treaties and 15 bilateral TIEAs
which can be used by either the United States or its treaty partner to obtain
documents and testimony located in the other party’s territory for criminal
and civil tax investigations and proceedings. These pacts are concluded by the
United States Department of Treasury, with the assistance of the IRS and the
Tax Division of the Department of Justice, and are administered by the
Director, International, Large and Mid-Size Business Division, IRS, as the
Competent Authority for the United States.
When a treaty partner makes a request to the United States under one of
these pacts, the Office of the Competent Authority refers the matter to either
a revenue agent or special agent in the field where the evidence is located, and
directs the agent to undertake the execution of the request. The agent will
attempt to obtain the requested information by asking the witness(es) or
record holder(s) in question to provide such information voluntarily, but, if the
information cannot be obtained voluntarily, the agent will issue summons(es)
on behalf of the treaty partner to obtain the requested information.
The Tax Division typically conducts such litigation arising from a
summons issued on behalf of a treaty partner in much the same way as it
would with respect to an IRS summons issued for a domestic tax investigation.
This summary procedure has been explicitly approved in the context of an IRS
summons issued in furtherance of the Government’s obligations under a tax
treaty or TIEA. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989); Barquero v.
United States, 18 F.3d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1994). To obtain enforcement of a
treaty partner summons, the IRS must establish the four Powell factors.
While the IRS must establish its good faith in issuing the summons, the IRS
does not have to attest to – much less prove – the good faith of the requesting
nation. Mazurek v. United States, 271 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2001).
The Government makes a prima facie showing for enforcement by
submitting, in addition to the declaration of the IRS agent who issued the
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summons, the declaration of the U.S. Competent Authority responsible for
administering the tax treaty in question. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 360; Barquero,
18 F.3d at 1316-17.
The Competent Authority’s declaration should include a description of
the duties and responsibilities of the Competent Authority (i.e., administering
all exchange of information programs under tax treaties and exchange of
information agreements) and the identification and description of the foreign
request. In general, the Competent Authority should aver that:
(1) the summons was issued and served in response to a request by a
foreign government;
(2) the Competent Authority personally reviewed the request;
(3) the Competent Authority determined that the request is properly
within the scope of the tax treaty in question;
(4) the Competent Authority determined that it is appropriate for the
United States to give assistance to the foreign country in question
pursuant to the request;
(5) the foreign tax authorities have reason to believe that the subject of
the foreign tax inquiry may have failed to comply with the foreign
country’s tax laws during the periods covered by the summons;
(6) the requested information is not within the possession of the IRS or
the foreign authorities;
(7) the requested information may be relevant to a determination of the
foreign subject’s tax liability;
(8) the same type of information can be obtained by the foreign tax
authorities under the foreign country’s tax laws;
(9) it is the understanding of the parties to the tax treaty in question
that information exchanged will be used by the applicant State only
for the purposes identified in the tax treaty;
(10) exchanged information may be disclosed only as required in the
normal administrative or judicial process operative in the
administration of the tax system of the applicant State; and
(11) improper use of the information would be protested and, if continued,
would lead to recommendations to terminate the tax treaty.
An attorney to whom a treaty-partner summons is assigned may obtain
the declaration of the Competent Authority by contacting Branch 7, Associate
Chief Counsel (International), IRS. That office may also provide advice and
other forms of assistance for the conduct of the litigation.
Before the 1998 IRS reorganization, the CIC program was called the
11
coordinated examination program (CEP). CIC is the successor to CEP.
This statutory requirement was added after the decision in United States v.
12
Derr, 968 F. 2d 943 (9th Cir. 1992), which held that the examining agent had the
authority to issue a designated summons.
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5. Designated summonses (I.R.C. § 6503(j))
Designated summonses are very rare. All proceedings involving such
summonses are handled by the Tax Division.
Examinations of large corporations may warrant the application of a team
examination approach and the examination may qualify as a “Coordinated
Industry Case” (CIC). See I.R.M. §§ 4.45.1.2, et seq. Designated summonses
11
are issued only in connection with a CIC. I.R.M. § 25.5.3.3(2); I.R.C. § 6503
(j)(1). Often in CIC exams, taxpayers will agree to extend the statute of
limitations on assessment in order to permit the IRS to complete the audit and
obtain the information it needs by asking for the information through
information document requests (IDR’s). On occasion, however, a CIC taxpayer
will decline to produce voluntarily information the IRS agents need to
complete the audit, and will also decline to extend the statute of limitations.
In such circumstances the IRS can unilaterally extend the statute of
limitations on assessment by issuing a designated summons and seeking
judicial enforcement of that summons (or related summonses issued within
thirty days of the issuance of the designated summons). This helps explain
why designated summons cases are often contentious – the IRS is holding the
statute of limitations open when the taxpayer does not want the statute
extended.
A designated summons must meet three specific requirements:
(1) Prior to issuance, a designated summons must be reviewed by Area
Counsel of the Office of Chief Counsel, for the region where the
examination is being conducted. I.R.C. § 6503(j)(2)(A)(i);
12
(2) A designated summons must be issued at least 60 days before the
statute of limitations will expire (including any extensions the
taxpayer has agreed to. I.R.C. § 6503(j)(2)(A)(ii);
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(3) The summons must specifically state on its face that it is a
designated summons. I.R.C. § 6503(j)(2)(A)(iii).
The standard for enforcing a designated summons is the Powell standard.
It is not necessary for the IRS to make any showing that the taxpayer had
been uncooperative in the audit prior to the issuance of the summons. United
States v. Derr, 968 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1992).
The IRS may issue only one designated summons per return. However,
the IRS may issue other summonses that relate to the same return within the
30-day period beginning when the designated summons is issued, and those
related summonses also will hold the statute of limitations open during the
judicial enforcement period. I.R.C. § 6503(j)(1)(A)(ii).
The designated summons does not itself toll the running of the statute of
limitations. If the designated summons or a related summons is enforced, the
statute of limitations remains suspended for 120 days after the end of the
judicial enforcement period. I.R.C. § 6503 (j)(1)(B). If the designated
summons is not enforced, the statute remains open for 60 days after the close
of the judicial enforcement period.
The IRS must seek judicial enforcement of the designated or related
summonses before the statute of limitations expires. If it does so, the statute
of limitations is suspended during the judicial enforcement period, which is
defined as the period beginning of the day the proceeding to enforce the
summons is brought and ending on the day on which there is a “final
resolution” as to the summoned person’s response to each summons. I.R.C.
§ 6503(j)(3).
The term “final resolution” of the summoned person’s response to such
summons is not defined by statute. The IRS has issued proposed regulations
dealing with this question. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.8199-91, 68 Fed. Reg.
44905-01 (2003), reprinted in 2003-2 C.B. 756. The proposed regulations,
relying on the legislative history, assert that the term “final resolution” in the
context of a designated summons is the same as it is under I.R.C. § 7609
(e)(2)(B), namely that no court proceedings remain pending, the period for
appeal has run, and the summoned party has fully complied with the
summons to the extent ordered by the court. If all appeal periods have expired
but the summoned party has not complied with the summons to the extent
required by the court order, the proposed regulations provide that final
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resolution does not occur until the summoned party has complied with the
summons to the extent of the court order.
However, because designated summonses are issued in connection with
the audit of large corporate returns, the summoned information is often
voluminous and complex. Therefore, it is not always the case that the IRS
agents will be able to determine immediately that the taxpayer has fully
complied. The proposed regulations deal with this problem by stating that the
determination of compliance will be made as soon as practicable, and that
notice of the determination shall be made in writing within five days. If the
taxpayer is not satisfied with leaving this issue in the hands of the IRS, it may
give the IRS a written statement of compliance that requests the IRS to issue
a determination that the taxpayer has fully complied with the summons. If
the taxpayer files a statement of compliance within 180 days of receipt of the
statement, the IRS must notify the taxpayer by certified mail that the IRS is
not satisfied with the taxpayer’s compliance. If the IRS does not issue such a
notice, the summons will be deemed to have been complied with as of the
180th day after the statement of compliance was received.
6. Summonses to entities located in the United States for
records located abroad
A person or entity located in the United States may have control over
documents located abroad that the IRS wants to review in connection with an
investigation. For example, a foreign bank might have a United States branch
and the IRS may seek documents located at the bank’s foreign headquarters.
E.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia), 691 F.2d 1384 (11th
Cir. 1982). Similarly, the IRS may want to review documents of a foreign
accounting firm that is controlled by an accounting firm located in the United
States. Cf. In re Parmalat Sec. Litigation, 594 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (holding in a tort suit that Deloitte & Touche USA had not established
that it was entitled to summary judgment based upon its claim that it did not
control an Italian accounting firm which was a member of the same
accounting group as Deloitte & Touche USA). See also United States v. Vetco
Inc., 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming order enforcing summonses
issued to U.S. company and to its U.S. auditing firm for records maintained in
Switzerland by the company’s Swiss subsidiary and the auditing firm’s Swiss
affiliate).
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Such summonses for documents located abroad present special
considerations. You should consult with your Section Chief and the Senior
Counsel for International Tax Matters before filing any suit to enforce a
summons for documents located abroad.
7. Formal Document Requests
Formal document requests (FDR) under I.R.C. § 982 supplement the IRS’s
administrative summons power where a summons may not be an effective
means of obtaining production of documents held abroad. Under § 982(a), if a
taxpayer fails to substantially comply with a request for foreign-based
documentation relating to an item under examination within 90 days of the
mailing of the request, the taxpayer is prohibited from introducing the foreign-
based documentation into evidence in any civil proceeding in which the tax
treatment of the item under examination is at issue.
An FDR is defined in I.R.C. § 982(c)(1) as:
any request (made after the normal request procedures have failed to
produce the requested documentation) for the production of
foreign-based documentation which is mailed by registered or
certified mail to the taxpayer at his last known address and which
sets forth--
(A) the time and place for the production of the documentation,
(B) a statement of the reason the documentation previously
produced (if any) is not sufficient,
(C) a description of the documentation being sought, and
(D) the consequences to the taxpayer of the failure to produce the
documentation described in subparagraph (C).
(Emphasis added.) “Foreign-based documentation,” in turn, is defined as “any
documentation which is outside the United States and which may be relevant
or material to the tax treatment of the examined item.” I.R.C. § 982(d)(1).
The Tax Division becomes involved in litigation relating to FDRs in two
situations. First, unlike in the case of a summons, a person to whom an FDR
Updated July 2011
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was mailed can petition to quash the FDR under I.RC. § 982(c)(2). The
Government then can seek to compel compliance with the FDR in the
proceeding to quash. The second situation arises when a taxpayer fails to
substantially comply with an FDR. In that event, the Government can file a
motion invoking the exclusionary rule in I.R.C. § 982(a) in any appropriate
civil proceeding.
Unlike in the summons area, the Government cannot seek enforcement of
the FDR independent of a petition to quash. If a non-complying taxpayer does
not file a petition to quash, the Government’s remedy is to invoke the
exclusionary rule if the taxpayer later attempts to introduce foreign-based
documents subject to the FDR in a civil proceeding.
“The standards for enforcement of an FDR and a summons are similar,
though not identical.” Eulich v. United States, 74 Fed. Appx. 373, 374 (5 Cir.
th
2003); see also Chris-Marine USA, Inc. v. United States, 892 F. Supp. 1437,
1443 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Spearbeck v. United States, 846 F. Supp. 47 (W.D.
Wash. 1993); Yujuico v. United States, 818 F.Supp. 285, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
Thus, the opponent of an FDR may challenge not only the IRS’s compliance
with the statutory requirements of § 982, but also the IRS’s compliance with
the Powell requirements applicable to a summons. We also have seen an FDR
opponent argue that a revenue agent lacks authority to issue an FDR. This
argument is refuted by Delegation Order 25-8 (formerly Delegation Order
213), I.R.M. 1.2.52.9, which can be accessed at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part1/irm_01-002-052.html#d0e1031.
The exclusionary rule is subject to a reasonable-cause exception provided
in I.R.C. § 982(b)(1). Section 982(b)(2), however, states that “the fact that a
foreign jurisdiction would impose a civil or criminal penalty on the taxpayer
(or any other person) for disclosing the requested documentation is not
reasonable cause.”
III. PROCEDURES
A. PETITION TO ENFORCE
1. Which office should file
The United States Attorneys Manual § 6-5.230 provides that, in general,
IRS Chief Counsel attorneys may directly refer to the United States Attorneys
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77
routine requests to enforce summonses and to defend petitions to quash.
Cases involving sensitive or novel issues should be referred to and handled by
the Tax Division. The manual provides that Tax Division attorneys are to
handle cases involving summonses issued to or for:
• attorneys
• tax practitioners, as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 7525
• churches
• the press or members of the news media
• tax accrual workpapers (tax pool analysis)
• foreign document requests
• treaty partners or other matters with international implications
• John Doe summonses
• Section 6050I
• novel/complex Fifth Amendment claims
• computer software and other non-traditional items
• state/local agencies and courts
• designated summonses
• consent directives
• tax shelter promoters
• tax scam promoters
• examinations into potential liabilities for penalties under Sections
6700, 6701, 6707, and 6708
• offshore records
• other unique issues as may be determined from time to time.
See United States Attorneys Manual § 6-5.240. Among the unique issues that
the Tax Division has determined it should handle are all summons
proceedings involving examinations of promoters of:
• tax shelters,
• scams,
• and schemes.
In addition, the Division handles all summons proceedings arising from the
Offshore Credit Card Project when the summons involves a request for
offshore records.
The Chief of the appropriate Civil Trial Section should be notified
immediately of all adverse decisions. All appeals, whether initiated by the
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United States or the other party, will be handled by the Appellate Section of
the Tax Division. U.S.A.M. § 6-5.260. If you have any questions, please
contact the Chief of the appropriate Civil Trial Section:
• Civil Trial Section, Central, Seth G. Heald, Chief
• Civil Trial Section, Eastern, David A. Hubbert, Chief
• Civil Trial Section, Northern, D. Patrick Mullarkey, Chief
• Civil Trial Section, Southern, Michael J. Kearns, Chief
• Civil Trial Section, Southwestern, Louise P. Hytken, Chief
• Civil Trial Section, Western, Richard R. Ward, Chief
2. Approvals
Proceedings to enforce certain types of summonses must be approved by
higher-level officials at the Tax Division:
CSummonses to attorneys and law firms must be approved by the
Deputy Assistant Attorney General (Civil Trial Matters), Tax
Division.
C“John Doe” summonses must be approved by the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General (Civil Trial Matters), Tax Division.
CSummonses to the press or media for information other than purely
financial records unrelated to the news gathering function (e.g.,
employment records of an employee of a newspaper) must be
approved by the Attorney General. A request for such approval
should be submitted through the Deputy Assistant Attorney General
and Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division.
3. Documents to File
Documents for submission may vary from court to court. Consult local
rules and practice to determine what is needed in your jurisdiction.
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Documents for submission to the court to enforce a summons generally
include (1) petition, (2) declaration, and (3) proposed order to show cause. The
attached forms provide suggested language, but they should be tailored to fit
the requirements of the local jurisdictions.
The petition [Exhibit 2] provides the jurisdictional grounds for the suit,
asserts the underlying facts, and provides a request for relief. Fed. R. Civ. P.
8. It also demonstrates satisfaction of the relevant legal standards and tests.
The agent issuing and serving the summons is generally the one signing
the declaration [Exhibit 3] for submission with the petition. It is a sworn
statement putting forward the relevant facts in the case. If the IRS provides
an agent declaration with the request to enforce, the assigned attorney should
review it carefully to assure that it satisfies all requirements necessary to
enforcement and does not contain any extraneous recitations. Moreover, the
attorney should review any declaration with the agent, even if it has already
been signed, to assure that it is still accurate and complete. Even though
establishing a prima facie case for enforcement through an agent’s declaration
“isn’t much of a hurdle,” 2121 Arlington Heights Corp. v. IRS, 109 F.3d 1221,
1224 (7th Cir. 1997), attorneys should take care to present persuasive support
for enforcement through the declarations. A well-drafted declaration should
anticipate defenses to enforcement.
The typical proposed show cause order [Exhibit 4] either sets the time and
date for a hearing or provides a place for the court to do so. It also includes a
finding that the Powell factors have been met, and sets deadlines for any
response.
The order to show cause, when approved by the judge, represents a
determination that the United States has made a prima facie showing that the
Powell requirements have been satisfied and, consequently, shifts the burden
to the summoned person to demonstrate or “show cause” why the summons
should not be enforced. In order for a court to obtain personal jurisdiction over
the summoned person, the summoned person must be served with the order to
show cause. See United States v. Gilleran, 992 F.2d 232, 233 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“The district court acquires personal jurisdiction over the taxpayer by service
of the show cause order and the petition for enforcement of the summons.”);
United States v. Miller, 609 F.2d 336, 338 (8th Cir. 1979) (service of summons
and complaint not required, as “[t]he district court predicated personal
jurisdiction on the service of the show cause order and the petition for
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enforcement” on respondent); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 372
(3d Cir. 1975) (“Process on the complaint could be in the form of an order
served on the person summoned fixing a deadline for filing any responsive
pleading, albeit an informal pleading, together with an affidavit, and any
motions, and directing that person to show cause at a date and time certain
why an order should not be entered enforcing the administrative summons.
The order should provide that unless the court determines otherwise, any
motions and issues raised by the pleadings will be considered at the return
date of the order to show cause.”).
4. Service of order to show cause
After the court issues the order to show cause, it must be served on the
summoned party. Service of process other than a district court summons or a
subpoena is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.1, which provides for service by the
“United States marshal, or a person specially appointed for that purpose, who
shall make proof of service as provided in Rule 4(l).” Accordingly, the
proposed order to show cause presented to court should provide that service
may be made by any agent, officer, or other person designated by the IRS. A
copy of the petition, declaration, and any other document submitted to the
court in support of the petition must be served on the summoned party along
with the order to show cause. The proposed order to show cause should
provide for the method(s) of service and may propose alternative service
methods for the court’s consideration. The person making service should
complete a proof of service provided by the trial attorney or Assistant United
States Attorney.
5. Monitoring compliance
As soon as an order requiring compliance of a summons is received, the
attorney should forward it to the issuing agent with a request to be informed
whether there has been compliance. Under ordinary circumstances, the
issuing agent will receive the summoned documents and testimony. The
attorney should remain available to the agent to facilitate compliance. The
case file is not ready to be closed until the summoned party has complied.
6. Contempt procedures
An attorney assigned to a summons enforcement case should monitor the
case to assure full compliance with any enforcement order. If a party has not
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fully complied with the summons, the attorney should attempt to confer with
the party to determine if the party will comply without additional judicial
action. Once the attorney determines that the party will not comply, the
attorney should file a motion to find the respondent in contempt.
The motion should identify the order of the court (the summons
enforcement order) with which the respondent failed to comply, and should
detail the respondent’s noncompliance. The motion for contempt should be
supported with a declaration from the agent setting forth that respondent was
aware of the order and that respondent failed to comply with the order. The
motion for contempt is generally accompanied by a proposed order to show
cause why respondent should not be held in contempt, which sets a hearing
date for further court action.
At any hearing on contempt, the attorney should be prepared to address
any issues the respondent may raise for failing to comply, such as current non-
possession of the information, or the Fifth Amendment. The attorney should
also be prepared to address possible coercive sanctions for non-compliance,
including fines and incarceration.
B. RESPONDING TO PETITIONS TO QUASH
When a petition to quash a summons is filed, the Government should file
an appropriate response as soon as possible. The response may take the form
of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a motion for summary denial, a
motion or counterclaim for enforcement, or something similar in accordance
with local practice.
The Government may, but is not obligated to, file a counter-petition or
motion to enforce the summons. (See Section II(B)(4)(b)). The United States
may simply move to dismiss the petition to quash. See Sugarloaf Funding,
LLC v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 584 F.3d at 350; Cosme v. Internal Revenue
Service, 708 F. Supp. 45, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Tarpley v. United States, 1997
WL 767577, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec 11, 1997). If the United States files a motion to
dismiss without simultaneously seeking an order enforcing the summons, the
United States need not establish a Powell prima facie case; rather, “‘the
burden shifts immediately to the petitioner to establish a valid defense to the
summons.’” Knauss v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1254 (S.D. Fla.
1998) (quoting Cosme, 708 F. Supp. at 48); Conrad v. United States, 1989 WL
165576, *1 (W.D. Mich. Nov 09, 1989); Deleeuw v. I.R.S., 681 F. Supp. 402
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82
(E.D. Mich. 1987); Jungles v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 585, 586 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
A declaration from the agent or officer is necessary if seeking
enforcement, and may be appropriate to rebut allegations asserted in the
petition to quash. It is important to respond as quickly as possible so that the
IRS’s examination is not unduly delayed.
C. DISCOVERY AND EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS
Most summons enforcement proceedings should be decided on the papers,
except for the very rare case where the party opposing enforcement has
established the existence of a question as to a material fact. Discovery thus is
rarely appropriate in summons proceedings, and evidentiary hearings are also
rare.
1. Limitations on discovery
The summary nature of summons proceedings limits the circumstances
under which discovery is available. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369
(1989) (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-494, vol. 1, at 285 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1031.) Discovery is rarely appropriate in summons cases.
See United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 1981); Chen Chi Wang v.
United States, 757 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Will, 671
F.2d 963, 967-68 (6th Cir. 1982). In order for discovery to occur, a taxpayer
must make “a substantial preliminary showing that enforcement of the
summons would result in an abuse of the court’s process” and that “discovery
would likely lead to useful, relevant evidence.” Robert v. United States, 364
F.3d 988, 999-1000 (8th Cir. 2004).
Respondents who seek to propound formal discovery requests often have
the real and improper objective of trying to shift the court’s focus from the
Powell standard to a critique of the IRS’s investigative techniques. This is not
a proper inquiry for a summons enforcement proceeding. Tiffany Fine Arts,
Inc. v. United States, 469 U.S. 310, 323 (1985). “[I]t is for the agency, and not
the taxpayer, to determine the course and conduct of an audit, and ‘the
judiciary should not go beyond the requirements of the statute and force IRS
to litigate the reasonableness of its investigative procedures.’” United States
v. Norwest Corp., 116 F.3d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v.
Clement, 668 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1982)).
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Sometimes respondents couch their requests for discovery in terms of
seeking to determine whether the summons was issued for an improper
purpose. The Court in Powell clearly did not intend to permit taxpayers to use
the “improper purpose” exception as a pretext for litigating the wisdom of the
IRS’s investigatory techniques. A mere allegation of improper purpose is not
sufficient to justify discovery. See United States v. Ladd, 471 F. Supp. 1150,
1153 n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (no prehearing discovery when taxpayer failed “to
include circumstances upon which her claim of improper purpose was based”).
When the purported purpose of a discovery request is to inquire into the
motivation for an audit, the movant must show “extraordinary circumstances”
that set them apart from any other taxpayer. United States v. Judicial Watch,
Inc., 371 F.3d 824, 830-31 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting SEC v. McGoff, 647 F.2d
185, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
Indeed, some courts have held that they will not decide whether
discovery should be allowed until after an evidentiary hearing is held. United
States v. Harris, 628 F.2d 875, 882 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing with approval United
States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1970) (discovery should be allowed in
summons enforcement proceedings only after the court has heard cross-
examination of agent at the evidentiary hearing and determines that further
discovery is necessary)); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368 (3d Cir.
1975); United States v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Abrahams, 905 F.2d at 1276; United States v. Lask, 703 F.2d
293 (8th Cir. 1983); Kis, 658 F.2d at 542. But see Nero Trading, LLC v. U.S.
Dept. of Treasury, I.R.S., 570 F.3d 1244, 1249 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We are
mindful that our precedent in this area is not in accord with that of a number
of our sister circuits.”).
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2. Evidentiary Hearings
Summons enforcement proceedings are intended to be summary in nature
with the sole purpose of insuring “that the IRS has issued the summons for a
proper purpose and in good faith.” United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d
802, 810 (7th Cir. 2003). Because summonses are issued during the
investigative stage, no guilt or liability on the part of the taxpayer need be
established. “The summons power ‘is not a power to procure or perpetuate
evidence at all; it is strictly inquisitorial.’” PAA Mgmt., Ltd. v. United States,
962 F.2d 212, 219 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). See also United States v.
Mueller, 930 F.2d 10, 12 (8th Cir. 1991) (taxpayer “could not use the
proceedings to enforce the IRS summons as a forum in which to contest the
validity of the underlying assessments”). Accordingly, “the enforcement
proceeding should be concluded expeditiously so that the actual investigation
can be continued.” Barrett, 837 F.2d at 1349. “[C]ourts have recognized that a
proceeding to enforce a tax summons is a most appropriate candidate for
streamlined procedures.” United States v. McCoy, 954 F.2d 1000, 1004 (5th
Cir. 1992).
While a district court may, in its discretion, allow the taxpayer an
evidentiary hearing to substantiate his allegations and supplement offers of
proof that the summons was not issued in good faith, the “right to an
adversary hearing . . . is not absolute.” United States v. Harris, 628 F.2d 875,
879 (5th Cir. 1980). “There is no requirement that the court conduct [an
evidentiary] hearing or permit discovery in each and every case. . . . [A] party
challenging IRS summonses will be entitled to an adversary hearing only upon
the production of some substantive evidence corroborating the claim of abuse.”
Hintze v. IRS, 879 F.2d 121, 126-27 (4th Cir. 1989). See also United States v.
BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir. 2003); Fortney v. United States, 59
F.3d 117, 121 (9th Cir. 1995); Copp v. United States, 968 F.2d 1435, 1438 n.1
(1st Cir. 1992); Alphin v. United States, 809 F.2d 236, 238 (4th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Balanced Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 769 F.2d 1440, 1444 (10th Cir.
1985); United States v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 718 F.2d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1983),
aff'd, 469 U.S. 310 (1985); United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 539 n.39 (7th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Nat’l Bank of S. D., 622 F.2d 365, 367 (8th Cir.
1980).
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D. THE ROLE OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES
A magistrate judge does not have authority to render a final decision in a
summons case. A magistrate judge’s powers are enumerated in Section 636(a)
of Title 28, and include procedural pretrial matters. Magistrate judges do not
have authority to make a final determination on motions for judgment on the
pleadings, for summary judgment, or other dispositive motions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(a). A summons proceeding is not a procedural pretrial motion, and
the respondent in a summons enforcement proceeding or petitioner who seeks
to quash a summons is entitled to a determination by an Article III judge. See
Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 930-32 (1991). A summons enforcement
order is a final dispositive and appealable order, Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S.
440, 449 (1964), beyond the authority of a magistrate judge to issue. United
States v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Wisnowski, 580 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1978).
Proceedings may be conducted by a magistrate judge with the consent of
both parties. While reference to a magistrate judge for report and
recommendation, with a de novo determination by a district judge, satisfies
the constitutional requirements, a final decision by a magistrate judge absent
consent of the parties, does not. See Flournoy v. Marshall, 842 F.2d 875, 878
(6th Cir. 1988); Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1093 (11th Cir. 1990). An
appeal from an “order” issued by a magistrate judge, absent consent of the
parties, enforcing a summons will be subject to dismissal on the grounds that
the order is not final. United States v. Jones, 581 F.2d 816, 817 (10th Cir.
1978). See also Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. B.B. Andersen
Constr. Co., 879 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1989). When a magistrate judge
mistakenly issues an “order” or “decision” rather than a report and
recommendation, the attorney should ask the district judge to construe the
magistrate judge’s ruling as a report and recommendation that the district
court enter an order enforcing the summons.
E. “JOHN DOE” SUMMONS PROCEDURES
A “John Doe” summons may be served only with judicial approval. I.R.C.
§ 7609(f). These cases are always handled by the Tax Division, and the
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, should approve the suit
before it is filed.
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title6/5mtax.
13
htm#6-5.230
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Similar to a suit to enforce a summons, a suit seeking authorization to
serve a John Doe summons is initiated by filing a petition and a declaration.
The forms included in this manual contain suggested language. They may
require modification to conform with local rules and practices.
A petition [Exhibit 9] provides the jurisdictional grounds for the suit,
asserts the underlying facts, and provides a request for relief. Fed. R. Civ. P.
8. It also demonstrates satisfaction of the statutory requirements of § 7609(f).
A declaration [Exhibit 10] must be submitted with the petition. It is a
sworn statement putting forward the facts that establish the criteria
necessary for a court to approve service of the summons: (1) that the summons
relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascertainable group or
class of persons; (2) that there is a reasonable basis for believing that such
person or group or class of persons may fail or may have failed to comply with
any provision of any internal revenue law; and (3) that the information sought
to be obtained from the examination of the records or testimony (and the
identity of the person or persons with respect to whose liability the summons
is issued) is not readily available from other sources. I.R.C. § 7609(f).
A proceeding seeking the court’s authorization to serve a John Doe
summons is ex parte. Thus, the matter is ripe for the court’s consideration as
soon as it is filed. Filing a notice [Exhibit 13] calling that fact to the attention
of the court is recommended.
Finally, a proposed order [Exhibit 12] should be submitted for the court’s
execution.
F. APPEAL PROCEDURES
All appeals in summons cases – whether or not adverse – will be handled
by the Appellate Section of the Tax Division. Exceptions to this policy must be
approved by the Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division. See U.S.A.M.
§ 6-5.230.
13
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title6/5mtax.
14
htm#6-5.700
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If the court does not fully enforce the summons, the order is considered
adverse. The Chief of the appropriate Civil Trial Section should be notified of
adverse summons-related decisions as soon as practicable. Id.
• Civil Trial Section, Central, Seth G. Heald, Chief
• Civil Trial Section, Northern, Patrick D. Mullarkey, Chief
• Civil Trial Section, Eastern, David A. Hubbert, Chief
• Civil Trial Section, Southern, Michael J. Kearns, Chief
• Civil Trial Section, Southwestern, Louise P. Hytken, Chief
• Civil Trial Section, Western, Richard R. Ward, Chief
When a case is decided in favor of the Government, the United States
Attorney should furnish the Tax Division with a copy of a notice of appeal or
cross-appeal filed by an adverse party as soon as possible (preferably within 5
days of the filing of the notice). See U.S.A.M. § 6-5.700. DOJ trial attorneys
14
should consult with their managers to ensure than the correct actions and
procedures are taken.
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IV. FORMS
A. Checklist ............................................. Exhibit 1
B. Enforcement proceedings
1. Petition to Enforce.................................. Exhibit 2
2. Declaration in Support of Petition to Enforce. . . . . . . . . . . . Exhibit 3
3. Show Cause Order.................................. Exhibit 4
4. Certificate of Service................................ Exhibit 5
C. Proceedings to quash a summons
1. Motions to Dismiss.................................. Exhibit 6
2. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. . . . . . . . . . . Exhibit 7
3. Order of Dismissal.................................. Exhibit 8
D. JOHN DOE SUMMONS
1 . Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe” Summons. . . . . . . . . .
.................................................. Exhibit 9
2. Declaration in Support of Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe”
Summons ........................................ Exhibit 10
3. Memorandum in Support of Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe”
Summons. ....................................... Exhibit 11
4. Order............................................ Exhibit 12
5. Notice of Filing Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe”
Summons......................................... Exhibit 13
CHECKLIST
T Requirement
Reference
When seeking Enforcement. . .
CIs the correct office handling the case?
III.A.1
CIs special approval required?
III.A.2
CFile in the district where the summoned party “resides or is
found.”
II.B.4.a.
CHave the Powell Requirements been met?
CThe summons was issued for a legitimate purpose?
II.B.2.a.(1)
CThe summoned information may be relevant?
II.B.2.a.(2)
CThe summoned information is not already in
possession of the IRS?
II.B.2.a.(3)
CAll administrative requirements have been met?
II.B.2.a.(4)
C Summons was properly issued?
CSummons was properly served?
CSummons copy was attested?
CNotification to taxpayer proper for third-party
recordkeeper summons?
CNo Justice Department referral in effect?
II.B.2.b.
CIs the declaration complete and accurate?
CAre the factual allegations of the petition supported by
the declaration?
CHave you reviewed the declaration with the agent?
When responding to a petition to quash . . .
II.B.4.
CWas petition to quash timely filed?
CWas notice properly given?
Cto designated IRS office; and
Cto summonee
CWas it filed in the district where the summoned party
“resides or is found?”
CWas service on the United States proper?
CShould the Government move to compel compliance?
Exhibit 2, Page 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
_________ DISTRICT OF_________
____________ DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No.
______________________
____________________________
Respondent.
PETITION TO ENFORCE IRS SUMMONS
The United States of America petitions this Court for an order enforcing the
IRS administrative summons served on the respondent, __________________. In
support, the United States avers as follows:
1. Jurisdiction over this matter is conferred upon this Court by 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402
and 7604(a) and by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340 and 1345.
2. The summoned person [persons] resides or may be found within the boundaries
of this district.
3. ___________is a Revenue Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special Agent of the Internal
Revenue Service, employed in the __________________ Division of the IRS in
_____________.
4. Revenue Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special Agent ________ is conducting an
examination/investigation for the purpose of [determining the correct federal
__________tax liabilities of __________for the periods ________________________]
Exhibit 2, Page 2
[collecting the assessed, unpaid federal _______ tax liabilities of ____ for the
periods ___________________] [determining whether respondents committed any
offense connected with the administration or enforcement of the internal
revenue law].
5. In his capacity as an IRS Revenue Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special Agent
______________ is authorized to issue IRS summonses pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §
7602, 26 C.F.R. § 301.7602-1, 26 C.F.R. § 301.7602-1T, and Internal Revenue
Service Delegation Order No. 4 (as revised).
6. Pursuant to the above-described investigation, on __________, Revenue Agent/
Revenue Officer/ Special Agent __________ issued an IRS administrative
summons to _________________ directing ___________ to appear before Revenue
Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special Agent _________ on ______________ at
___ a.m./p.m., at the place identified in the summons. The summons directed
___________ to appear and to give testimony and produce for examination
certain books, papers, records, or other data as described in the summons.
7. Revenue Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special Agent _____________ served an
attested copy of the summons [by delivering in hand to ___________] [by leaving
it at the last and usual place of abode of the person to whom it was directed] [by
delivering in hand to _______, an officer of __________________ ] [by certified
mail].
8. The respondent failed to appear on _______________, and, to date, has failed to
comply with the summons.
Exhibit 2, Page 3
9. [Except for the documents indicated in Revenue Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special
Agent ________’s declaration] [T]he testimony and documents described in the
summons are not already in the possession of the IRS. [The United States does
not seek enforcement of the summons with respect to those documents already
within the IRS’s possession.]
10. All administrative steps required by the Internal Revenue Code for the issuance
of the IRS summons have been followed.
11. The testimony, books, records, papers, and/or other data sought by the
summons may be relevant to the IRS’s investigation.
12. No Justice Department referral is in effect within the meaning of 26 U.S.C.
§ 7602(d)(2) with respect to _______ for the years under investigation.
13. In order to obtain enforcement of a summons, the United States must establish
that the summons: (1) is issued for a legitimate purpose; (2) seeks information
relevant to that purpose; (3) seeks information that is not already within the
IRS’s possession; and (4) satisfies all administrative steps required by the
Internal Revenue Code. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
14. The attached Declaration of Revenue Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special Agent
________ establishes the government’s prima facie showing under Powell.
WHEREFORE, the United States respectfully prays as follows:
A. That this Court enter an order directing the respondent to show cause in
writing, if any, why he/she/it should not comply with and obey the aforementioned
IRS summons and every requirement thereof;
Exhibit 2, Page 4
B. That this Court enter an order directing the respondent to fully obey the
subject summons and each requirement thereof, by ordering the attendance,
testimony, and production required and called for by the terms of the summons,
before Revenue Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special Agent ________, or any other proper
officer or employee of the IRS, at such time and place as may be set by Revenue
Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special Agent or any other proper officer or employee of the
IRS;
C. That the United States recover its costs incurred in maintaining this
proceeding; and
D. That the Court grant such other and further relief as the Court deems
proper or justice may require.
Exhibit 3, Page 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
____________ DISTRICT OF _______
_____________ DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. ______________________
___________________,
Respondent.
DECLARATION OF REVENUE AGENT/ REVENUE OFFICER/
SPECIAL AGENT _______________
I, _______________ declare:
1. I am a duly commissioned Revenue Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special Agent
employed in the ________________________ of the Internal Revenue
Service [with a post of duty at _____________]. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
§ 7602, 26 C.F.R. § 301.7602-1, and Internal Revenue Service Delegation
Order No. 4 (as revised), I am authorized to issue administrative
summonses.
2. [_____________________is not my real name. It is a pseudonym I use in
my official capacity as an employee of the IRS. This pseudonym—used for
privacy and safety reasons—has been registered with the IRS, in
accordance with IRS procedures (Internal Revenue Manual 1.2.4), and all
IRS procedures governing the use of pseudonyms have been followed.]
Exhibit 3, Page 2
3. [Except where noted to the contrary, I have personal knowledge of the
matters set forth in this Declaration, and, if called upon to testify to such
matters, could do so competently.]
4. In my capacity as a Revenue Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special Agent, I am
conducting an examination/investigation for the purpose of [determining
the correct federal __________tax liabilities of __________for the periods
________________________] [collecting the assessed, unpaid federal
_______ tax liabilities of ____ for the periods ___________________]
[determining whether respondents committed any offense connected with
the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue law].
5. Describe nexus between examination/investigation and the summoned
records.
6. On ____________________in furtherance of my investigation, I issued an
IRS administrative summons to ______________. The summons directed
____ to appear at __ a.m/p.m. on_________, to give testimony and
produce for examination certain books, papers, records, or other data as
described in the summons. A copy of the summons is attached as Exhibit
A.
7. In accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 7603, [I served] [At my direction
_____________ served] an attested copy of the summons directed to
________________[by delivering in hand to ___________] [by leaving it at
Exhibit 3, Page 3
the last and usual place of abode of the person to whom it was directed]
[by delivering in hand to _______, an officer of __________________ ] [by
certified mail]. A true and correct copy of the certificate of service is
included as a part of Exhibit A.
8. The respondent failed to appear at the appointed time and, to date, has
failed to comply with the summons.
9. [Attached to this declaration as Exhibit B is a list of the documents the
IRS has obtained and those which it still seeks. With the exception of the
specific documents indicated in Exhibit B as already received,] [T]he
books, records, papers and other data sought by the summons are not
already in the possession of the Internal Revenue Service.]
10. The testimony, books, records, papers, and/or other data sought by the
summons may be relevant to this investigation. Explain why.
11. No Justice Department referral, as defined by 26 U.S.C. § 7602(d)(2), is in
effect with respect to __________________________ for the years under
investigation.
Exhibit 3, Page 4
12. All administrative steps required by the Internal Revenue Code for
issuance of the summons have been followed.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this day of _________, ____.
Revenue Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special Agent
Internal Revenue Service
Exhibit 4, Page 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
_______ DISTRICT OF _____________
____________DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. ______________________
,
Respondent/s.
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Upon the petition of the United States and the Declaration of Revenue Agent
_____________, including the exhibits attached thereto, it is hereby
ORDERED that the respondent/s, ____________________appear before the
Honorable ________________, in that Judge's courtroom in the United States
Courthouse, _____________________________on the _______ day of _______________,
____, at _______ __.m., to show cause why ______________ should not be compelled to
obey the Internal Revenue Service summonses served upon __________.
It is further ORDERED that:
1. A copy of this Order, together with the petition and its exhibits, shall be
served in accordance with Rule 4(e) [(h)] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure upon
the respondent/s within [21] days of the date that this Order is served upon counsel
Exhibit 4, Page 2
for the United States or as soon thereafter as possible. Pursuant to Rule 4.1(a), the
Court hereby appoints Revenue Agent/ Revenue Officer/ Special Agent ___________,
or any other person designated by the IRS to effect service in this case.
2. Proof of any service done pursuant to paragraph 1, above, shall be filed
with the Clerk as soon as practicable.
3. Because the file in this case reflects a prima facie showing that the
investigation is being conducted for a legitimate purpose, that the inquiries may be
relevant to that purpose, that the information sought is not already within the
Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps required by the
Internal Revenue Code have been substantially followed, the burden of coming
forward has shifted to the respondents to oppose enforcement of the summonses.
4. If the respondent/s has/have any defense to present or opposition to the
petition, such defense or opposition shall be made in writing and filed with the Clerk
and copies served on counsel for the United States, at least [14] days prior to the
date set for the show cause hearing. The United States may file a reply
memorandum to any opposition at least 5 days prior to the date set for the show
cause hearing.
5. At the show cause hearing, only those issues brought into controversy by
the responsive pleadings and factual allegations supported by affidavit will be
considered. Any uncontested allegation in the petition will be considered admitted.
6. Respondents may notify the Court, in a writing filed with the Clerk and
served on counsel for the United States at the address(es) on the petition, at least
Exhibit 4, Page 3
[14] days prior to the date set for the show cause hearing, that the respondents have
no objection to enforcement of the summonses. The respondents’ appearance at the
hearing will then be excused.
The respondents are hereby notified that a failure to comply with this Order
may subject them to sanctions for contempt of court.
DONE and ORDERED at _______, _____________this ______ day of
______________________, _____.
___________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Exhibit 5, Page 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
_________ DISTRICT OF_________
____________ DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. ______________________
____________________________
Respondent.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies under penalty of perjury that he or she is an
employee of the Internal Revenue Service, is not a party to this action, and is a
person of such age and discretion as to be competent to serve papers.
On _____ day of ______________, _______, I served a copy of the below-listed
papers upon _______________________, by
(check and complete one)
____ Hand-delivering a copy to _______, at _________________________
____________________________________________________________
_____ Leaving a copy of each pleading at the respondent's dwelling house or
usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein.
Name of person with whom the summons and complaint were left:
.
Exhibit 5, Page 2
Papers served:
1) Order to Show Cause Re: Enforcement of Internal Revenue Summonses;
2) United States' Petition to Enforce an Internal Revenue Service
Summonses;
3) Declaration of Revenue Agent ____.
I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed: __________________ ________________________________
Date Signature
Exhibit 6, Page 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
___________ DISTRICT OF ___________
____________ DIVISION
______________________, )
)
Petitioner__, )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. ___________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent. )
MOTION TO DISMISS
The respondent, the United States of America, by its attorney,
__________________, and pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure moves the Court for the entry of an Order dismissing the above-
titled action on the grounds that the commencement and maintenance of the
action is barred by the sovereign immunity of the United States; that the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding; and that it
fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
A memorandum in support of this motion is filed and served concurrently
herewith.
Exhibit 7, Page 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
___________ DISTRICT OF __________
____________ DIVISION
___________________________, )
)
Petitioner__, )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.___________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION TO QUASH
The above-titled action has been brought by ______________ seeking to quash
______ Internal Revenue Service summons__ issued to "______________."
The respondent, United States of America, has moved to dismiss the petition on
the grounds that the action is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, that the
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding, and that it fails to state a claim
for which relief may be granted.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a petition to quash [a]
summons__ issued to [a] person__ who [is/are] not [a] third-party.
2 . [Formulate questions appropriate to the case.]
INTRODUCTION
Exhibit 7, Page 2
Sections 7602 through 7609 of the Internal Revenue Code govern the procedure
applicable to issuance, compliance, enforcement, and challenges of summonses.
Section 7602 is a broad grant of authority that applies to all summonses issued as
part of an investigation of tax liability. See United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714
(1980); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984). Section 7609
is a detailed description of the procedures which apply to, and rights created by,
issuance of a special category of summonses – third-party summonses. One entitled
to receive notice of a third-party summons may bring a proceeding to quash the
summons.
The “proceeding to quash” procedure, first enacted in 1982 as part of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA), was intended to provide some
assurance that taxpayer interference with legitimate law enforcement efforts would
be based on proper grounds and not merely interposed on frivolous grounds resulting
in fruitless delays, as had frequently been the case before the passage of TEFRA.
See S. Rep. No. 97-494, vol. 1, at 282, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1027;
Godwin v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 1209, 1211-1212 (D. Del. 1983).
ARGUMENT
I
THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT WAIVED ITS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Section 7609(b)(2), which allows a proceeding to quash an Internal Revenue
Service summons to be brought against the United States constitutes a waiver of
sovereign immunity. See Stringer v. United States, 776 F. 2d 274, 275 (11th Cir.
Exhibit 7, Page 3
1985). Like all such waivers, the one contained in Section 7609 must be strictly
construed. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981); Soriano v.
United States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957). “Men must turn square corners when they deal
with the Government. If it attaches even purely formal conditions to its consent to
be sued those conditions must be complied with.” Rock Island A. & L.R. Co. v.
United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920). These statutes are jurisdictional and limit
the power of the federal courts to adjudicate claims against the United States.
F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in
nature.”).
Because Section 7609(b) is not applicable here [has not been complied with],
and no other statute waives sovereign immunity for the instant suit, this Court lacks
jurisdiction and the action should be dismissed. [Insert discussion of 7609
requirements, as appropriate.]
Petition Not Timely
One of the conditions of the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity is that
a petition to quash must be commenced within 20 days of the date notice of the
summons is given. Section 7609(b)(2)(A). Where, as here, the action was not
commenced against the United States as prescribed by statute, the Court must
dismiss the petition. Berman v. United States, 264 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2001)
(motion to quash must be filed within 20 days of mailing notice); accord Faber v.
United States, 921 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1990); Stringer v. United States, 776 F.2d
274 (11th Cir. 1985); Ponsford v. United States, 771 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1985).
Exhibit 7, Page 4
Section 7609(b)(2)(A) provides, in part, “any person who is entitled to notice of a
summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to begin a proceeding to quash
such summons not later than the 20th day after the day such notice is given in the
manner provided in subsection (a)(2).” Subsection (a)(2) of Section 7609 provides,
“notice shall be sufficient if . . . such notice . . . is mailed by certified or registered
mail to the last known address of such person. . . .” Thus, the date that notice of the
summons was mailed begins the running of the 20-day period. Shipley v. United
States, 74 A.F.T.R.2d 94-7713 (E.D. Cal. 1994); Brohman v. United States,
587 F. Supp. 62 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); Riggs v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Grisham v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bilodeau v.
United States, 577 F. Supp. 234 (D.N.H. 1983).
The certificates of service and of notice on the summons__ demonstrate that
proper notice was given on _______________, in the manner as required by 26 U.S.C.
Section 7609(a). This petition to quash was filed on ______________________, 200__,
more than 20 days after notice was given. Accordingly, since the United States has
not consented to be sued except as to suits filed “not later than the 20th day after
such notice is given,” sovereign immunity has not been waived and the petition
should be dismissed.
Summons Out of District.
Section 7609(h)(1) provides that the district court in which the summoned
person “resides or is found” shall have jurisdiction to entertain an otherwise proper
petition to quash. This provision is a jurisdictional requirement rather than a
Exhibit 7, Page 5
matter of venue. Deal v. United States, 759 F.2d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 1985); Fortney v.
United States, 59 F.3d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit stated that
jurisdiction is “vested in the district where the summons is to be answered” rather
than “by the location of the taxpayer.” Masat v. United States, 745 F.2d 985, 988
(5th Cir. 1984). See also, Beck v. United States, 2003 WL 1194253, 91 A.F.T.R.2d
2003-1345 (6th Cir. 2003); Oldham v. United States, 89 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2095, 2097
(D. Or. 2002) (the statute requires “something more than the Due Process analysis of
minimum contacts” and requires “a physical presence within the forum”).
In this case, the summoned person, _______, neither resides nor is found in
this judicial district. [Insert appropriate facts.] Accordingly, the petition must be
dismissed.
Section 7609 does not apply to the type of summons at issue in this case.
Section 7609(c) defines the types of summonses that can be challenged under
7609(b)(2) and expressly excepts certain summonses. Section 7609(b)(2) does not
apply to any summons
[“served on the person with respect to whom the summons is issued.” §
7609(c)(2)(A).]
[issued in aid of collection. § 7609(c)(2)(D)]
[“issued by a criminal investigator of the Internal Revenue Service in
connection with the investigation of an offense connected with the administration or
enforcement of the internal revenue laws; and served on any person who is not a
third-party recordkeeper (as defined in section 7603((b)).” § 7609(c)(2)(E). Section
Exhibit 7, Page 6
7603(b)(2) provides that the following ten categories of persons are "third-party
recordkeepers": (A) banks; (B) consumer reporting agencies; (C) persons extending
credit through credit cards or other similar devices; (D) brokers; (E) attorneys;
(F) accountants; (G) any barter exchange; (H) regulated investment companies and
their agents; (I) enrolled agents; and (J) owner or developer of a computer software
source code (as defined in section 7612(d)(2)).]
Failure to Comply with the Requirements of Section 7609(b)(2)(b).
Petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of Section 7609(b)(2)(B) to
send a copy of the petition by registered or certified mail to both the summoned
person and the issuing agent within 20 days after the IRS gave notice. Dorsey v.
United States, 618 F. Supp. 471 (D. Md. 1985); Yocum v. United States, 586 F. Supp.
317 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (failure to give notice to Internal Revenue Service); Fogelson v.
United States, 579 F. Supp. 573 (D. Kan. 1983) (oral notice to summoned party
inadequate); McTaggart v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 547, 551 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
(failure to give notice to summoned party).
I I
THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACTS DO NOT
APPLY TO IRS SUMMONSES
The government need not comply with either the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a,
et seq., or the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, et seq., as a prerequisite to
issuing or enforcing a summons. United States v. McAnlis, 721 F. 2d 334, 337
(11th Cir. 1983); Uhrig v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 349, 353 (D. Md. 1984);
Exhibit 7, Page 7
McTaggert v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 547, 550 (E.D. Mich. 1983);
United States v. Wills, 475 F. Supp. 492, 494 (M.D. Fla. 1979). Neither act contains
any provision which allows either the quashing or the denial of enforcement of an
Internal Revenue Service summons as a remedy for any alleged failure to provide
information or to maintain secrecy as required by those acts. Indeed, it would be
inconsistent with the intent of Congress, which urges the speedy enforcement of
summonses, if the Court were to allow such a challenge to the summons[es] to be
maintained.
III
IMPROPER SERVICE
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i) provides that service upon the United States shall be
effected by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the United States
Attorney for the district in which the action is brought and by sending a copy of the
summons and complaint to the Attorney General of the United States at
Washington, D.C. In this case, [state the facts in your case]. Accordingly, unless the
petitioners show a justifiable excuse for their failure to serve properly, the petition
should be dismissed for insufficiency of service of process. See Hart v. United
States, 817 F.2d 78, 80 (9th Cir. 1987).
Additionally, the petition should be dismissed based on Petitioners’ failure to
obtain issuance of a summons. As with a complaint, a petition to quash an IRS
summons requires the issuance of a summons under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. See Kish v.
United States, 77 A.F.T.R.2d 96-1305, 1996 WL 196730, *1 (W.D.Mich. 1996); see
Exhibit 7, Page 8
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b) and (c) (summons shall be issued for each defendant to be
served and must be served together with a copy of the complaint). In this case, [state
the facts in your case]. For this reason, the petition should be dismissed under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4).
Petitioners may argue that they are entitled to a reasonable time to cure the
defective service in this case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(3). That rule is inapplicable,
however. Rule 4(i)(3) applies only when the plaintiff must serve federal officers in
addition to the U.S. Attorney and the Attorney General. Tuke v. United States, 76
F.3d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1996). Even if the rule was applicable to this case, it entitles
a plaintiff time to cure defective service only “if the plaintiff has served either the
United States attorney or the Attorney General of the United States.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(i)(3)(A). In this case, [state the facts in your case] . Therefore, Petitioners’ case
must be dismissed.
I V
PETITIONER FAILS TO STATE
A CLAIM FOR WHICH RELIEF CAN
BE GRANTED
The petitioner fails to set forth any allegations which would constitute a
legally sufficient challenge or defense to the enforcement of the IRS summons.
[Identify and deal with objections raised in petition].
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the proceeding should be dismissed.
Exhibit 8, Page 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF
DIVISION
)
)
Petitioner__, )
)
v. ) CIVIL NO. _____________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. )
)
Respondent__. )
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This matter having been submitted to the Court on the motion of the United
States to dismiss the above-titled action to quash summons, the Court having
considered the matter on the papers pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and for good cause shown, it is this ______ day of _____________,
200__, hereby
ORDERED that the above-titled proceeding is dismissed [for the reason--].
DONE and ORDERED at _______, ________, this _____ day of
_________________, 200__.
___________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Exhibit 9, Page 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
_____________ DISTRICT OF____________
_____________ DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE TAX
LIABILITIES OF:
JOHN DOES, United States taxpayers who,
during [ tax period and identify group]
EX PARTE PETITION FOR LEAVE
TO SERVE “JOHN DOE” SUMMONS
The United States of America avers as follows:
1. This ex parte proceeding is commenced pursuant to Sections 7402(a), 7609(f),
and 7609(h) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.), for leave to serve an
Internal Revenue Service “John Doe” summons upon
________________________.
2. __________________ is found at ______________________ within the jurisdiction
of this Court.
3. As explained in the Declaration of Revenue Agent ______________ attached as
Exhibit A, the Internal Revenue Service is conducting an investigation to
determine the correct federal __________ tax liabilities, for [periods] of United
States taxpayers who [describe group].
4. In furtherance of this investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, [has issued]
[once service of the summons is authorized by the Court, will issue] under the
authority of Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, an administrative
Exhibit 9, Page 2
“John Doe” summons to_______________. A copy of the summons is attached
to the Exhibits Appendix to Declaration of Revenue Agent_________ at Tab 1.
5. The “John Doe” summons relates to the investigation of an ascertainable
group or class of persons, that is, United States taxpayers who, [describe
group]. There is a reasonable basis for believing that such group or class of
persons may fail, or may have failed, to comply with one or more provisions of
the Internal Revenue laws. The information sought to be obtained from the
examination of the records or testimony (and the identity of the persons with
respect to whose tax liabilities the summonses have been issued) is not readily
available from other sources.
6. In support of this Petition, the United States submits a Declaration of
Revenue Agent _____________________ attached as Exhibit A; the Exhibits
Appendix to the Declaration of Revenue Agent_________; and a Memorandum.
WHEREFORE, the United States respectfully requests:
A. That this Court enter an order permitting service of an Internal
Revenue Service “John Doe” summons to ____________________ in substantially the
form as attached to the Exhibits Appendix to the Declaration of Revenue Agent
_________at Tab 1; and
B. That this Court grant such other and further relief as the Court deems
proper or justice may require.
Exhibit 10, page 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
_____________ DISTRICT OF____________
_____________ DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE TAX
LIABILITIES OF:
JOHN DOES, United States taxpayers who,
during [ tax period and identify group]
DECLARATION OF _____________________
I, _____________ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1746, declare and state:
# I am a Revenue Agent/Officer __________________with the
_________________Division of the Internal Revenue Service. I have been a Revenue
Agent/Officer for __ years. [Describe specific relevant training and experience]
# The Internal Revenue Service is conducting an investigation to
determine the correct federal tax liabilities, for [periods] of United States
taxpayers who [identify group]
# To facilitate this investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, [has
issued] [once authorized by the court, will issue] under the authority of Section
7602 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.), a “John Doe” summons to
_____________________ and its affiliates and subsidiaries. A copy of this summons
is attached to the Exhibits Appendix, submitted contemporaneously with this
Declaration, at Tab 1.
Exhibit 10, page 2
# [ Describe the summoned party and records sought. ] The records
sought by the summons will reveal the identities of and/or disclose transactions by
persons who may be liable for federal taxes and will enable the Internal Revenue
Service to investigate whether those persons have complied with the internal
revenue laws.
# Based on information received by the Internal Revenue Service, it is
likely that a significant number of the persons who have
[ Detail the basis for the belief that the “John Doe” class has failed, or may
have failed, to comply with the internal revenue laws. ]
[ Detail the history of the IRS’s investigation of the class and how the
information summoned may assist in that investigation.]
# The summons to _________________ seeks to identify persons in the
‘John Doe’ class not yet identified. [Give details]
# Based upon the foregoing, I have concluded the “John Doe” summons
relates to the investigation of an ascertainable group or class of persons; there is a
reasonable basis for believing that such group or class of persons may fail, or may
have failed, to comply with one or more provisions of the Internal Revenue laws;
and the information sought to be obtained from the examination of the records or
testimony (and the identity of the persons with respect to whose tax liabilities the
summonses have been issued) is not readily available from other sources.
I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1746, that
the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this _______ day of __________
Exhibit 10, page 3
______________________
Revenue Agent/Officer
Internal Revenue Service
Exhibit 11, page 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
_____________ DISTRICT OF____________
_____________ DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE TAX
LIABILITIES OF:
JOHN DOES, United States taxpayers who,
during [ tax period and identify group]
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
EX PARTE PETITION FOR LEAVE
TO SERVE “JOHN DOE” SUMMONS
The United States of America respectfully submits the following
Memorandum in support of its EX PARTE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE JOHN DOE
SUMMONS:
INTRODUC TION
This is an ex parte proceeding brought by the United States of America,
pursuant to Sections 7609(f) and (h) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.), for
leave to serve an Internal Revenue Service “John Doe” summons upon
_____________. Section 7609(f) provides that a summons which does not identify
the person with respect to whose liability it is issued may be served only after a
court proceeding in which the United States establishes certain factors. These
types of summonses are known as “John Doe” summonses. Section 7609(h)(1)
provides that a district court in which the person to be summoned resides or is
found shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any proceeding brought under
Section 7609(f). Section 7609(h)(2) provides that any determinations required to be
The term “United States taxpayer” refers to all persons subject to tax in the
15
United States. All United States citizens and resident aliens are liable for federal
income taxes on income received from sources within or without the United States;
nonresident aliens are only liable for taxes on income from sources within the
United States. Pursuant to Section 7701(b)(1), an alien may be treated as a resident
for the purposes of income taxation if he (1) is a lawful permanent resident of the
United States, (2) meets the substantial presence test (this is an objective test in
which the number of days the alien is present in the United States are counted), or
(3) makes an election to be treated as a resident. See Lujan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo
2000-365, 2000 WL 1772503 (2000).
Exhibit 11, page 2
made under Section 7609(f) shall be made ex parte and shall be made solely on the
petition and supporting affidavits.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether, as required by Section 7609(f), the United States of America has
demonstrated (1) that the “John Doe” summons which the Internal Revenue
Service desires to serve upon _____________ relates to the investigation of an
ascertainable group or class of persons; (2) that there is a reasonable basis for
believing that such group or class of persons may fail or may have failed to comply
with any provision of any internal revenue law; and (3) that the information sought
to be obtained from the examination of the records or testimony (and the identities
of the persons with respect to whose liability the summons is issued) is not readily
available from other sources.
DISCUSSION
The Internal Revenue Service is conducting an investigation to determine
the correct federal income tax liabilities, for the years ended _____________, of
United States taxpayers who _____________
15
Exhibit 11, page 3
In furtherance of this investigation, the United States is requesting
authorization for the IRS to serve a “John Doe” summons on _____________.
I. The Summons for Which the Government Seeks Authorization Meets
the Requirements of a “John Doe” Summons
Section 7601 of the Internal Revenue Code requires the Secretary of the
Treasury to “cause officers or employees of the Treasury Department to proceed,
from time to time, through each internal revenue district and inquire after and
concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax.”
Section 7602 authorizes the Secretary to summon records and testimony for that
purpose. Specifically, Section 7602 authorizes the Secretary “[f]or the purpose of
ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been
made, [or] determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax . . .
[t]o summon . . . any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account
containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax . . ., or any
other person the Secretary may deem proper, to appear . . . and to produce such
books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as
may be relevant or material to such inquiry.”
Section 7602 is the Internal Revenue Service’s principal information-
gathering authority, and, accordingly, the courts have broadly construed it in light
of its intended purpose of furthering the effective conduct of tax investigations.
Thus, the courts have repeatedly rejected attempts to circumscribe or thwart the
effective exercise of the Internal Revenue Service’s summons power. See, e.g.,
Exhibit 11, page 4
United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 715-716 (1980); United States v. Bisceglia, 420
U.S. 141 (1975); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 338 (1973).
In Bisceglia, the Supreme Court held that Sections 7601 and 7602
empowered the Internal Revenue Service to issue a “John Doe” summons to a bank
to discover the identity of a person who had engaged in certain bank transactions.
This authority was subsequently codified in Section 7609(f) of the Internal
Revenue Code, as added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Section 7609(f) provides:
Any summons . . . which does not identify the person with
respect to whose liability the summons is issued may be served only
after a court proceeding in which the Secretary establishes that –
(1) the summons relates to the investigation of a
particular person or ascertainable group or class of
persons,
(2) there is a reasonable basis for believing that such
person or group or class of persons may fail or may have failed
to comply with any provision of any internal revenue law, and
(3) the information sought to be obtained from the
examination of the records or testimony (and the identity of the
person or persons with respect to whose liability the summons
is issued) is not readily available from other sources.
The “John Doe” summons for which the United States seeks authorization in the
instant case meets those three requirements.
A. The Investigation Is Related to an Ascertainable Class
As required by Section 7609(f)(1), the group or class of persons to be
investigated here is ascertainable – United States taxpayers _____________
[describe ascertainable group or class]. Where the identities of the taxpayers are
Exhibit 11, page 5
yet not known, no greater specificity can be expected in defining the group or class
of persons.
B. Reasonable Basis Exists for the Belief That the Unknown
Persons May Fail, or May Have Failed to Comply with the
Internal Revenue Laws
With respect to the second requirement, set forth in Section 7609(f)(2), the
Declaration of Revenue _____________ reflects a reasonable basis for believing that
the unknown persons whose identities are sought by the summonses may fail, or
may have failed, to comply with one or more provisions of the internal revenue
laws.
First, _____________ [describe transactions at issue] are inherently
reasonably suggestive of tax avoidance, given that tax avoidance is frequently the
purpose for _____________. In United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exchange, Inc.,
644 F.2d 302, 306 (3d Cir. 1981), the court held that the “reasonable basis” test had
been met based upon a revenue agent’s testimony that barter transactions of the
type arranged by the Pittsburgh Trade Exchange were “inherently susceptible to
tax error.” In United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 601 (6 Cir. 1994), the court
th
held that the mere payment for legal services with large amounts of cash is a
reasonable basis for the issuance of a “John Doe” summons. Likewise,
_____________ provides a reasonable basis for the issuance of the summons at
issue.
[add additional legal support such as law review articles, cases, statutes]
Second, the Declaration of Revenue Agent _____________ [add factual
support such as newspaper articles, webpages and information about litigation and
Exhibit 11, page 6
prosecutions involving similarly situated taxpayers]. See, e.g., United States v.
Brigham Young University, 679 F.2d 1345, 1349-50 (10 Cir. 1982), vacated for
th
consideration of mootness, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983) (prior audit experience with other
contributors that had overvalued “in kind” contributions was a reasonable basis for
issuing a “John Doe” summons for the identity of all “in kind” contributors to
Brigham Young University); United States v. Kersting, 891 F.2d 1407, 1409 (9 Cir.
th
1989) (“John Doe” summons enforced after district court found “the existence of at
least one case in which a Tax Court found some of Kersting’s programs to be
abusive of the tax code.”
C. The Identity of Persons in the Class Is Not Readily Available
from Other Sources
With respect to the third and final requirement set forth in Section
7609(f)(3), the information sought (and the identity of the persons with respect to
whose tax liabilities the summonses have been issued) is not readily available to
the Internal Revenue Service from other sources, but is available from
_____________.
Persons in the “John Doe” class may have filed tax returns with the Internal
Revenue Service, but their names are unknown, and an inspection of a particular
taxpayer’s return is not likely to reveal understatements or misstatements of
income resulting from _____________. Their names cannot be obtained from
_____________.
Accordingly, the requirements for service of the “John Doe” summons have
been satisfied in this proceeding.
Exhibit 11, page 7
II. Courts Have Approved Prior “John Doe” Summonses in this
Investigation
In _____________ similar proceedings, Courts have approved the issuance of
“John Doe” summonses pertaining to United States taxpayers who _____________.
[add description of similar John Doe summonses authorized by courts]
III. CONCLUSION
The summons for which the government seeks authorization meets the
requirements of a “John Doe” summons. Accordingly, the Court should enter an
order granting the Internal Revenue Service leave to serve a “John Doe” summons
upon _____________ in substantially the form as attached to the Exhibits Appendix
to the Declaration of Revenue Agent _____________ at Tab 1.
_____________________
Exhibit 12, Page 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
_________ DISTRICT OF __________
______________ DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE TAX
LIABILITIES OF:
JOHN DOES, United States taxpayers who,
during [ tax period and identify group]
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the United States of America’s EX
PARTE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE JOHN DOE SUMMONS. Based upon a review of
the PETITION and exhibits thereto, the Court has determined that the “John Doe”
summons to _____________________ and its affiliates and subsidiaries relates to the
investigation of an ascertainable group or class of persons, that there is a
reasonable basis for believing that such group or class of persons may fail or may
have failed to comply with any provision of any internal revenue law, and that the
information sought to be obtained from the examination of the records or testimony
(and the identities of the persons with respect to whose liability the summons is
issued) are not readily available from other sources. It is therefore –
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Internal Revenue Service, through
Revenue Agent ________________________ or any other authorized officer or agent,
may serve an Internal Revenue Service “John Doe” summons upon
________________ [and its affiliates and subsidiaries] in substantially the form as
attached to the Exhibits Appendix to the Declaration of Revenue Agent
Exhibit 12, Page 2
___________at Tab 1. A copy of this Order shall be served together with the
summons.
DONE AND ORDERED this ______ day of ___________________, _____.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
_____________________
Trial Attorney, Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice
____________________
United States Attorney
Exhibit 13, Page 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
_________ DISTRICT OF __________
______________ DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE TAX
LIABILITIES OF:
JOHN DOES, United States taxpayers who,
during [ tax period and identify group]
NOTICE OF FILING EX PARTE PETITION
FOR LEAVE TO SERVE “JOHN DOE” SUMMONS
The United States of America notifies the Court that it has commenced this
ex parte proceeding pursuant to Section 7609(f) of the Internal Revenue Code (26
U.S.C.), for leave to serve an Internal Revenue Service “John Doe” summons upon
_______________________. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7609(h), the determination to be
made by the Court “shall be made ex parte and shall be made solely on the petition
and supporting affidavits.” Thus, the pleadings filed in this proceeding will not be
served upon any person or entity and no other filings are permitted from other
persons or entities. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for the Court’s consideration.
The United States requests that the Court review the Petition and supporting
documents and enter the proposed Order at the Court’s earliest opportunity.
